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Abstract
This work proposes answers to methodological and substantive questions related to
convenience voting. The first analytical chapter surveys the various research designs
that have been proposed within this literature, and concludes that the field benefits
from using all in conjunction. The next chapter uses matching to identify the rela-
tionship between disability status and political participation, and considers whether
any forms of convenience voting mediate in the relationship. The final two analytical
chapters examine how online voter registration, one of the most recent policy inno-
vations, affects participation and vote share in American elections. The concluding
chapter summarizes the findings presented herein, and briefly discusses the natural






2 Modeling Convenience 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Binary Response Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.1 Within-State Natural Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.2 Nonparametric Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Extended Response to Glynn and Quinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.1 Reconsidering Glynn and Quinn (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7 Supplementary Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 The Impact of Disability on Political Participation 29
3.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Higher Hurdles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Matching to Achieve Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
viii
3.5 Convenience Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 Data and Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7.1 The Necessity of Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7.2 Interactive Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.9 Supplementary Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 In Line or Online? American Voter Registration in the Digital Era 63
4.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Convenience Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Registration in the Digital Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 The Voting Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.6 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.7 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.8 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.8.1 Primary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.8.2 Spotlighting Under-represented Subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.8.3 Aggregate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.10 Supplementary Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5 Who Votes, and How? 106
5.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3 Online Registration: A Bipartisan Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.4 Predicting Turnout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5 Predicting Partisanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5.2 Introducing CART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
ix
5.5.3 The Value of Random Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5.4 Data and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129





2.1 Bias in ATC Estimates Induced by Coding Error . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 ATC Estimates from Alternative Cross Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 ATC Estimates for Cross-Sectional and Panel Data . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.A1 Glynn and Quinn Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.A2 2004 Cross Section (Adjusted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.A3 2000 Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.A4 2008 Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.A5 2012 Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.A6 Panel Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Effect of Disability on Participation by Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Discrete Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.A1 Balance Statistics, Before and After Matching (2008) . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.A2 Balance Statistics, Before and After Matching (2012) . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.A3 Participation Rates by Subgroup (Unweighted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.A4 Effect of Disability on Registration by Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.A5 Effect of Disability on Turnout by Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.A6 Participation Models, with Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1 Average Effect on Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Average Effect on Political Participation (Probit, Treatment by Wave) 81
4.3 Average Effect of Online Registration on Political Participation (Sub-
samples) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Estimated Influx of Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
xi
4.A1 Demographic Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.A2 Access to Convenience Voting by State and Year . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.A3 Convenience Voting by State and Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.A4 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Binary Treatment) . . . . . . 95
4.A5 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Treatment by Wave) . . . . . 96
4.A6 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Young Voters) . . . . . . . . 97
4.A7 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Minority Voters) . . . . . . . 98
4.A8 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Recent Movers) . . . . . . . 99
4.A9 Estimated Influx of Voters, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.A10 Estimated Influx of Voters, 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.A11 Effects on Political Participation (Logit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.A12 Effects on Political Participation (Scobit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.A13 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Alternate Coding of Non-
Response to Participation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.A14 Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Omitting Non-Respondents to
Participation Questions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1 Legislative History of Online Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2 Accuracy of the Turnout Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3 Conditional Multinomial Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.4 Contrasting Simulated and Official Obama VS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.5 Average Obama Vote Share Without and With Online Registration . . 137
xii
List of Figures
3.1 Density of Age Distribution by Disability Status and Dataset (2012) . 39
3.2 Effect of Disability on Participation by Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Interactive Effects on Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.A1 Density of Age Distribution by Disability Status and Dataset (2008) . 56
4.1 The Relationship Between Participation and Election Policies . . . . . 79
4.A1 Confidence Intervals for Discrete Differences, Registration . . . . . . . 90
4.A2 Confidence Intervals for Discrete Differences, Turnout . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1 Classification Accuracy by (Estimated) Propensity Score . . . . . . . . 117
5.2 Simulated and Actual Vote Shares in the 2012 Presidential Elections . 126




Participation rates in American elections have remained nearly constant over the
past several decades, and turnout in the United States perennially lags behind that
of other contemporary democracies (Hanmer 2007, 2009). In response, the academic
community has dedicated considerable attention to the “turnout puzzle”: This lack
of participation has persisted despite numerous efforts to make the voting process
more convenient (first expressed in Brody 1978; see also Leighley and Nagler 1992).
Yet according to the “rational voter” theory (formalized in Downs 1957; expanded in
Riker and Ordeshook 1968), a reduction in cost should yield an increased propensity
to cast a ballot.
The convenience voting literature, pioneered by Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978),
attempts to characterize how the voting-eligible respond to election policies, and how
these liberalizations affect the representativeness of the electorate. Yet despite the
vast amount of scholarship in this area, there are still important methodological and
substantive questions that the peer-reviewed literature has neglected.
The second chapter of this manuscript is a methodological inquiry into the appro-
priate modeling strategy for this stream of research. Although the majority of schol-
arship emulates the Rosenstone-Wolfinger design (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006),
a few detractors have criticized Rosenstone and Wolfinger’s model as untenable and
offered various alternatives (Glynn and Quinn 2011; Keele and Minozzi 2013). More
specifically, these detractors highlight the tenuousness of the exogenous selection as-
sumption embedded within the binary response model that Rosenstone and Wolfinger
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(and their successors) employ. A few projects propose non-parametric bounds as a
complement to (Hanmer 2007, 2009) or outright substitute for (Glynn and Quinn
2011) parametric point identification, while others rely on natural experiments for
inference (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Neiheisel and Burden 2012; Keele and
Minozzi 2013). After reviewing these papers, I respond to the prominent critique
of Glynn and Quinn (2011), and I offer evidence that the parametric estimates they
obtain in their paper serve as little more than a straw man. I argue that the bound-
ing method serves as a useful “sanity check,” as argued in Hanmer (2007, 2009), but
that the current body of literature has yet to dismantle the more traditional point
estimation using observational data.
I subsequently employ this research design to examine a specific set of questions
regarding how individuals are responding to election policy: How are individuals with
disabilities responding to convenience voting procedures (Chapter 3)? How is online
voter registration, one of the most recent innovations in electoral policy impacting
individual and aggregate participation (Chapter 4)? Does online registration shift
vote share for either one of the major parties (Chapter 5)? Below, I detail more
thoroughly the purpose and scope of each chapter.
The third chapter considers a demographic subpopulation that has been under-
represented at the polls and in the literature: individuals with disabilities, who com-
prise one of the most sizeable political minorities and participate at systematically
low rates (Schur and Adya 2013). One paper calls mobilization of this group “the
last suffrage movement” (Schriner, Ochs, and Shields 1997). Another notes the irony
that disability rights advocates were influential in shaping recent legislation, but the
literature has overlooked how the changing electoral landscape has affected this de-
mographic group (Stewart 2011). Among the small collection of papers, there is
considerable disagreement about the relationship between disability and turnout; the
reduction in turnout associated with disability status has been estimated to be as
high as 21% and as low as 4% (Schur, Shields, and Shriner 2005; Schur and Kruse
2011). My study is the first in this area to utilize matching to reduce the role of
potential confounders, such as age; I then estimate that disability status reduces the
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propensity to be registered by 3 to 5 percentage points, and the propensity to vote
by 6 to 8 percentage points. Incorporating interactive effects, I discover that most of
this relationship can be explained by employment status, supporting earlier findings
by Schur and Kruse (2000) and Schur et al. (2002). And finally, although individuals
with disabilities may take advantage of convenience voting procedures, these poli-
cies do not improve the representativeness of this demographic group in the overall
electorate.
While the third chapter focuses on a particular demographic group but a broad
array of policy, the fourth chapter spotlights how a particular policy affects vari-
ous demographic groups. More explicitly, I consider how online voter registration,
one of the newest forms of convenience voting, fits into the participation puzzle; the
peer-reviewed literature is completely silent about its efficacy, although a few pa-
pers published elsewhere offer some insight. This omission is a glaring one, given
the increasing popularity of online registration. In the fourth chapter, I estimate an
individual-level model of participation (registration, turnout) as a function of demo-
graphics, state-level electoral characteristics (competitiveness and policy), and online
registration. I find that this new registration alternative does stimulate participa-
tion at both stages of participation, though the magnitude of the impact is minimal.
Moreover, the effect is statistically significant for the youngest age bracket of the vot-
ing eligible, as well as recent movers; the impact on ethnic minorities, meanwhile, is
not statistically distinguishable from zero. In other words, online registration might
render the electorate more representative in terms of age and residential mobility,
but not race. Finally, the estimated influx of voters exceeded the margin of victory
in the 2008 and 2012 Presidential contests for a handful of states. Unfortunately,
because the Current Population Survey dataset that I (and most of the papers in this
literature) use does not include information about political beliefs and preferences,
it is difficult to determine whether the outcome would have changed in any of these
states from this data alone.
Chapter 4 motivated the final analytical chapter in this manuscript, which con-
siders the implications for convenience voting on vote share among presidential can-
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didates. Nearly all of the papers in this literature have simply speculated how these
policies might shape the partisan composition of the electorate, as a results of the
data limitations of the CPS mentioned in the previous paragraph. I introduce a new
method to recover these missing data, drawing on insight from the machine learn-
ing literature and incorporating another large nationally-representative dataset (the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study). For every state, I use a Random For-
est approach (introduced in Breiman 2001) to discover the relationship between the
most-preferred presidential candidate and demographic profile. Random Forest is an
ensemble method that is computationally efficient, robust to overfitting, and as ac-
curate as other prominent machine learning techniques (Breiman and Cutler n.d.). I
use this fitted model to estimate the vote share in each state, with and without online
registration. I conclude from the current data that online registration will not have
significant bearing on electoral outcomes. My method is readily applicable to other
forms of convenience voting. More generally, because I offer a blueprint for merging
information across surveys, the procedure broadens the set of hypotheses that can be





The convenience voting literature dates back several decades, but the current body
of work remains ambivalent about the extent that convenience voting impacts the
electorate, as well as the appropriate research design for this line of inquiry. The ma-
jority of the papers in this area adopt the binary response model used in Rosenstone
and Wolfinger (1978), but recent papers have criticized the underlying assumptions as
untenable. Given that the next several chapters of my thesis discuss how individuals
respond to election policy, I preface them with this brief methodological overview of
the literature. I introduce the binary response model in Rosenstone and Wolfinger,
as well as a few prominent alternatives.
Although the critics of the binary response model articulate their discomfort about
the identifying assumptions elegantly, most of the empirical results suggest that the
model is less sensitive if the researcher includes variables that capture state-level het-
erogeneity. In particular, by pooling cross sections, incorporating fixed effects, and
ensuring that pre-treatment data is included for the covariate of interest, much of the
selection bias is mitigated. I first discuss the binary response model, and establish the
criticisms levied against it. I then discuss the most noteworthy alternatives, natural
experiments (which use a within-state design) and nonparametric bounds (which re-
lax most assumptions). In the penultimate section, I replicate the analysis of Glynn
and Quinn (2011), and contend that their parametric results function as a “straw
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man” arising from poor specification, rather than a genuine example of improper
inference. I conclude that the Rosenstone-Wolfinger approach remains a viable esti-
mation strategy, though I endorse a broader array of approaches as a valuable insight
into the nuances of implementation.
2.2 Binary Response Model
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 dismantled several election practices that were widely
considered to be unduly prohibitive (such as poll taxes and literacy tests). A reduction
in the costs associated with voter participation should be accompanied by an increase
in turnout (Downs 1957). In the wake of this effort to engage the voting-eligible
population, Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) published a seminal investigation of
how institutional features impact the turnout calculus and the composition of the
electorate; they developed this framework further in Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).
They concluded that certain institutional features significantly affect the probability
of turnout, including policies related to registration —for example, closing date and
office hours. And perhaps even more importantly, they established an initial statistical
framework for estimating the impact of electoral policy on behavior.
To draw inference about how individuals interact with their electoral environment,
we consider how different conditions alter an individual’s expected propensity to par-
ticipate. In data, however, this variable is unobserved, and we only observe a binary
outcome: participation or abstention. Rosenstone and Wolfinger therefore conceptu-
alized the propensity to participate as a latent variable, and they fit a variation of
the following binary response model to the observed data:
P(Yist = 1) = f(α +Xistβ + Zstρ+ δTstεist),
where Y is observed participation behavior, X is a vector of demographic controls,
Z is a vector of state-level controls, and T is a policy of interest.1 Rosenstone and
1Due to computational limitations, Rosenstone-Wolfinger used a series of bivariate regressions, but
their successors have employed a multivariate approach.
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Wolfinger specify a probit link, but there is some disagreement within this general
framework about the ideal functional representation. Many subsequent papers have
used probit (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Alvarez and Nagler 2007, 2008, 2011), while
others have used logit (Highton 1997; McDonald 2008). Notably, Nagler (1994) pro-
posed a scobit model, which generalizes the point of inflection a priori and allows the
program to discover the optimal location within the data.2
This framework has been used broadly in the convenience literature, as pointed
out in Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006). An incomplete list of papers that use
some variant of Rosenstone and Wolfinger’s model for the primary statistical analysis
includes Leighley and Nagler (1992), Nagler (1994), Mitchell and Wlezien (1995),
Highton and Wolfinger (1998), Brians and Grofman (2001), McDonald (2008), Alvarez
and Hall (2012), and Burden et al. (2014). This statistical approach is not without its
detractors, however. Below I discuss the manuscripts that highlight the weaknesses of
the binary response model, though their authors disagree about the severity of these
concerns.
2.3 Criticism
Several important pieces of scholarship highlight the problems associated with iden-
tification of the average treatment effect and other quantities of interest when using
observational data (Hanmer 2007, 2009; Glynn and Quinn 2011; Keele and Minozzi
2013). In particular, the researcher typically cannot assume that the treatment assign-
ment mechanism is orthogonal to the outcome distribution (“exogenous selection”),
which ensures balance among the observables and unobservables (at least in infinite
populations). Mathematically, we can represent this as Y ⊥ T , where Y = (Y 1, Y 0)
represents the distribution of potential outcomes and T represents the distribution
of the treatment.3 As a prerequisite, the researcher needs a randomized treatment
2A drawback of the scobit model is its lack of robustness to improper specification (Hanmer 2006).
3In almost all cases, researchers work with finite samples, so these desirable properties do not
necessarily hold, regardless. As the sample size increases, however, we approach asymptotic balance,
and the estimates of interest become asymptotically consistent.
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mechanism, which is often absent outside of laboratory and field experiments. To ac-
commodate this feature of observational data, researchers employ various techniques
based on pre- or post-treatment variables.
Most of the papers on convenience voting utilize the joint distributions of treat-
ment and pre-treatment variables —i.e., variables that may influence selection to
the treatment group but are not themselves affected by treatment status. The
Rosenstone-Wolfinger design falls into this category, as the researcher implicitly as-
sumes that by conditioning on other variables, one can isolate the independent effect
of the treatment on the propensity to vote. We can express this assumption as
E[Y |X,T = 1] = E[Y |X,T = 0]. Note that this condition is actually less strin-
gent than exogenous selection (Y |X ⊥ T |X), which requires that the distribution
of Y |X is independent from the distribution of T |X. The imposition is only on the
first moment of Y |X. Even so, this assumption —“conditional mean ignorability”
—is quite strong (Glynn and Quinn 2011).4 And importantly, “it cannot be verified
with observed data” (Keele and Minozzi 2013: p. 3; see also Manski 2007).
The binary response model used by Rosenstone and Wolfinger, and many of their
successors, also makes certain assumptions about the functional nature of the relation-
ship (Hanmer 2007; Keele and Minozzi 2013). As discussed in the previous section,
most of the papers have specified a logit, probit, or scobit link; this entails assuming
that the propensity to participate is some transformed function of a linear combina-
tion of the relevant covariates, estimated using maximum likelihood methods. The
linear combination of variables includes individual-level demographic characteristics
and state-level controls (sometimes including state or regional dummies). Rosenstone
and Wolfinger conducted and published their research several decades ago, and so were
limited by the computational efficiency of programming at the time. They could only
regress on one variable at a time, and they used cross-sectional data. Subsequent
work has adopted a multivariate approach, but despite the widespread availability of
CPS data, most of the literature has continued to rely on the same cross-sectional
4Keele and Minozzi (2013) term this assumption “selection on observables” and focus on the impor-
tance of correctly identifying the set of covariates that intervene in the relationship between the
outcome and treatment.
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approach (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006).
The cross-sectional resesarch design poses serious concerns for inference (Brians
and Grofman 2001; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Neiheisel and Burden 2012;
Leighley and Nagler 2014). Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006) point out that this
method is susceptible to omitted variable bias, given that the researcher cannot ad-
equately control for heterogeneity across states in terms of election institutions and
environment.5 These authors also mention an unnecessary reduction in the statistical
power of the model. Meanwhile, Leighley and Nagler (2014) explicitly frame their
critique of cross-sectional design in the context of selection; states that offer certain
liberalizations could already feature above-average turnout rates. Chapter 4 of their
book additionally discusses the importance of including quality pre-treatment data
on turnout for states that have altered their election policy.
To test or relax these assumption, the aforementioned papers have proposed nat-
ural experiments and nonparametric bounds.
2.4 Alternatives
2.4.1 Within-State Natural Experiments
When implementation permits, natural experiments can serve as an important insight
into policy’s influence. A few papers in the convenience literature utilize within-state
heterogeneity of electoral policy to tease out this relationship (Ansolabehere and
Konisky 2006; Neiheisel and Burden 2012; Keele and Minozzi 2013). Keele and Mi-
nozzi explain the intuition behind the natural experiment as an organic circumstance
in which treatment assignment imitates a random mechanism. This design bears
some similarity to matching, in which the researcher “pre-processes” data to improve
balance among observed covariates artificially (see Ho et al. 2007), although in this
case the observational data already possess this feature. Today, 49 states require
that all residents register for voting eligibility, but this was not always the case.6
5They point out that select papers incorporate state fixed effects to sidestep this concern.
6Currently, only North Dakota does not require this step.
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States began to require registration in the first part of the twentieth century, and
several states initially required registration only if their jurisdiction exceed a certain
population threshold. The “natural experiment” papers have used this within-state
heterogeneity to identify the impact of registration law on turnout.
While most of the convenience voting literature estimates the degree that a lib-
eralization increases turnout, Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006) consider the prob-
lem from reverse. Using county-level data from New York and Ohio, this paper
considers how legislation that made registration requirements universal depressed
turnout. They demonstrate that a cross-sectional approach implies that registration
dramatically reduces turnout; the results from a panel model (with fixed effects) and
difference-in-difference models, however, suggest that the true impact hovers some-
where between 3 and 5 percentage points, with a steeper drop in the first election with
these new requirements. The paper makes a nice apology for using panel methods
and exploiting within-state variation whenever possible.
Neihesel and Burden (2012) explore the impact of EDR on turnout in Wisconsin
using a method similar to the fixed-effects panel model in Ansolabehere and Konisky
(2006). Wisconsin was another state that did not universally require registration,
and it introduced EDR while there was still variation in the registration requirement.
As in Ansolabehere and Konisky, the dependent variable is county-level turnout, but
their covariate of interest is the proportion of the county that allowed EDR. Post-
estimation manipulation suggests that EDR increases turnout approximately 3.3%,
which is within the neighborhood identified by Ansolabehere and Konsiky (2006).
Keele and Minozzi (2013) also consider the introduction of EDR in Wisconsin, and
extend the analysis to Minnesota, as well. Keele and Minozzi, however, deviate much
further from the Rosenstone-Wolfinger framework, and instead turn to Regression
Discontinuity to identify the difference in participation likelihood in municipalities
under and above the population threshold that dictated registration requirements.
They compare the difference in participation prior to the introduction of EDR, as
well, to create an “upper bound” for EDR’s effect; that is, logically, we would expect
the difference between registration with a closing date and no registration to exceed
11
the difference between EDR and no registration. The authors identify a minimal
and statistically insignificant affect using this research strategy, and conclude that
traditional approaches overstate the impact of EDR.
The Keele-Minozzi critique is thorough and important, but I contend that their
results should be interpreted with care. In fact, these authors admit, ”No single
study, including ours, is likely to be definitive” (p. 17). First, it is fairly dangerous to
extrapolate that the loss of significance of EDR’s impact in Wisconsin and Minnesota
will extend to every other state, in every year. Imposing results from Wisconsin and
Minnesota, two somewhat anomalous states in terms of their historic participation,
on the rest of the country introduces different concerns about selection. Additionally,
this project captures response for one brief period of time. It is entirely possible that
a lagged effect exists as individuals become increasingly aware about the change in
procedure. The authors themselves acknowledge that their scope is quite limited in
footnote 18. And finally, as Keele and Minozzi point out, the RD design identifies
a local effect; the analysis reveals the difference in turnout associated with election
policy right around the threshold. It is worth noting that the unit of analysis is
different; while the logistic and DID models use individual-level data, the RD model
uses municipal-level data.
The authors’ contention that the parametric model overstates the impact is subject
to some of the concerns in the next section’s analysis of Glynn and Quinn (2011).
Keele and Minozzi use cross-sectional data for their parametric research design, so the
regression does not include a pre-treatment wave. Thus, the coefficient for EDR does
not help to identify the causal relationship between EDR and turnout; it represents
the turnout associated with states that offer EDR. Because these two states typically
have high turnout, the cross-sectional estimand should reflect this reality. In other
words, without including pre-treatment data, it is difficult to disentangle how much
of the estimand is a product of EDR and how much is attributable to a culture of
participation; the coefficient on EDR is conflated with state-level characteristics of
these two states. As Table 3 of their paper evidences, the DID approach (which
does incorporate pre-treatment data) greatly reduces the magnitude of the estimand
12
(Keele and Minozzi 2013: p. 10). Finally, the authors contend that the Rosenstone-
Wolfinger approach fails to account for between-state heterogeneity, but they include
very few controls in their cross-sectional model to represent this source of variation;
they do not include any other variables that describe the electoral institutions of the
state, or any metric of electoral competitiveness.
Natural experiments are a rich source of data when available, but many implemen-
tations of convenience voting procedures do not accommodate this particular research
design. Furthermore, the natural experiment requires the researcher to restrict the
scope of inquiry to the states that implemented the procedure heterogeneously across
municipalities. It is a priori unrealistic to assume that EDR will have the same ef-
fect in other states, or that its effect will be time-invariant in those states included.
Thus, while this stream of literature should encourage researchers to identify other
data conducive to this methodological setup, the broader perspective afforded by the
Rosenstone-Wolfinger design should not be discarded.
2.4.2 Nonparametric Bounds
The proliferation of the bounding approach stems primarily from a number of influen-
tial works by Manski (1995). The bounding literature is characterized by a number of
appealing features. First, research that utilizes bounds typically relies on fairly uncon-
troversial assumptions. Second, the approach encourages the researcher to explicate
very clearly exactly which assumptions s/he is employing. This transparency affords
the reader the opportunity to consider deliberately the plausibility of the assump-
tions, and how they affect the robustness of the results. Unfortunately, the weaker
the assumptions, the less informative the inference, as Manski himself acknowledges
(Manski 1995).7
Hanmer (2007) discusses concerns about exogenous selection, and turns to Manski
bounds to ascertain whether such concerns are warranted. Stratifying by education
7In this subsection, I primarily discuss analyses in Hanmer (2007, 2009) and Glynn and Quinn
(2011). For the interested reader, Keele and Minozzi (2013) also include a brief but nice discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages of non-parametric bounds, though they spend more time on
natural experiments.
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group, he contrasts the treatment effect identified in a probit model with an identified
region generated by bounds. Although the point estimate often falls outside of the
bounded region, the 90% parametric confidence interval almost always overlaps with
the non-parametrically identified region. Hanmer concludes that he cannot reject the
exogenous selection assumption, and advocates the bounds as “an additional tool”
(p. 21). This discussion is expanded in Hanmer (2009).
Glynn and Quinn (2011) also use non-parametric bounds, but they narrow the
region of identification by using the distribution of a post-treatment variable: reg-
istration. The value of registration is itself a function of treatment status, but is
realized prior to the outcome of turnout. Furthermore, registration “mediates” in the
relationship between policy and turnout, because registration is almost universally
required for voting eligibility. In particular, these authors propose that the influence
of EDR on turnout is primarily borne through its effect on registration, a reasonable
conjecture. As an illustrative exercise, Glynn and Quinn use bounds and self-reported
explanations of abstention to identify a region of possible values for the average treat-
ment effect of EDR on the control group (ATC); they restrict their sample to African
Americans. More explicitly, the authors estimate the possible change in turnout of
African Americans in non-EDR states had they been allowed to register on Election
Day.
To accomplish this objective, they utilize a question in the CPS that asks non-
voters why they abstained. They bifurcate abstainers into two groups: those who
might have participated under different electoral conditions, and those who are sim-
ply “uninterested.” First, they assume the direction of causality to be non-negative.
They then posit that EDR would have minimal impact on registered non-voters (5%
or lower), and that EDR would primarily affect interested non-registrants. However,
even assuming that all interested non-registrants vote, and that only 5% or fewer
of “uninterested” non-registrants would alter their behavior, this set of assumptions
creates an upper bound on the region of possible values of 11%. They contrast this
purportedly conservative upper bound with the point estimates of the ATC gener-
ated by logit models and conclude that the typical parametric approach dramatically
14
overstates the effect of EDR, at least for this particular subgroup (cf. Figure 2, p.
284).
Their bounding technique is interesting, and offers a useful test for parametric
results, but the authors draw an extreme conclusion: They assert that the Rosenstone-
Wolfinger approach grossly exaggerates the magnitude of quantities of interest. In so
doing, Glynn and Quinn unnecessarily throw out a great deal of information. The
bounds estimates suggest that their parametric approach is flawed, and it is. The
authors use a number of questionable practices in their parametric example, and
accordingly, it functions as little more than a straw man. Re-examining their paper,
I find that a few simple tweaks to the model produce far more reasonable estimands.
Thus, the bounds —if used appropriately and effectively —do offer an extremely
important advancement to the convenience voting literature.
2.5 Extended Response to Glynn and Quinn
Glynn and Quinn (2011) suggested that the typical parametric and semi-parametric
approaches to causal inference yield impossibly high estimates of Election Day Reg-
istration (hereafter, EDR), one of the most scrutinized forms of convenience voting.
They use a post-treatment variable and non-parametric bounds to conclude that
traditional models grossly overstate the impact of EDR on turnout among African
Americans. Upon closer examination, though, I contend that these results are actu-
ally an artifact of errors in their coding, as well as peculiarities within the 2004 cross
section used in their analysis. Accordingly, I argue that abandoning the Rosenstone-
Wolfinger (1978) model may be premature, and that many of the concerns advanced
in Glynn and Quinn (2011) can be remedied by closer attention to parametric speci-
fication. At the same time, the identification strategy advanced in Glynn and Quinn
(2011) offers a useful “sanity check” for the results of parametric estimation, and
their overall argument serves as a worthwhile reminder to researchers to be trans-
parent about the assumptions underlying their model. To this end, I contend that
the regional identification employed in Glynn and Quinn (2011) is a highly useful
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complement to, rather than substitute for, more traditional parametric estimation.8
2.5.1 Reconsidering Glynn and Quinn (2011)
The analysis in Glynn and Quinn (2011) exaggerates the degree of bias in parametric
regression and too quickly rejects this methodological approach as untenable. Impor-
tantly, although the point estimates of their quantities of interest lie outside of the
non-parametrically identified region, the parametric confidence intervals overlap it. In
an earlier paper, Hanmer (2007) concludes from similar results that he cannot reject
the exogenous selection results. This in and of itself suggests that Glynn and Quinn
may have been overly hasty in rejecting parametric design. Moreover, after consult-
ing their replication materials, available in the Political Analysis public Dataverse
collection (hdl: 1902:1/15920), I found that their results are adversely affected by
researcher-induced measurement error and an unnecessarily restricted sample. After
fixing the coding and constructing a panel dataset, the output of the logistic models
suggests a far more reasonable estimand.
Table 2.1: Bias in ATC Estimates Induced by Coding
Error
Original Coding Correct Coding Bias
Model 1 12.9 % 11.0 % 14.7 %
Model 2 12.9 % 10.9 % 15.5 %
Model 3 12.9 % 10.7 % 17.1 %
Model 4 13.2 % 9.7 % 26.5 %
Model 5 13.3 % 11.2 % 15.8%
Model 6 12.7 % 8.9 % 29.9 %
Model 7 13.1 % 9.5 % 27.5 %
Model 8 9.7 % 9.5 % 2.1 %
Model 9 9.6 % 10.9 % -13.5 %
Column 1 lists the results reported in Table 2 of Glynn and Quinn
(2011). Column 2 lists the adjusted results after fixing their coding
error. Column 3 reports the proportion of the original estimate that
is directly attributable to the coding error. See also Tables 2.A1
and 2.A2 of the Supplementary Materials.
Firstly, Glynn and Quinn mistakenly code Michigan as an EDR state and Maine as
8Part of this analysis is reproduced from Pellissier (forthcoming).
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a control state in their dataset. The state variable in the CPS dataset is GESTFIPS
(or alternatively, GESTCEN ); the authors create an EDR variable, and assign a value
of “1” to the states with GESTFIPS codes of 16, 27, 26, 33, 55, and 56. Referencing
the 2004 CPS codebook, these values correspond to Idaho, Minnesota, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. As evidenced by the authors’ commentary
within their code, they actually intended to include Maine and omit Michigan to
reflect the true collection of states that offered EDR in 2004. I reproduce their findings
exactly when I retain the coding error (Table 2.A1 of the Supplementary Materials).
After correcting this oversight, it becomes evident that their misclassification in and
of itself biased the estimates of the parametrically-identified ATC upwards. Table
2.1 presents the original and adjusted parametric estimates of the ATC for each of
the nine logit models that Glynn and Quinn specify. Across the nine models, the
flawed coding induces a bias of 1.9 percentage points in the ATC. And for all but the
final (most parsimonious) model, the original exceeds the adjusted ATC.9 That being
said, the revised non-parametric upper bound is 10.4%, so the authors’ concern of
“impossibly large” results at this point remains (p. 284).
And secondly, these concerns of bias might be abated simply by adopting a supe-
rior parametric approach. It is instructive to consider other electoral cross sections
when trying to draw broad conclusions about response to a particular treatment,
in this case EDR. The final three columns of Table 2.2 report the ATC estimates
for the 2000, 2008, and 2012 cross sections, respectively (see Tables 2.A3 - 2.A5 for
full results).10 In all of these years, the point estimate for each model’s estimate of
the ATC is far lower than the corresponding estimate in the 2004 panel. Moreover,
in 2000, each point estimate for the ATC is actually negative. This peculiarity is
certainly worth mentioning, given the popularity of cross sectional data in the conve-
nience voting literature.11 It is undesirable that an estimate exhibit such instability
9I have reproduced Glynn and Quinn’s results in Table 2.A1, and I report the full set of results using
the proper coding in Table 2.A2.
10Of note, Iowa and Montana added EDR prior to the 2008 election, and Connecticut and D.C.
added EDR prior to the 2012 election; the coding of EDR states for these cross sections reflects
the changes in legislation.
11The papers using a cross sectional approach are too numerous to mention, but include Rosenstone
17
Table 2.2: ATC Estimates from Alternative Cross Sections
2004 Cross Section 2000 CS 2008 CS 2012 CS
Model 1 11.0 % -1.3 % 1.8 % 3.2 %
Model 2 10.9 % -1.2 % 1.9 % 3.5 %
Model 3 10.7 % -1.2 % 1.8 % 3.5 %
Model 4 9.7 % -3.1 % 1.0 % 3.3 %
Model 5 11.2 % -1.9 % 1.7 % 3.5 %
Model 6 8.9 % -3.4 % 0.3 % 3.9 %
Model 7 9.5 % -3.3 % 0.3 % 3.7 %
Model 8 9.5 % -1.7 % 0.5 % 3.6 %
Model 9 10.9 % -1.4 % 0.2 % 4.5 %
Column 1 gives the results for models using the 2004 cross section (Column
2 of Table 2.1), mimicking the approach of Glynn and Quinn (but fixing the
coding error for EDR states); the next three columns report the results for
the same regressions using the 2000, 2008, and 2012 cross sections. See also
Tables 2.A3, 2.A4, and 2.A5 of the Supplementary Materials.
across cross sections unless we have theoretical or substantive reason to believe that
something about the 2004 election in and of itself encouraged African Americans to
respond to the treatment markedly differently.12 Furthermore, as pointed out in each
of the papers that considers the bounding approach, it is unlikely that the availability
of EDR discourages turnout (Hanmer 2007, 2009; Glynn and Quinn 2011; Keele and
Minozzi 2013). Such results should give the discerning researcher pause.
As pointed out in Leighley and Nagler (2014), “the causal inferences from any
cross-sectional analysis are suspect” (p. 98). Accordingly, researchers should utilize
a time-series cross-section design when such data are readily available, as is the case
with the CPS. A panel dataset improves the statistical power of the model, and more
importantly, allows the researcher to capture a broader perspective of the treatment’s
impact. I merge the CPS data for 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 cross sections and again
execute the nine logistic regressions, also including year fixed effects. As shown in
and Wolfinger (1978) and the majority of follow-up investigations.
12In the 2004 CPS data, the difference in African American turnout between treated and control
groups is particularly large: 10.9%. In the other cross sections, it is -1.4% (2000), 0.3% (2008),
and 4.5% (2012). A cursory scan of advertising patterns in the weeks preceding the 2004 election
suggests that the Kerry campaign spent heavily in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa (http://
www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/special/president/campaign.ads/). Given the high levels of
Democratic support among African Americans, it is quite possible that the 2004 cross section
reflects the concentrated mobilization efforts in several EDR states. Future research should explore
the substantive factors driving the 2004 results.
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Table 2.3, the emergent estimates of the ATC are far more consistent with the persis-
tent stability of turnout rates, as well as the increasing skepticism that current reform
efforts target the relevant costs (cf. Berinsky 2005); full results are displayed in Table
2.A6. Moreover, the 95% confidence interval around the ATC is much narrower for
Table 2.3: ATC Estimates for Cross-Sectional and
Panel Data
2004 CS Panel Difference
Model 1 11.0 % 3.6 % 7.4 %
Model 2 10.9 % 3.8 % 7.1 %
Model 3 10.7 % 3.7 % 7.0 %
Model 4 9.7 % 3.4 % 6.3 %
Model 5 11.2 % 3.9 % 7.3 %
Model 6 8.9 % 3.6 % 5.3 %
Model 7 9.5 % 3.4 % 6.1 %
Model 8 9.5 % 3.6 % 5.9 %
Model 9 10.9 % 4.4 % 6.5 %
Column 1 gives the results for models using the 2004 cross sec-
tion (Column 2 of Table 2.1). Column 2 gives the results for a
panel model incorporating the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 data;
it includes year fixed effects. The final column reports the differ-
ence in percentage points between the estimates using the panel
dataset (Column 2) and the 2004 cross section (Column 1). See
also Table 2.A6 of the Supplementary Materials.
the panel estimates than any of the cross-section estimates, reflecting the additional
statistical power that the larger sample yields. The CPS generally maintains a good
deal of consistency across implementations, rarely making major changes to the ques-
tions it asks and the answers it allows; therefore, a panel dataset is quickly attainable
for research in this area. A panel approach ensures that the resulting estimands are
more robust to idiosyncrasies in electoral cycles. And furthermore, if the researcher is
still interested in isolating a particular cross-section for analysis, he or she can simply
condition on membership of this subgroup when generating the estimate.
2.5.2 Discussion
It is worthwhile to consider and explicate the assumptions underlying the statisti-
cal models of one’s research. Sound science requires transparency, and it should be
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a norm within the methodological literature to delineate clearly and precisely the
assumptions underlying one’s approach. And certainly, it is fair to question the con-
ditional ignorability assumption covertly embedded within the Rosenstone-Wolfinger
approach. That being said, I contend that it is premature to reject the parametric
approach in light of current evidence. Instead, researchers should pay greater atten-
tion to the specification of their parametric models and consider using panel rather
than cross-sectional data.
Glynn and Quinn exacerbate the degree of bias in parametric models of conve-
nience voting with researcher-induced measurement error and less-than-ideal para-
metric design. My findings echo the earlier conclusions of Hanmer (2007) that the
nonparametric approach fails to discredit the binary outcome regression, though the
researcher should pay close attention to the functional form of the model. And as
Manski himself acknowledges, the cost of weaker assumptions is less informative in-
ference (Manski 1995; cf. Keele and Minozzi 2013).
It is not my intention to discourage researchers from non-parametrically identify-
ing over a region, or from using post- instead of pre-treatment variables, but rather,
to emphasize that the existing body of literature has yet to offer an adequate dis-
mantling of the conventional approach. In fact, I believe that the bounding approach
can be instructive as an initial inquiry into the validity of one’s parametric model, as
well as a reminder to be attentive to and transparent about the role of assumptions
in causal analysis. The discipline would greatly benefit from methodological innova-
tions that consider the selection process underlying the introduction of convenience
voting procedures. It is my hope in presenting this re-analysis that researchers will
not prematurely abandon point identification in favor of less controversial, but also
less informative, regional identification.
2.6 Conclusion
The papers discussed in this chapter bring to light important concerns about the
Rosenstone-Wolfinger research design. This scholarship offers alternative approaches
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to inference about convenience voting procedures, but both the RD approach and
the bounds method come with a cost. Regression Discontinuity localizes the quan-
tity of interest, and can lead the researcher to draw more general conclusions than
warranted. The nonparametric bounds typically rely on transparent, uncontroversial
assumptions, but they also yield results that are typically unhelpful as a standalone.
A recent paper by Burden et al. (2014) acknowledges that challenges regarding exoge-
nous selection are valid and important, but that researchers can accommodate such
concerns by including a host of variables that capture the state-level electoral envi-
ronment. These authors also point out that for most convenience voting procedures,
the current body of states that have adopted a particular liberalization embody very
different characteristics, and the legislation arose in heterogeneous ways.
One crucial takeaway from this methodological overview is that cross sectional
data can produce biased results when examining electoral policy. Ansolabehere and
Konisky (2006) and Leighley and Nagler (2014) highlight the dangers of using a cross-
section design, and encourage researchers to select a panel approach instead whenever
possible. In their critique of the Rosenstone-Wolfinger framework, Glynn and Quinn
(2011) and Keele and Minozzi (2013) recover unreasonably high estimands when they
execute logistic regression. My replication of the parametric estimation of Glynn
and Quinn (2011), however, lends credence to the advice to use panel data; when I
incorporate other cross sections, the logistic models produce more plausible estimates,
in the neighborhood of 3 to 4 percentage points (see Table 2.3). This magnitude is
similar to the effect identified in Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006).
In subsequent analysis, I use a longitudinal approach similar to Brians and Grof-
man (2001), and related to the panel approaches of Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006),
Neiheisel and Burden (2012), and Leighley and Nagler (2014), though I keep the unit
of inference the individual, rather than the county or state.13 It also bears some
resemblance to the variant of difference-in-difference presented in Chapter 3 of Han-
mer (2009). Although the scathing criticisms of Glynn and Quinn (2011) and Keele
and Minozzi (2013) point to unreasonable estimands generated by the Rosenstone-
13Hanmer (2009) offers some justification for keeping the analysis at the individual level (p. 30).
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Wolfinger design, both papers use cross-sectional results as their example. When I
replicated the models in Glynn and Quinn, but incorporated longitudinal data, the
point estimates fell within the plausible neighborhood identified in Ansolabehere and
Konisky. In the subsequent chapters, I find a fairly small impact of convenience vot-
ing, which may further obviate potential concern regarding research design. The next
chapter focuses on voters with disabilities, and whether any of the policy relaxations
effectively target the barriers faced by this group. The following two chapters pay
closer attention to online registration specifically, since this new form of convenience

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Impact of Disability on
Political Participation
3.1 Summary
Individuals with disabilities are consistently underrepresented in American elections,
despite legislative efforts to make civic participation more accessible. A small but
steady stream of literature has consistently identified a pronounced, negative effect
of disability status on turnout and other forms of civic participation. However, the
magnitude of the estimated effect on turnout has varied considerably, ranging from 4%
to 21%, creating ambiguity about the degree of the relationship. Moreover, because
disability is strongly correlated with other demographic features, notably age, there
is a danger that the existing estimates suffer from confounding bias. I present the
first analysis that involves matching, and I show that ignoring the imbalance among
the observables can bias the estimates of disability’s impact upwards. Nevertheless,
I still identify a reduction in the propensity to be registered of 2 to 5 percentage
points, and a reduction in the propensity to cast a ballot of approximately 5 to 8
percentage points. When I incorporate interactive effects, though, it becomes clear
that this impact is borne primarily by individuals who report disabilities and are not
currently employed, supporting earlier findings by Schur and Kruse (2000) and Schur
et al. (2002). And finally, I find no evidence that the most popular convenience
voting procedures effectively target this demographic subgroup.
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3.2 Introduction
The demographic distribution of the American electorate differs markedly from that
of the voting-eligible population (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Because in-
dividuals of different demographic backgrounds vary systematically in their political
preferences, the degree of representativeness (or lack, thereof) has meaningful impli-
cations for electoral results. Moreover, the political system incentivizes officeholders
to respond to the electorate, rather than the entire constituency, and policy is shaped
accordingly (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Due to the historical incidence
of racial disenfranchisement (both overt and indirect), political scientists have paid
particular attention to racial representativeness (cf. Alvarez and Nagler 2007, 2008,
2011; Glynn and Quinn 2011). The lack of participation among young voters is also
widely noted, both in the press and in the academic literature (see, for example,
Leighley and Nagler 1992).
One demographic feature that has received considerably less scrutiny is disability
status, even though individuals with disabilities constitute one of the most sizable
political minorities, and their participation rates are significantly —and persistently
—lower (Schur and Adya 2013). In fact, 8.3% of respondents indicate that they have
some form of disability in both the 2008 and 2012 cross sections of the Current Pop-
ulation Survey Voting and Registration Supplement ; in other words, roughly 1 out of
every 12 individuals reports some kind of disability (ICPSR 25643, 31082).1 Shriner,
Ochs, and Shields (1997) label the advocacy for those with cognitive and behavioral
disabilities the “last suffrage movement” and point out that discrimination based on
disability commands a lower level of judicial scrutiny than discrimination on race or
gender. Nevertheless, the corpus of literature examining the impact of disability on
electoral participation remains fairly limited. Perhaps this de-emphasis is due to a
lack of salience, or simply a lack of data. Few large, nationally-representative surveys
ask about both disability status and political participation and beliefs (Alvarez and
1The CPS allows individuals to report auditory, visual, cognitive, and ambulatory difficulties, as
well as impediments to typical activities such as bathing or running errands. An individual is
considered disabled if he or she reports any of the aforementioned conditions.
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Hall 2012; Schur et al. 2002).
Over the past several decades, several pieces of federal legislation have attempted
to facilitate electoral participation among individuals with disabilities. The effective-
ness of these laws depends (at least in part) on compliance, and there is evidence
that execution is lacking (Schur, Shields, and Shriner 2005). Harrington (1999), for
example, argues that precincts in Texas had broadly disregarded the spirit, if not the
letter, of the legal provisions within Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. And at
the national level, accessibility continues to represent a real threat to turnout among
citizens with disabilities (Alvarez and Hall 2012). A recent report issued by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office suggested that a mere 27% of polling places “had no
potential impediments in the path from the parking to the voting area” (Bovbjerg
2009, p. 1). Although this estimate actually represented improvement from the 2000
election, it suggests that American elections are perenially characterized by a lack of
accessibility. Moreover, technology is playing an increasingly large role in American
elections, and it remains unclear how this development is affecting voters with dis-
abilities (Baker, Roy and Moon 2005). Stewart (2011) points out the irony of this
“silence,” since advocates for citizens with disabilities were instrumental in shaping
and passing the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Given the fungible nature of compliance, and our continued uncertainty about how
voters with disabilities will respond to new technologies, it is important to continue to
estimate the relationship between disability status and turnout. The CPS altered its
approach to measuring disability in 2008, and recent papers have emphasized the need
for further exploration as additional cross sections of data become available (Alvarez
and Hall 2012; Schur and Adya 2013). To my knowledge, my paper is the first to
incorporate the 2012 cross section using multivariate analysis, and the first to explore
concerns regarding selection. Disability status is correlated with several well-known
predictors of turnout, including age, education, and employment status (Baker, Roy,
and Moon 2005; Schur and Adya 2013). It is important to address whether these
other demographic factors are driving the under-representation, or whether being
disabled in and of itself lessens the propensity to vote. Many papers in this area
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rely on differences in means between the subgroups, perhaps stratified by one other
demographic factor. The more statistically intricate adopt a multivariate approach
(Schur et al. 2002; Alvarez and Hall 2012; Schur and Adya 2013). Yet no papers in
this area explicitly consider the danger of confounders, and my analysis is the first to
implement statistical matching as a safeguard against this potential source of bias.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on the continued un-
derrepresentation of voters with disabilities, and the electoral policies that have been
introduced to encourage participation among those who face higher barriers, includ-
ing citizens with disabilities. I then discuss briefly the theoretical motivation behind
matching, an econometric technique that researchers can employ when they suspect
imbalance among the observed characteristics across the stratification of interest (in
this case, the disability indicator). Next, I describe the binary response model that I
use to identify and estimate the effect of disability status on registration turnout. I
extend the model to consider how age, employment status, and various convenience
voting procedures may mediate the relationship between disability and turnout. To
this end, Alvarez and Hall (2012) offer an excellent initial inquiry into these research
questions, though the authors highlight the need for more data and further analysis
in the conclusion of their book. I follow their statistical approach fairly closely, but I
modify it to incorporate new data —namely, the 2012 cross section —and to reduce
any bias introduced by confounders.
I find that without matching, the estimated effect of disability is artificially in-
flated, particularly with regard to turnout, highlighting the sensitivity of these models
to the composition of the data. Still, however, the impact of disability is significant
both statistically and substantively; it reduces the propensity to be registered by 3 to
5 percentage points, and the propensity to cast a ballot by approximately 6 to 8 per-
centage points. The interactive effects reveal that employment status heavily drives
this reduction, substantiating earlier work by Schur and Kruse (2000) and Schur et al.
(2002). Unfortunately, my findings temper the optimism of Alvarez and Hall (2012)
that convenience voting procedures target this particular subpopulation effectively.
Altogether, my analysis reiterates the concern in the literature that the current tac-
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tics to enfranchise this group of voters do not adequately address the barriers they
face.
3.3 Higher Hurdles
Over the last half century, several pieces of federal legislation have sought to ease the
electoral process for voters in general, with acts and provisions directly considering
the interests of individuals with disabilities. The first landmark bill is the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which rendered illegal a number of practices. Among these were
“literacy tests,” which played some role in disenfranchising individuals with cognitive
disabilities (Schriner, Ochs, and Shields 1997). Additionally, the VRA explicated
that voters with disabilities may designate an individual to assist them at the polls
(Schriner and Batavia 2001). Nearly two decades later, the Voting Accessibility for
the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 assigned the state an additional role in
ensuring accessibility by requiring polling places to offer “auxiliary aids” (Schriner
and Batavia 2001).
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its 2008 Amendments reflected a
belief among the legislative branch that individuals with disabilities do not enjoy the
same legal protections as other minority groups (Schriner, Ochs, and Shields (1997).
This legislation purportedly sought to encourage civic engagement of individuals with
disabilities, and remove some of the existing barriers (Schur et al. 2002), though
its efficacy has been questioned (Harrington 1999). The ADA included provisions
targeting discrimination and accessibility in all aspects of civic life; yet while its focus
was broad in nature, it also specifically highlighted the importance of accessibility
in elections (Bovbjerg 2013; see also Baker, Roy, and Moon 2005). The federal
government maintains a list of features that polling places must possess to be in
compliance with the provisions of the document, available at http://www.ada.gov/
votingchecklist.htm.
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 liberalized several electoral policies;
perhaps most prominently, in a provision labeled “motor voter,” it insisted that states
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allow citizens to register as voters at DMVs and public assistance agencies, or offer
Election Day Registration (Hanmer 2009). While these policies do not explicitly
mention voters with disabilities, they expand the pool of registration alternatives.
Because access is a chief concern for many individuals who report disability (Alvarez
and Hall 2012), this expansion has important implications for this subpopulation.
And most recently, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 sought to modernize the
technology used in election administration (see Stewart 2011). HAVA requires that
every polling site offer an accessible voting mode; it also insists that “each state
allow electronic voter registration at disability agencies, all voting-related materials
are available in alternative formats, and poll workers are provided disability etiquette
training” (Schur, Shields, and Schriner 2005: 1618).
Nonetheless, individuals with disabilities still face substantially higher costs of
participation, particularly if their states are strict about in-person voting. As a
motivating example, Los Angeles County conducted a focus groups for several demo-
graphic groups, including voters with disabilities; many of the participants expressed
a preference for voting absentee, citing various frustrations with in-person voting (Al-
varez and Hall 2012).2 For many, the polling location may be difficult to navigate.
Others may have trouble obtaining transportation to and from the polling site. The
inverse relationship between cost and participation is well-established in the voting
literature. Since Downs (1957), the norm within the literature is to treat the voting
eligible as utility-maximizers who will cast a ballot if and only if the doing so offers
greater expected utility than abstention.3
Qualitative and observational data confirm that these costs affect voting experi-
ences. In the 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections, the raw fre-
quencies of individuals who report difficulty with registration, voting technology, and
casting a ballot are significantly higher among the disabled (Alvarez and Hall 2012).
A separate survey conducted by the authors of Baker, Roy, and Moon (2005) in-
dicates that voters with disabilities report less satisfaction with their overall voting
2For a more extensive discussion of these interesting qualitative data, see Alvarez and Hall (2012).
3Riker and Ordeshook (1967) further developed the “rational agent” framework by adding a psy-
chological component, and most subsequent papers have adopted this framework.
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experience, poll workers and site, and voting machines. Other surveys reveal that
individuals with disabilities not only experience a less enjoyable voting experience,
but also expect to (Schur et al. 2002; Schur and Kruse 2011).4 This finding is crit-
ical, as the Downsian calculus considers anticipated costs and benefits. If citizens
with disabilities assume the voting experience will be more costly, even if it is not in
actuality, their (expected) propensity to turn out will still be reduced.
Quantifying that reduction is a difficult but important task. In my review of the
extant literature, every study has identified a negative and statistically significant
effect, but the degree varies quite dramatically by dataset and research design. Dif-
ferent surveys and investigations have concluded that the effect is as low as 4% and
as high as 21% (cf. Schur, Shields, and Shriner 2005; Schur and Kruse 2011). What
drives this relationship is even murkier, as disability status is correlated with a host
of other factors that influence behavior; individuals with disabilities are more likely
to be older, and they report lower levels of income, education, and employment. The
“net effect” of these correlates is ambiguous a priori, as age is typically positively
related to turnout while the other features are inversely related (cf. Schur and Adya
2013). Additionally, it is difficult to disentangle how much of the reduced turnout
among the disabled is attributable to these other correlates, and how much is due
to features more specific to the disabled community (e.g., physical or psychological
inaccessibility).
The timing of the onset of disability could influence turnout patterns, as well
(Schur, Shields, and Shriner 2005; Schur et al. 2002). Schur and Kruse (2000) focus
specifically on individuals with spinal cord injuries. Because the occurrence of this
kind of disability is more independent from other demographic characteristics, this
research design (at least partially) controls for some other features that might mediate
in the relationship between disability and turnout, such as age and education. The
authors find that employed individuals with such injuries behave quite similarly to
individuals without any disabilities, but the unemployed are substantially less likely to
4The latter two surveys have sample sizes of 563 and 1240, respectively, so their results should be
interpreted with care.
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vote than their counterparts. A multivariate approach by Schur et al. (2002) echoes
the importance of the interaction between disability and employment, but adds a
caveat that participation is reduced for retirement-age individuals with disabilities,
even if they are employed.
In this paper, I promote a different strategy to address concerns regarding selec-
tion: matching. In the next section, I discuss the technical literature and my specific
implementation, but a brief introduction to the intuition may be instructive. In ob-
servational studies, the researcher often has reason to believe that individuals do not
experience a particular condition randomly (or even conditionally randomly). Match-
ing stratifies a dataset into subgroups according to the condition of interest, and then
pairs “similar” individuals across groups. For this project, I subdivide individuals into
two groups: those who report disabilities and those who do not. Each individual with
a disability is matched to an individual without disabilities of a similar demographic
background; I then parse the dataset to include only these matched observations. It
is important to note that this procedure does not render selection exogenous, as the
selection process was not organically orthogonal to the joint distribution of the other
covariates. Matching merely imposes restrictions on the dataset so that it mimics
random selection.
3.4 Matching to Achieve Balance
The previous attempts to quantify the relationship between disability and participa-
tion have used strictly parametric approaches. Ideally, researchers encounter datasets
that are characterized by balance among both the observables or unobservables. When
the independent variable of interest is associated with other covariates that also af-
fect the outcome, parametric estimates can exhibit bias; these covariates are called
“confounders.” In laboratory and field experiments, the researcher can ignore such
concerns by assigning a “treatment” randomly. With observational data, however, it
is harder to disentangle the variable of interest from their confounders. Such concern
certainly seems warranted for the purposes of this paper, given that age in particular
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is a significant driver of both disability status and turnout (cf. Schur et al. 2002).
As a means of reducing bias from confounders, there is growing support for a
semi-parametric technique called matching, which extracts a subset of the original
dataset so that the variable of interest is distributed “as if” randomly; essentially,
the researcher “pre-processes” the dataset to induce balance among the observables
before executing regression analysis (Ho et al. 2007).5 I implement three different
matching techniques: matching on propensity score, matching on Mahalanobis dis-
tance, and genetic matching. For propensity score matching, the probability of being
disabled is modeled as a function of the other demographic covariates; each disabled
individual is then paired with a non-disabled individual based on the proximity of the
propensity score. This approach is appealing, because it works around the “curse of
dimensionality,” and in infinite populations, asymptotically induces balance among
the observables (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).6 The second alternative uses Maha-
lanobis distance, which measures the space between any two vectors of covariates,
weighting the familiar Euclidean distance by the variance-covariance matrix of the
covariates (Ho et al. 2007; Diamond and Sekhon 2013). Finally, Genetic Matching is
a variation of both procedures that interposes an initially arbitary weighting matrix
between the decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix. The program itera-
tively converges to a matrix that locally optimizes balance across specified covariates,
including (if desired) the propensity score (Diamond and Sekhon 2013; Mebane and
Sekhon 1998).
I execute each kind of matching with the R package ‘Matching’ (Sekhon 2011).
Ho et al. (2007) recommend that the researcher use the entire set of pre-treatment
covariates in the matching procedure. In this case, it is impossible to identify fully
the variables that were realized prior to treatment, given that the dataset does not
5There is a healthy literature on the most effective techniques for matching, and when matching
might be appropriate. A full review is beyond the scope of this paper, but prominent discussions of
matching include Rubin (1973); Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Dehejia and Wahba (1999); Abadie
and Imbens (2006); Ho et al. (2007); Gelman and Hill (2007); Angrist and Pischke (2008); Diamond
and Sekhon (2013); and Morgan and Winship (2014), though this list is far from exhaustive. For
a recent review, see Stuart (2010).
6However, if the sample is small, this method may be unable to facilitate balance among the observ-
ables (Diamond and Sekhon 2013).
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chart the onset of disability. Accordingly, I have selected the demographic variables
that are certainly determined prior to (or at least, concurrently with) disability: age,
gender, race, and Hispanic origin. I also include education, employment, and family
income to capture the socio-economic background of the individual, which sometimes
plays a role in determining disability status.7 And finally, in my implementation of
genetic matching, I include the propensity score as a covariate, as well (cf. Diamond
and Sekhon 2013). In all of the matching executions, I match exactly on state and
cross-section; that is, I induce balance within each state and for each electoral year.
Prior to matching, the dataset exhibits great imbalance among the observable
characteristics. Figure 3.1 displays the density plots of age distributions for dis-
abled and non-disabled individuals in the unmatched dataset, the dataset matched on
propensity score, the dataset matched on Mahalanobis distance, and the genetically-
matched dataset, respectively.8 It is immediately obvious that each of the matching
methods dramatically improves the balance in age distributions between these two
subsets. A cursory glance at the unmatched dataset (top, left) reveals that the dis-
abled subpopulation is significantly older than the non-disabled. Propensity score
matching improves this disparity, though not to the degree of Manahalobis matching
or genetic matching. In the latter types of matched datasets, the plotted points barely
deviate from the line of symmetry. Tables 3.A1 and 3.A2 of the Supplementary Ma-
terials describe the distribution for each covariate before and after matching (for the
2008 and 2012 cross sections, respectively), demonstrating that matching can assuage
concerns about the orthogonality of “treatment” assignment.
Having created datasets that are less susceptible to bias from confounders, I can
turn to the more traditional parametric models used in this literature to explain
voter behavior. In particular, I aim to estimate the degree to which disability status
affects voter registration and turnout, and whether any of the most prominent forms
7Admittedly, the choice to include these variables is more controversial, because the direction of
causality is not fully identified. However, given the established association, and the existing claims
that these factors can intervene in the relationship between disability and participation (Schur et
al. 2002), I elect to include them.
8These graphs use the 2012 cross section; the same graphs are displayed for the 2008 cross section
in Figure A1 of the Supplementary Materials.
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Figure 3.1: Density of Age Distribution by Disability Status and Dataset (2012)
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of convenience voting intervene in those relationships.
3.5 Convenience Voting
The academic literature on the efficacy of convenience voting is quite extensive, al-
beit ambivalent (Alvarez, Levin, and Sinclair 2012).9 The initial works offer optimism
that policy liberalizations can yield a far more mobilized electorate (Rosenstone and
Wolfinger 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Many papers have highlighted the
potential of Election Day Registration (hereafter, EDR) to improve turnout, in par-
ticular among racial minorities (Alvarez and Nagler 2007, 2008, 2011; Knack and
White 2000; Brians and Grofman 2001; Burden et al. 2014; but see Glynn and Quinn
2011 for a competing perspective). Additionally, a few studies suggest that online
registration, one of the most recent innovations in election law, increases turnout gen-
erally, and may improve the historical under-representation of young voters (Baretto
et al. 2010; Garćıa Bedolla and Veléz 2013; Pellissier 2015).10 Gronke, Galanes-
Rosenbaum, and Miller (2007) and Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott (2005) find that
all-postal voting increases turnout, though the latter paper argues that it does so by
retaining existing voters, and eventually leads to a less representative electorate.
Several researchers caution that the research on election procedures may overstate
their impact (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Hanmer 2007, 2009; Glynn and Quinn
2011; Neiheisel and Burden 2012; Keele and Minozzi 2013). Meanwhile, a couple of
papers find that early voting is actually associated with lower participation, perhaps
due to a less patriotic electoral environment (Burden et al. 2014; see also Gronke,
Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007).11 Berinsky (2005) expresses skepticism that
any form of convenience voting significantly increases turnout, and argues instead
that such liberalizations merely streamline the process for individuals who would vote
regardless. These policies, though well-intentioned, may not address the true reasons
9Gronke et al. (2008) and Highton (2004) offer nice reviews.
10I will explore online registration’s role within this literature more extensively in the next chapter.
11Another possible explanation is that regression results could be conflated by lower incidences of
participation among the states that offer early voting, though such investigation is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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that people do not participate. Berinsky hypothesizes that the cognitive costs involved
in obtaining political information may be the prevailing factor for many abstainers.
If this is indeed the case, then we are targeting the wrong mechanism; and moreover,
these individuals are less likely to be aware of convenience voting procedures. For
individuals with cognitive disabilities, this possibility is particularly relevant; and
more generally, Alvarez and Hall (2012) find that individuals with disabilities are less
likely to read a political blog, read the newspaper, and listen to the news on the radio.
Only a few papers have explicitly considered how citizens with disabilities are re-
sponding to attempts to make voting less costly. Of those who voted in the 2008 and
2010 elections, individuals with disabilities reported voting by mail at significantly
higher rates (Schur and Adya 2013; Schur and Kruse 2000; Alvarez and Hall 2012;
see also Alvarez, Levin, and Sinclair 2012).12 Notably, individuals with disabilities
did not seem to have more difficulty procuring absentee ballots, though they did need
more assistance (Alvarez and Hall 2012). Alvarez and Hall (2012) offer the most ex-
tensive insight into how individuals with disabilities respond to various convenience
voting procedures. They regress both registration and turnout on a number of fac-
tors, including indicators for whether the individual’s state allows particular forms
of convenience voting; in some models, they also interact disability status with these
state-level variables. EDR increases the probability of registration, but the magnitude
of the impact may be larger for voters without disabilities. Additionally, no-excuse
absentee and permanent absentee states are associated with increased likelihood of
turnout, and there is additional boost for voters with disabilities. Altogether, these
findings suggest that convenience voting procedures can improve participation among
the disabled, even if the impact is more muted. It is important to continue to test
this interaction given the persistent concerns about accessibility (cf. Bovbjerg 2013)
and the role of advocates for the disabled in shaping electoral policy (cf. Stewart
2011).
12It is worth mentioning that this gap might be partially explained by states’ varying eligibility
requirements for this voting mode.
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3.6 Data and Model
The data come from the 2008 and 2012 November cross sections of the CPS, an
extensive, nationally-representative survey implemented by the Census Bureau. 13
Prior to 2008, the Census Bureau addressed disability differently (Alvarez and Hall
2012; Schur and Kruse 2011; Schur and Adya 2013), so I begin with this cross-
section to minimize measurement error. The Census Bureau asks each individual a
battery of questions about whether they experience various kinds of disability, and
the disability indicator flags individuals who answer affirmatively to at least one
of these questions. As evidenced by Table 3.A3 of the Supplementary Materials,
individuals with disabilities report lower levels of participation for almost every type
of demographic stratification. Obviously, disabilities vary widely in type and degree,
so it may not be appropriate to treat disability status as homogeneous (Alvarez and
Hall 2012). To ensure an adequate sample of disabled individuals for each state-year,
though, I elect to include a single disability indicator; conceptually, the estimated
coefficient and effect will be the weighted average across individuals with all types
of disability. Matching already reduces the size of the dataset, and consequently,
the power of the model; disaggregating the disability measure would further reduce
the statistical power.14 And finally, to measure competitiveness in a particular state
for a given election, I use the margin of victory from the narrowest high-profile race
available (President, Governor, U.S. Senator). My indicators of convenience voting
come from a dataset originated by Cemenska et al. (2009), which I updated to include
13The size and representativeness of this dataset render it an appealing option for modeling partic-
ipation. However, there is evidence that significant measurement error plagues unvalidated data
on voter participation (see Katz and Katz 2010; Ansolabehere and Hersch 2012; Hur and Achen
2013). Individuals may respond incorrectly, due to imperfect recall or satisficing, or they may
choose not to respond at all. Social scientists accommodate these concerns differently; some exe-
cute listwise deletion, while others attempt to estimate the responses via multiple imputation. I
follow the Census Bureau’s procedure, counting all those who do not answer affirmatively to the
participation questions as abstainers. I listwise delete observations that are missing demographic
information.
14My focus in this chapter is fairly broad. If future research projects prefer to consider specific kinds
of disability, they can perhaps combat concerns about power by pooling additional cross-sections,
or not restricting the match to state-year subsets.
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Online Registration and recent legal changes.15
The primary estimand of interest is the analog of the Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated.16 Mathematically, this is equivalent to E[Y 1 |D = 1, X]−E[Y 0 |D =
1, X]. The first term of the expression is identified with observational data, and I
impute the second using matching and regression analysis.
As described in Chapter 2, I conceptualize the propensity to participate as a latent
variable, which we only observe in censored form as participation (or lack thereof).17
Following Alvarez and Hall (2012), I consider both registration and turnout (sepa-
rately). My base specification is as follows:
P[Yist] = Φ(βXi + ζZst + δDi + γs + θt + ε),
where Y is the binary indicator of participation, X is a standard list of demographic
controls, Z is state-level covariates, D is an indicator of disability status, and γ and
θ are state and year fixed effects, respectively. The vector X includes age, gender,
race, Hispanic heritage, education, family income, employment, and residential mo-
bility. The vector Z includes the metric of competitiveness described above, as well
as indicators of convenience voting procedures.18 I measure most of these variables
conventionally, though it is worth noting that I categorize employment somewhat un-
usually. Most papers consider employment as a binary variable, with a value of unity
indicating full-time employment and a value of null indicating otherwise. Instead,
I treat employment as a categorical variable, classifying individuals as “employed,”
“unemployed,” or “not in the labor force.” Individuals who declare themselves out
of the labor force might participate in elections systematically differently from in-
15This information is available at the National Council of State Legislatures website: http:\\www.
ncsl.org.
16It seems inappropriate to label disability status a treatment, given that it is not a condition that
researchers or policymakers ever impose. Accordingly, I am also not interested in the Average
Treatment Effect of the entire population, since I am not looking to introduce a policy or impose
a particular condition. I want to identify the relationship between disability and participation,
conditioned on reporting disability.
17I specify a probit model, though other papers have used logit and scobit specifications.
18For the model of registration, this includes EDR and online registration. For the model of turnout,
this includes EDR, online registration, no-fault early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, and all-
postal voting.
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dividuals who are unemployed but seeking work. This may be particularly true for
individuals who report disabilities, given that their disabilities might prohibit them
from the possibility of viable employment. My specification is similar to that of Al-
varez and Hall (2012), though I pool cross-sections (and include year fixed effects)
and modify the set of covariates slightly.19
I later extend the model to consider interactive effects that previous papers have
identified as significant. More specifically, I interact disability with age, employment,
and the convenience voting procedures. Schur and Kruse (2000) found that the de-
terrence of disability is primarily driven by the relationship between disability and
employment, though they focused exclusively on spinal cord injuries. Schur et al.
(2002) identified significant interactive effects between disability and age, as well as
employment. More recently, using a difference-in-means test, Schur and Kruse (2011)
identified similar participation behavior among the employed, whether they reported
disability or not. The same study established a consistent gap between the disabled
and non-disabled subgroups when stratified by age bracket. For the state-level covari-
ates, Alvarez and Hall (2012) simulated a “typical” (modal) individual in the dataset,
and found interesting patterns in how individuals with disabilities engage with their
electoral environments. Those with disabilities were less likely to take advantage of
EDR, though the effect of EDR was still positive. They were more likely to ben-
efit from absentee voting, whether or not the state required an excuse. The total
effect for early voting was negative, though less so for the subset of individuals with
disabilities.20
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[-5.11%, -3.83%] [-9.03%, -7.60%]
Matched on PS
-3.63% -7.57%
[-4.55%, -2.63%] [-8.63%, -6.51%]
Matched on MD
-3.26% -6.34%
[-4.18%, -2.34%] [-7.35%, -5.30%]
Genetically Matched
-3.17% -6.25%
[-4.06%, -2.24%] [-7.41%, -5.20%]
3.7 Results
3.7.1 The Necessity of Matching
To understand how the imbalance in the original dataset can bias estimates, I fit the
base model to each of the four datasets: unmatched, matched on propensity score,
matched on Mahalanobis distance, and genetically matched. Recall that the primary
quantity of interest for this study is the overall impact of disability on participation
among the subset of disabled voters. The literature has identified a persistent depres-
sive effect of disability on participation, but the magnitude of the impact has varied
considerably (cf. Schur and Adya 2013). This lack of robustness may be an artifact
of the alternate specifications or data samples, but it could also be driven partially by
variation in how individuals with disability interact with their electoral environments
over time. To my knowledge, all of the studies in this area have used unmatched
datasets, and accordingly, the point estimates could be biased by confounders. Ta-
ble 3.1 lists the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the
effect of disability suggested by each dataset, and Figure 3.2 graphs the associated
distributions.21
19Pooling improves the statistical power of the mode and reduces the influence of electoral idiosyn-
crasies (Leighley and Nagler 2014; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006).
20Early voting states are often associated with reduced participation, perhaps due to civic atmo-
sphere or other commonalities among the states that allow individuals to vote in person prior to
Election Day (cf. Burden et al. 2014).
21Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5 in the Appendix display the full set of results for registration and turnout,
respectively. Note that the effect on balance is not uniform across covariates; matching greatly
improves the balance across disability status improves for certain characteristics (e.g, age) but
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Figure 3.2: Effect of Disability on Participation by Dataset
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These results lend credence to concerns that imbalance among the observables
might bias the model, and in turn, postestimation. For both registration and turnout,
the matched datasets produce lower point estimates of disability’s effect than the
unmatched dataset. It is worth mentioning that for both stages of participation,
the point estimate for the unmatched data lies outside the 95% confidence interval
for the genetically-matched data and the data matched on Mahalanobis distance,
and near the boundary for the data matched on propensity score, as well. Notably,
the dataset matched on propensity score produces higher estimates than the other
matched datasets, and a couple of explanations exist. It is possible that the propensity
score model is incorrectly specified, though if either the propensity score model or the
participation model is correctly specified, the results will be valid (Ho et al. 2007). It
should also be mentioned that matching on the (correctly-specified) propensity score
induces balance on the observables asymptotically ; in finite samples, this result does
not hold (Diamond and Sekhon 2013).22
These results suggest important substantive conclusions, as well. For all datasets,
disability’s impact on turnout considerably exceeds its impact on registration. This
result fits the intuitive narrative of how disability intervenes in participation; because
disability often occurs or (at least intensifies) with age, it is quite possible that many
individuals with disabilities are already registered voters by the time of onset. For
one, the individuals might not have experienced cognitive and/or physical barriers
to participation when they considered registration. Additionally, because disability
status coincides with reduced civic participation more generally (Schur et al. 2002),
those who were not disabled as they became eligible to vote may have experienced
the typical level of mobilization efforts. Nonetheless, it noteworthy that even so, dis-
ability significantly reduces the propensity to be registered, as suggested in Alvarez
and Hall (2012) and Schur, Shields, and Shriner (2005). Moreover, even the most
conservative estimates suggest a persistent depressive effect of disability on partici-
actually reduces it for some of the less common characteristics (e.g., Asian, other race indicators).
This is probably exacerbated by my restriction that matching occur within state-year.
22It is worth noting that a more thorough exercise in propensity score matching would iteratively
repeat the procedure until some objective balance criterion had been satisfied.
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pation. Controlling for all other factors, and matching to reduce confounding bias,
disability status is associated with an approximately 5 to 8% reduction in turnout.
Given that certain studies suggest an independent effect of nearly 20% (Schur and
Kruse 2011), my results suggest that these estimates are indeed artificially inflated by
the statistical approach and bias from confounders. Even after matching, it is clear
that despite legislative efforts to curtail the threats to accessibility that individuals
with disabilities may face, for many the costs of voting are still unduly high.
3.7.2 Interactive Effects
To further probe the substantive implications, I incorporate interaction terms into
the participation models.23 For intuitive interpretation of binary response models,
researchers can either identify a (hypothetical) individual of interest or average across
all individuals in the sample. Following Hanmer and Kalkan (2013), I choose the
latter approach; unless there is a priori reason to specify a particular realization of
the demographic covariates, a broader perspective is more instructive. Table 3.2 lists
the discrete differences for each of the independent variables; that is, for each entry,
the quantity is obtained by the expression P(Y |X−I , XI = x1)−P(Y |X−I , XI = x0),
where Y is the outcome, XI is the covariate of interest, evaluated at values x1 and x0,
and X−I is all other covariates (at their observed values). All values in the table are
percentage points. It is worth mentioning that for the variables that are interacted,
the effect measured below is the total effect.
Most of the individual-level variables exhibit the expected effect.24 The propensity
to participate increases with age, and females are also more likely to participate. All
other factors held constant, Asians are less likely to register and vote than whites,
and Hispanics are less likely than non-Hispanics. Interestingly, though, blacks are
more likely to register and vote than whites, reversing the historical trend. A full
investigation of this relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, though a report
issued by the Census Bureau speculates that the uptick in participation among blacks
23For simplicity of exposition, I focus exclusively on the genetically matched dataset.
24For a thorough discussion of demographic predictors, see Leighley and Nagler (1992).
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Table 3.2: Discrete Differences
Registration Turnout
Disability: No → Yes −1.28 (-4.15, 1.36) −1.04 (-4.37, 2.26)
Age: 18 → 25 3.81 (3.31, 4.27) 3.69 (3.27, 4.10)
Age: 25 → 45 9.88 (8.63, 11.05) 10.16 (8.98, 10.07)
Age: 45 → 65 7.99 (7.11, 8.79) 9.11 (8.12, 10.07)
Gender: Male → Female 3.50 (2.75, 4.25) 4.38 (3.53, 5.24)
Race: White → Black 8.38 (6.96, 9.72) 13.27 (11.68, 14.95)
Race: White → Asian −9.56 (-12.20, -7.05) −11.19 (-14.11, -8.29)
Race: White → Other 0.61 (-1.29, 2.49) 0.09 (-1.75, 2.11)
Hispanic: No → Yes −4.14 (-5.80, -2.67) −4.25 (-6.05, -2.45)
Income: Level 8 → Level 11 3.32 (3.00, 3.66) 5.11 (4.73, 5.49)
Income: Level 11 → Level 14 2.97 (2.72, 3.24) 4.67 (4.36, 4.98)
Education: High School → Some College 0.87 (-0.23, 1.89) 0.00 (-1.17, 1.24)
Education: Some College → College 12.51 (11.43, 13.60) 15.23 (13.98, 16.46)
Education: College → Postgraduate 0.20 (-0.95, 1.31) 0.86 (-0.46, 2.28)
Employment: Employed → Unemployed −6.27 (-7.48, -5.03) −7.69 (-9.13, -6.17)
Employment: Employed → Not in Labor Force −4.64 (-5.79, -3.59) −4.87 (-6.14, -3.58)
Recent Mover: No → Yes −6.50 (-7.32, -5.59) −7.97 (-9.03, -6.93)
Margin of Victory: 1% → 5% 0.38 (-0.02, 0.84) −0.02 (-0.50, 0.47)
EDR: No → Yes −3.81 (-10.00, 1.37) −1.54 (-8.52, 4.48)
Online Registration: No → Yes 0.06 (-1.81, 1.84) 1.25 (-0.99, 3.45)
Early: No → Yes −4.74 (-11.98, 3.06)
Absentee: No → Yes 2.88 (-3.89, 9.45)
Postal: No → Yes 3.08 (-5.30, 10.32)
This table delineates the discrete differences in the outcome associated with each independent variable
in the regression model, along with the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
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is due to a shock to the mobilization patterns among African Americans in response to
the Obama campaign (2013). Less surprisingly, the propensity to participate increases
with each level of income. For education level, the only significant leap occurs between
“some college” and “college,” suggesting that (in this subsample) the primary driver
might be a binary indicator of a college degree. Those who are employed are more
likely to engage than both those are unemployed and those who have are not in the
labor force, and the gap is significantly wider for the unemployed; the estimated effects
for membership of these two groups, however, are not statistically distinguishable,
offering evidence against my hypothesis that these two subpopulations would behave
differently. The effect of the last demographic variable, a metric of residential stability,
is in the expected direction; those who have moved recently are less likely to be
registered and to participate (McDonald 2008).
None of the coefficients on the state-level covariates (aside from the state fixed
effects) exhibit statistical significance. Matching reduces the size of the dataset, and
consequently, the statistical power of the model; it is possible that a larger dataset
might shed more light on these associations. Additionally, some of the variation
could be absorbed or conflated by the state-level fixed effects. In any case, these
results should be interpreted with care. It is important to note that the causal effect
of these convenience voting procedures is not fully identified, for any policy. These
estimates represent the (weighted) change in turnout associated with states offering
that particular method. To identify the causal effect, I would need to include at
least one pre-treatment wave for each each state that offers the procedure, and all
of these convenience voting procedures were implemented in at least one state prior
to the 2008 election. Given that the Census only recently altered its survey design
to capture disability more effectively (Schur and Kruse 2011; Alvarez and Hall 2012;
Schur and Adya 2013), I can only include the 2008 and 2012 implementations.
For the purposes of this paper, the most interesting result is that the total effect
of disability is not statistically distinguishable from the null in the extended model.
In other words, disability status in and of itself is not a significant determinant of
turnout. The negative impact of disability on participation identified in Table 3.1 is
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actually borne primarily by a specific subset of individuals who report disabilities.
To isolate these interactive effects, I take the cross-partial derivative of the entire
expression, with respect to disability status and the other interacted covariate of
interest (for an extended discussion of identifying these effects in non-linear models,
see Ai and Norton 2003).25 Figure 3.3 depicts the distribution of these interactive
effects.
These results strongly suggest that the primary mechanism through which disabil-
ity reduces participation is in some way associated with employment status, echoing
the conclusions of Schur and Kruse (2000) and Schur et al. (2002). In my model, the
coefficient on the main effect of disability is greatly reduced in magnitude, and loses
statistical significance (see Table 3.A6 in the Supplementary Materials), and the in-
teractive effects of disability with unemployment and absence from the labor force are
quite pronounced. A few different explanations exist.26 The first explanation involves
accessibility. Individuals who are disabled but currently employed have been able to
adopt a lifestyle similar to those who do not report disabilities. The second relates to
resources. Individuals who are employed are more likely to be able to afford monetary
costs that participation may entail —for example, transportation or childcare. The
final considers mobilization. Individuals who are employed may be more engaged in
their communities, and therefore, more likely to encounter typical get-out-the-vote
stimuli. Without further descriptive information about the individuals who are not
employed, it is difficult to tease out which explanation plays a dominant role.
The other takeaway is somewhat disheartening for those working toward improv-
ing the representativeness of the electorate: There is no evidence from this investiga-
tion that convenience voting procedures particularly mitigate the heightened barriers
faced by individuals with disabilities, for either registration or turnout. The inter-
active effect is not statistically distinguishable from the null for any of the electoral
procedures I consider. This outcome accords with the hypothesis in Berinsky (2005)
25The following identity is relatively straightforward: ∆Pr∆X∆D = Φ(x = x1, d = 1) − Φ(x = x0, d =
1)− Φ(x = x1, d = 0) + Φ(x = x0, d = 0).
26Much of the scholarship in this area focuses on accessibility, resources, and mobilization, per an
excellent inquiry into participation by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).
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Figure 3.3: Interactive Effects on Participation
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that these reforms do not improve the representativeness of the electorate, but simply
expedite the process for individuals who would participate regardless. Notably, these
results imply a different level of success of convenience voting than the slightly more
optimistic findings of Alvarez and Hall (2012), who identified a marginally positive
interactive effect with early and absentee voting on turnout. These authors also note
that an individual with a disability is less likely to gain from EDR, though impor-
tantly, the total effect of EDR is still positive.
My results do not directly conflict with those of Alvarez and Hall (2012), however.
Although matching has a number of appealing features, explained above, it does
come with one important cost: By extracting a subset of the original dataset, it
inevitably reduces the statistical power of the model. Alvarez and Hall consider each
electoral cross section separately, but even though I pool across two cross sections,
the number of individuals in a single cross section of CPS data nearly doubles the
number of individuals in my matched (pooled) dataset. Furthermore, those authors
measured absentee voting differently; more explicitly, they distinguish states that
allow permanent absentee status. My data consider a single indicator of whether a
state allows a resident to vote absentee without an excuse. And finally, Alvarez and
Hall set a (singular) specified list of values for the other covariates. I take a broader
scope, focusing not on a prototypical individual but using the observed values of the
remaining covariates and averaging across the sample, as prescribed by Hanmer and
Kalkan (2013).27
3.8 Discussion
The first contribution of this chapter is methodological. The matching estimates offer
evidence that concerns about selection are both theoretically and empirically justified.
Although the estimated effects of disability status on participation achieve statistical
significance for all datasets, matching typically reduced the magnitude. Substantively,
27More technically, those authors focus on the marginal interactive effect, evaluated at a specific
point on the plane. I average the discrete double difference over all points occupied in the plane.
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my results suggest that the average effect of disability status on participation is
negative and statically significant, but a closer investigation reveals that this finding
is being driven almost entirely by individuals who are not employed. Thus, disability
status mainly affects participation in its interaction with employment, a result that
substantiates the conclusions in Schur and Kruse (2000) and Schur et al. (2002).
It is extremely important for future research to evaluate the mechanisms driving
this result, since there are a variety of possible explanations. Chiefly, there is fairly
broad concern among advocates for the disabled that despite legislative efforts, the
barriers to voting (particularly in person) remain prohibitively high (Baker, Roy, and
Moon 2005). Accessibility is improving, but certainly still characterizes modern elec-
tions (Bovbjerg 2009). However, election officials are typically subject to tight budget
constraints, and even the most sympathetic to accessibility concerns may be logisti-
cally prohibited from implementing policy changes. Advocates interested in policy
reform should consider local pilot studies and qualitative feedback to prioritize which
features to target. Secondly, the barriers may be cognitive rather than physical; that
is, even if the polling place is physically accessible, information about the campaigns
and political process may not be (Alvarez and Hall 2012). Finding a means of dis-
seminating political information more effectively might be an important next step in
stimulating turnout among all under-represented subgroups, including the disabled
(cf. Berinsky 2005). And finally, it remains possible that those with disabilities are
simply less interested in politics; they may feel alienated by their current representa-
tives, jaded by the political system, or simply disinclined to participate. Apathy is
fairly widespread among non-voters, and those interested in mobilization must find
some way to capture the interest of abstainers. Any combination of these factors
—and others —could contribute to the reduced likelihood of participation among the
disabled, and subsequent research should find some way to quantify the composition
of these competing mechanisms’ roles. To improve the participation rate, we must




Figure 3.A1: Density of Age Distribution by Disability Status and Dataset (2008)
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Table 3.A1: Balance Statistics, Before and After Matching (2008)
Standard Mean Difference
Before Matching Propensity Score Mahalanobis Distance Genetic
Age 88.95 −1.29 2.83 1.79
Female 2.69 −2.07 0.02 −0.35
Black 3.71 2.82 −0.77 0.44
Asian 5.64 2.72 6.85 8.27
Other Race −0.52 −4.05 −2.87 −4.42
Hispanic −6.69 1.80 0.00 0.04
High School −34.89 −0.97 1.29 2.84
Some College 43.12 −1.40 −3.97 −10.15
Postgraduate −7.93 1.93 2.77 8.01
Unemployed 114.53 −1.87 0.64 0.07
Not in Labor Force −9.36 −1.92 0.40 0.27
Income −73.14 −3.88 −4.99 −3.64
Variance Ratio (Treated/Control)
Before Matching Propensity Score Mahalanobis Distance Genetic
Age 1.06 0.89 0.99 0.99
Female 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Black 1.12 1.09 0.98 1.01
Asian 1.41 1.16 1.55 1.75
Other Race 1.01 1.09 1.06 1.10
Hispanic 0.81 1.07 1.00 1.00
High School 0.67 0.98 1.02 1.05
Some College 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.05
Postgraduate 0.89 1.03 1.05 1.16
Unemployed 1.04 1.02 0.99 1.00
Not in Labor Force 0.65 0.90 1.02 1.02
Income 1.39 1.05 1.06 1.04
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Table 3.A2: Balance Statistics, Before and After Matching (2012)
Standard Mean Difference
Before Matching Propensity Score Mahalanobis Distance Genetic
Age 94.09 −2.78 3.26 1.85
Female 3.38 −3.94 −0.09 0.07
Black 4.44 3.40 0.57 1.20
Asian −13.21 0.76 −0.82 −0.44
Other Race 4.46 −0.05 1.18 1.97
Hispanic −9.71 3.69 0.07 2.12
High School 44.18 2.73 −2.85 −3.81
Some College −7.14 −3.04 1.03 1.78
Postgraduate −24.55 0.65 1.49 1.45
Unemployed −11.87 −1.44 2.05 4.54
Not in Labor Force 120.40 −1.62 0.36 0.83
Income −67.46 −5.14 −4.24 −4.77
Variance Ratio (Treated/Control)
Before Matching Propensity Score Mahalanobis Distance Genetic
Age 0.94 0.95 0.99 1.00
Female 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00
Black 1.13 1.09 1.01 1.03
Asian 0.53 1.05 0.95 0.97
Other Race 1.30 1.00 1.06 1.11
Hispanic 0.74 1.16 1.00 1.09
High School 1.05 0.99 1.01 1.01
Some College 0.90 0.95 1.02 1.03
Postgraduate 0.53 1.03 1.06 1.06
Unemployed 0.59 0.92 1.14 1.37
Not in Labor Force 0.88 1.02 1.00 0.99
Income 1.28 1.03 1.05 1.06
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Table 3.A3: Participation Rates by Subgroup (Unweighted)
Registered Voted
Disability No Disability Gap Disability No Disability Gap
Age 17 - 25 41.32 61.41 −20.09 28.10 48.72 −20.62
Age 26 - 45 65.65 79.51 −13.86 46.82 67.90 −21.08
Age 46 - 65 74.69 86.97 −12.28 64.76 78.88 −14.12
Age 66+ 85.53 91.36 −5.83 74.23 86.25 −12.02
Male 76.18 79.16 −2.98 65.67 68.49 −2.82
Female 78.21 83.78 −5.57 65.19 75.36 −10.17
White 77.53 81.91 −4.38 65.65 72.24 −6.59
Black 80.13 85.54 −5.41 71.79 78.42 −6.63
Asian 52.54 67.39 −14.85 33.90 58.19 −24.29
Other Race 75.82 73.93 1.89 57.14 60.43 −3.29
Not Hispanic 77.60 82.75 −5.15 65.78 73.45 −7.67
Hispanic 71.51 67.69 3.82 59.30 55.92 3.38
High School 70.90 70.08 0.82 57.83 58.18 −0.35
Some College 84.30 82.42 1.88 71.96 71.85 0.11
College 88.82 89.96 −1.14 79.19 82.11 −2.92
Postgraduate 90.67 94.82 −4.15 88.00 90.69 −2.69
Employed 81.49 82.68 −1.19 71.90 72.88 −0.98
Unemployed 71.43 70.53 0.90 61.90 58.22 3.68
Not in Labor Force 76.38 80.70 −4.32 63.88 72.43 −8.55
Did Not Move 81.28 86.36 −5.08 70.56 78.17 −7.61
Recent Mover 68.06 73.65 −5.59 53.66 62.01 −8.35
No EDR 77.52 81.15 −3.63 65.54 70.96 −5.42
EDR 76.07 83.57 −7.50 64.82 77.22 −12.40
No Online Reg 77.01 82.03 −5.02 64.32 72.08 −7.76
Online Reg 78.01 80.32 −2.31 68.74 72.17 −3.43
No Early 65.35 74.42 −9.07
Early 65.45 70.54 −5.09
No Abs 64.16 71.81 −7.65
Abs 66.76 72.41 −5.65
No Mail 65.14 71.98 −6.84























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A6: Participation Models, with Interactions
Registration Turnout
Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
Constant 0.283 (0.149) −0.210 (0.149)
Disabled 0.061 (0.062) 0.152 (0.062)
Age 0.018 (0.001) 0.019 (0.001)
Female 0.142 (0.015) 0.145 (0.014)
Black 0.387 (0.035) 0.495 (0.032)
Asian −0.341 (0.047) −0.344 (0.045)
Other Race 0.024 (0.037) 0.003 (0.034)
Income 0.045 (0.002) 0.055 (0.002)
High School −0.588 (0.026) −0.521 (0.023)
Some College −0.557 (0.026) −0.521 (0.024)
Postgraduate 0.012 (0.034) 0.036 (0.029)
Unemployed −0.223 (0.030) −0.200 (0.028)
Not in Labor Force −0.152 (0.026) −0.100 (0.024)
Recent Mover −0.256 (0.017) −0.257 (0.016)
Margin of Victory 0.004 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
EDR −0.152 (0.116) −0.038 (0.105)
Online Registration 0.003 (0.038) 0.017 (0.038)
Early Voting −0.182 (0.131)
Absentee Voting 0.106 (0.114)
Postal Voting 0.125 (0.139)
Interactions
Age −0.002 (0.001) −0.004 (0.001)
Unemployed −0.113 (0.046) −0.179 (0.042)
Not in Labor Force −0.140 (0.053) −0.207 (0.048)
EDR 0.006 (0.045) −0.039 (0.043)
Online Registration 0.000 (0.057) 0.076 (0.059)
Early Voting 0.073 (0.043)
Absentee Voting −0.033 (0.042)
Postal Voting −0.061 (0.094)
N 39,341 39,341
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.127
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Chapter 4
In Line or Online? American Voter
Registration in the Digital Era
4.1 Summary
Within the past decade, an increasing number of states have begun to allow their
residents to register as voters electronically. Like other efforts to increase political
participation, though, the actual impact on registration and turnout remains unclear.
Although other voting liberalizations have received a fair amount of scrutiny, the peer-
reviewed literature does not include a systematic exploration of how individuals are
responding to online registration. This chapter estimates an individual-level model of
the impact of online registration on the propensities to register and vote. The results
suggest that online registration may be one of the more successful implementations
of convenience voting, though its impact is still fairly minimal. Perhaps even more
importantly, its effects seem to be concentrated most highly among young adults and
those who have moved recently, two subgroups that are consistently under-represented
at the polls. At the aggregate level, several states in both the 2008 and 2012 Pres-
idential elections could have experienced different outcomes had they offered online
registration.1
1A version of this chapter appears in Pellissier (2015).
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4.2 Introduction
Online voter registration is the byproduct of sustained interest in stimulating partic-
ipation and the modernization of the election process. It is the latest innovation in a
series of policies that aim to reduce the costs associated with electoral participation.
Beginning with Arizona in 2002, a number of states now allow their residents to com-
plete and submit their registration paperwork over the Internet. Media outlets and
election administrators have enthusiastically announced that thousands of citizens
have taken advantage of this option.2
Without further inquiry, however, we cannot know if these individuals would have
registered regardless, and if online registration will merely have a substitutive impact.
A few recent papers address this question (notably, Baretto et al. 2010 and Garćıa
Bedolla and Veléz 2013), and several news outlets have published articles, but the
body of peer-reviewed literature is entirely silent. Meanwhile, legislators, election
administrators, and the press have touted online registration as a natural evolution
in an increasingly technological election environment, and an innovation that will
encourage participation from historically underrepresented demographic subgroups,
particularly young adults.
Yet other voting reforms have been accompanied by similar promises, and failed
to produce the eagerly-anticipated results. Instead, there is evidence that these re-
forms simplify the process for the politically engaged, but fail to stimulate turnout
from those who typically abstain (Berinsky 2005). For decades, turnout in Ameri-
can presidential elections has hovered around 60% of the voting-eligible population
(Leighley and Nagler 2014). Turnout in midterm and local elections typically has
dipped even lower; recent turnout in midterm elections has hovered between 40% and
42%.3 Despite concentrated efforts to mobilize eligible voters, low turnout rates have
proved pervasive, as the United States perennially lags behind other democracies in
participation rates (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Hanmer 2007, 2009).
2See, for example, Merl (2012).
3More specifically, 40.5% in 2002, 41.3% in 2006, and 41.7% in 2010, according to McDonald’s
estimates, per http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm.
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To assess whether online registration reshapes the turnout puzzle, I use an individual-
level model that estimates the relationship between online registration and political
behavior, at both the registration and turnout stages. Although its enduring legacy
remains to be seen, I find evidence that online registration does somewhat effectively
stimulate participation in the voting process. Furthermore, the effect seems to become
more pronounced as it becomes institutionalized within the state. I also execute re-
gressions on subsamples of theoretical interest —young adults, ethnic minorities, and
those who moved recently. The results suggest that young adults and recent movers
are utilizing this registration opportunity to some degree, but it is unlikely to generate
a more ethnically representative electorate. And in the final component of analysis,
I use the fitted model to predict counterfactual aggregate turnout in states that did
not allow online registration in 2008 and 2012. The predicted influx of voters exceeds
the margin of victory in the Presidential contest for a handful of states, though it is
difficult to know whether electoral outcomes would change without additional data.
I explore this question in the next chapter.
In the following sections, I first present a brief review of the broader literature
on convenience voting. I then offer an overview of the limited history of online regis-
tration in American elections, engaging the few inquiries into its efficacy. The next
section details the econometric methods I use to tackle this question of causal in-
ference. After presenting the results at the individual level, I use the fitted model
to predict aggregate turnout for the 2008 and 2012 elections if control states had
introduced online registration. I conclude with a discussion of the results, and the
implications for this and other mobilization efforts.
4.3 Convenience Voting
Since the initial inquiry of Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978), a number of voices have
contributed to the debate of the efficacy of various voter reforms.4 A tension has
emerged within the literature, as some scholars have identified a meaningful impact
4For nice reviews of the literature, see Gronke et al. (2008) and Highton (2004).
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while others have painted a murkier picture. The most optimistic papers suggest
that certain liberalizations (particularly EDR) can substantially increase turnout,
and perhaps more importantly, yield an electorate that more accurately reflects the
demographic distribution of voting-eligible citizens (e.g., Alvarez and Nagler 2007,
2008, 2011; Knack and White 2000; Brians and Grofman 2001; Burden et al. 2014).
These papers acknowledge that no reform is a panacea for the turnout problem, but
they express hope that certain reforms can make participation more accessible for
some subgroups that are systematically under-represented.
Other papers on convenience voting arrive at more conservative estimates and
more ambiguous conclusions. These papers tend to emphasize that while specific im-
plementations have yielded isolated success stories, by and large, we simply have not
seen the promised and anticipated results (Hanmer 2007, 2009; Neiheisel and Bur-
den 2012; Keele and Minozzi 2013). Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller (2007)
contend that all-postal voting stimulates turnout, but point out that early voting is
correlated with reduced participation. Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006) approach
this question somewhat differently, asking how the introduction of registration laws
depressed turnout in New York and Ohio; the authors conclude that the effect was
actually fairly muted, leading them to suggest that registration barriers are not an
overwhelming factor in the turnout calculus. Importantly, even local successes of con-
venience voting might warrant a caveat; convenience voting procedures might simply
aid retention, rather than increase engagement (Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott 2005).
Finally, the most dismal studies suggest that all these reforms simply streamline
the process for those who are already interested in politics, and that to engage non-
voters, we must entirely re-conceptualize our efforts to mobilize voters (Berinsky
2005; see also Glynn and Quinn 2011). Berinsky (2005) aptly points out that reform
efforts have targeted the more obvious costs, but have thus far failed to address the
barriers introduced by cognitive costs. That is, to entice non-voters, we must find
some means of communicating information about politics in a more accessible manner.
And furthermore, all these attempts to stimulate participation might have pernicious
unintended consequences (Berinsky 2005; Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott 2005). One
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potential drawback of EDR, for instance, is that delayed registration might hinder
parties in their mobilization efforts, since those who register on Election Day are
not included in any registration databases (Neiheisel and Burden 2012). Another
paper suggests that early voting actually alters the civic atmosphere surrounding the
electoral process and diminishes the “Get Out the Vote” effort (Burden et al. 2014).
Thus, although there is a healthy literature on barriers to participation, the debate
on the efficacy of convenience voting procedures remains unresolved. Moreover, the
peer-reviewed literature has yet to establish a niche for online registration, and so
it is unclear whether its implementation in any way shifts the debate. Given the
increasing popularity of this registration alternative, this chapter offers an important
initial investigation. Fortunately, the literature on convenience methods, particularly
EDR, offers a nice methodological blueprint for this line of inquiry.
4.4 Registration in the Digital Era
Before proceeding further, it is useful to consider online registration in the context
of the modern electoral landscape, a landscape whose frontier is a function of the
available technology. In the wake of the high-profile technological failures of the
2000 presidential election, political scientists have devoted considerable attention to
how we can modernize the technology in election administration (Alvarez and Hall
2014). Academics across several disciplines collaborated to form the Caltech/MIT
Voting Technology Project, which advances research that addresses obsolete tech-
nology. Proposals to incorporate new forms of technology are often met with public
resistance, with parties worrying that their opposition will exploit the new technology
(Alvarez and Hall 2008).
Registration problems are a consistent source of concern in American elections
(Ansolabehere and Hersh 2014). The advent of online registration in America coin-
cides nicely with legislative efforts to utilize technology to improve the registration
process. In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, which requires states
to maintain electronic registered voter databases; this feature allows potential voters
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to verify their registration status prior to Election Day, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, the registration closing date for their states of residence. Online registration
is a somewhat natural extension, then, of the digitalization of registration records.
Recent work has suggested that online registration will allow more accurate reg-
istration databases: Individuals verify their own personal information on registration
forms, and digitalized depositories will streamline the process of cross-referencing poll-
books across jurisdictions (PCEA 2014). Moreover, there is evidence that the Internet
is a viable tool for engaging the citizenry. With information about candidates, issues,
and campaigns accessible online, citizens may find obtaining political knowledge less
costly, and may consequently become more politically active (Tolbert and McNeal
2003). Future elections could feature the widespread use of online registration drives
at schools and libraries. As online registration gains traction, the literature should
explore how this policy influences mobilization, as other forms of convenience voting
have had important implications for campaigns (Gronke et al. 2008).
It is important to clarify just what online registration entails, and how it differs
from other registration mechanisms. Citizens in every state may fill out registration
paperwork online, but in most, they must print and return their paperwork via fax
or postal mail. The states that offer online registration allow residents to submit the
forms online. Typically, this option is limited to citizens with a driver’s license or other
form of state-issued identification. The website retrieves the citizen’s signature from
that form of identification (which is stored electronically) for the voter registration
paperwork.
Arizona spearheaded this movement in 2002, and eighteen states have since fol-
lowed suit:5 Washington (2008); Kansas (2009); Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Ore-
gon, and Utah (2010); New York (2011); California, Maryland, Nevada, and South
Carolina (2012); Minnesota, Virginia (2013); Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Missouri (2014); and Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and West Virginia (legisla-
tion passed, but not yet implemented). This voting initiative has received support
5For a current list, see http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/
electronic-or-online-voter-registration.aspx.
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and criticism from both major political parties. Typically, the majority party in the
state legislature has supported the legislation, and some members of the minority
party have vocalized concerns of fraud.6 By and large, however, policymakers of both
major political parties have embraced online registration (PCEA 2014).
Proponents point out that this form of registration is much cheaper for the state
and leads to fewer clerical errors, since individuals —rather than bureaucrats or third-
party registrants —verify the accuracy of their own information. In Arizona, for
example, the estimated difference in cost for the state is approximately $ 0.80 per
registrant (Barreto et al. 2010). Such features make online registration an appealing
alternative from an administrative perspective, given the inaccuracies that peren-
nially plague registration databases (Alvarez and Hall 2014). By adding an online
alternative, potential registrants have an option that is often more convenient and
less time-intensive. On the other hand, online registration may “crowd out” proven
methods of encouraging citizens to register. Furthermore, voters may fall into the
“procrastination trap”: Registration appears so costless that they put it off until
another time, and realize too late that they have neglected the process (cf. Bennion
and Nickerson 2011). The primary concern among the popular press and dissenting
legislators, however, appears to be potential fraud; detractors worry that there will
not be enough oversight to ensure that only voting-eligible citizens are using this
option.7
As online registration has gained traction, it has naturally attracted a brighter
spotlight in the public debate on election administration. The 2012 Presidential
election featured many news articles that questioned how online registration would
affect turnout. To date, though, very little research directly examines whether online
registration encourages additional participation. Studies that have been published
outside of academic journals give grounds for optimism about the potential impact
of online registration, particularly for young adults, who traditionally participate at
lower rates. Baretto et al. published a report of how citizens are utilizing online
6See Achohido (2012).
7As just one example, see Perlroth (2012).
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registration in the two states that implemented it first, Arizona and Washington
(2010). Those who are registering via this mechanism are disproportionately young.
The authors laud the fact that those who register online actually cast ballots at higher
rates than their counterparts, suggesting that this method of registration might do
more to stimulate actual turnout than other alternatives. And in a study of online
registrants in California prior to the most recent election, Garćıa Bedolla and Veléz
(2013) find that most belonged to the youngest cohort of eligible voters, though a
large number also belonged to other age brackets. Additionally, many of the online
registrants in San Diego and Alameda Counties belonged to low- or middle-income
brackets.8
While the above papers consider case studies of online registration in particular
states, I am interested in gauging the impact on the decision-making process at an
individual level. Furthermore, I want to predict how online registration could shift
participation rates in states that have not yet implemented it. Before I describe my
identification strategy for these tasks, it is worth quickly reviewing the theoretical
decision-making process for electoral participation.
4.5 The Voting Calculus
Although the act of voting in today’s American elections is technically “free,” the
actual process is nonetheless accompanied by certain inconveniences. As described
in Chapter 2, these costs depress participation (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook
1968). Because registration is a prerequisite for voting, we can also expect these costs
to affect behavior. Currently, all states except North Dakota require that citizens
register prior to (or in some states, concurrently with) casting a ballot. The United
States is somewhat unusual among Western democracies in that registration is both
voluntary and passive (Alvarez and Hall 2014); that is, individuals do not face any
kind of penalty for neglecting to register, and the burden of registration is on the
8The authors examined only these counties, selected for their volume of online registrants and
socioeconomic heterogeneity.
71
citizen rather than the government. Embedded within this utilitarian framework,
then, are any costs that the individual must incur to complete the registration process.
We can expect online registration to increase aggregate turnout if it provides a
substantial reduction in cost for a subset of non-registrants. More explicitly, for some
individuals, the introduction of online registration must reduce the cost of registration
enough that the expected utility crosses the threshold from negative to positive. Put
differently, the cost of the entire voting process must be sufficiently low with the
advent of online registration and prohibitively high otherwise.
It is reasonable to infer that the advent of online registration will reduce the
overall costs associated with electoral participation. Citizens can complete this stage
of the voting process from their homes, offices, or schools without the inconvenience
of driving to a government building or waiting in line; they can register at their most
convenient time, without having to consider the business hours of registration sites.
And although many states address these concerns by allowing their residents to mail
or fax registration forms, even this additional step might be exceedingly cumbersome.
Additionally, there is some evidence that online registration reduces the incidence of
clerical error among registration pollbooks (PCEA 2014). While states often have
provisional voting procedures that accommodate such inaccuracies, these kinds of
clerical errors at best increase the hassle of the voting process and at worst effectively
disenfranchise would-be voters (cf. Alvarez and Hall 2014; Ansolabehere and Hersh
2014).
As is the case with EDR, it is unlikely that online registration will in and of itself
stimulate participation among registered non-voters (cf. Glynn and Quinn 2011).
Certainly, online registration will reduce the overall cost of voting for some subset
of non-registrants, but the task at hand is to distinguish those who would register
regardless from those who would register only if the online alternative is available.
From a public policy perspective, it might be normatively desirable to reduce the
burden of registration independent of the impact on turnout, but the lingering ques-




With this intellectual history in mind, I turn to the primary questions of this chapter:
Does online voter registration actually fulfill its promise to capture new segments
of the electorate, or does it simply make the registration process easier for those
would participate regardless? Does it do anything to stimulate participation among
the historically underrepresented? To answer these questions, I need a model that
identifies and estimates the probability that an individual votes with and without the
opportunity to register online. As with any question of causal inference, I encounter
the challenge that I do not observe the counterfactual. In this particular case, I cannot
simultaneously know an individual’s voting behavior with and without treatment
exposure, since for each election the individual experiences only one of these two
states of the world. To derive estimates of how individuals would behave in the
counterfactual, I can use an experimental design that is within-unit (if their treatment
status changes over time) or between-unit. To my knowledge, there does not exist a
longitudinal survey that asks individuals about their registration and voting behavior
before and after exposure to the online registration treatment. Fortunately, though,
I can exploit the heterogeneity in the availability of online registration across states
and time to accommodate a between-unit approach.
To this end, I rely on the Rosenstone-Wolfinger design discussed in Chapter 2.
The outcome of interest —turnout, and in this case, registration as well —is modeled
as a probabilistic function of various demographic features, electoral characteristics,
and the treatment (online registration):9
P(Yist = 1) = Φ(α +Xistβ + Zstρ+ δTst + γs + θt + εist).
9I follow the conventional approach in the literature for modeling turnout, and the precedent estab-
lished in Mitchell and Wleizen (1995) and Alvarez and Hall (2012) for registration. For a discussion
of modeling the joint distributions of registration and turnout, and an alternative approach to mod-
eling registration, see Achen (2008). Furthermore, it is quite possible that changes in registration
policy can shift GOTV efforts (Gronke et al. 2008); as online registration becomes more promi-
nent within American elections, it will be worth considering how mobilization groups alter their
strategies in response.
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Previous papers have used probit (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Leighley and
Nagler 1992; Alvarez and Nagler 2007, 2008, 2011), logit (Highton 1997; McDonald
2008), and scobit (Nagler 1994) regressions; I select the probit link but include other
structural forms in the Supplementary Materials as a robustness check.10
In this specification, Y is a binary variable indicating whether or not the individual
participated (registered or voted, depending on the outcome of interest); X is a vector
of demographic covariates; Z is a vector of controls for the local political climate; and
T is a binary variable indicating whether the state offered online registration for that
particular election. State and year fixed effects (γ and θ, respectively) account for
heterogeneity in electoral trends dictated by geography and time. The demographic
covariates are taken from a long stream of literature that has explored heterogeneity
in voting behavior: age, gender, ethnicity, income, education, employment, and res-
idential mobility. The electoral controls are the competitiveness of the election and
the availability of the most prominent forms of convenience voting; I include EDR in
the model of registration behavior and EDR, early voting, no-excuse absentee voting,
and vote by mail in the model of turnout.11
Like many other papers in this area, I rely primarily on data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), a survey jointly administered by the Census Bureau and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.12 Every presidential and midterm election, the CPS
also includes a Voter Supplement, which asks respondents a series of questions about
their registration and voting behavior. The CPS is quite extensive, with each imple-
mentation surveying tens of thousands of respondents. Thus, the overall sample is
quite large, and more importantly, I observe a large number of individuals for each
state, for each election. Such a rich source of data offers us the opportunity to explore
political participation using a model with adequate statistical power.
10See Tables 4.A11 and 4.A12. The direction and significance of the main effects are not affected by
the variation in functional form.
11I see no strong theoretical reason to include early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, and vote by
mail when registration is the outcome of interest.
12For example, see Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978), Mitchell and Wlezien (1995), Alvarez and




Although the CPS does not track the same individuals across elections, I can leverage
the behavior of those who do not have access to online registration to draw inference
about the policy’s efficacy. Each cross-section of the survey samples tens of thousands
of respondents and lends itself quite naturally to a time-series cross-section design (see
Leighley and Nagler 2014; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; and particularly, Brians
and Grofman 2001). My sample includes each electoral cross-section from 2000 until
the most recent election in 2012.13 For the distribution of demographics and access
to convenience voting, refer to Tables 4.A1 and 4.A2 of the Supplementary Materials.
Somewhat problematically, a sizable minority of individuals refuse to answer ques-
tions regarding political participation, due to privacy concerns or simply memory
lapse. Furthermore, those who do respond may give incorrect information due to im-
perfect recall or social desirability concerns. There is reason to be skeptical that mea-
surement error and missingness are distributed as-if randomly among respondents,
and accordingly, some attention has been paid as to how to measure participation
appropriately (notably, see Katz and Katz 2010; Ansolabehere and Hersch 2012; Hur
and Achen 2013). The Census Bureau and many of the papers in this literature adopt
a somewhat conservative approach, coding all those who reply in the affirmative to
registration status and/or turnout as registrants and/or voters, and everyone else as
non-participators. I follow this precedent, but perform robustness checks both coding
non-responders as participants and dropping non-respondents.14
The literature on political participation considers both demographic and insti-
tutional predictors (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978). The model employs a host of
demographic covariates that can intervene in the relationship between online regis-
tration and participation: age, gender, ethnicity, income, education, and employment
status. I also include an indicator for those who moved within the last four years
13As described earlier, Arizona pioneered the treatment prior to the 2002 election. I therefore begin
with the 2000 cross-section to ensure that the sample contains residents who were and were not
allowed to register online for each state that adopted online registration over this time period.
14The estimates of the coefficients are actually the most conservative when using the Census Bureau’s
approach. For results using alternate coding, see Tables 4.A13 and 4.A14.
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as a measure of residential mobility, a well-known factor of predicting political be-
havior; moreover, there is evidence that recent movers may be particularly receptive
to convenience voting procedures (cf. McDonald 2008). Given that citizens have to
re-register every time they move, it is hardly surprising that those who moved within
the last four years are less likely to be registered and to vote. The CPS requests
such information from all respondents, and implements the Voter Supplement for all
voting-age citizens.15
Although demographic variables explain a substantial proportion of the variation
in registration and turnout, I would be remiss if I did not also control for institutional
factors that influence the electoral environment. Because turnout is systematically
higher in presidential elections, I include an indicator variable for these occurrences.
Additionally, it is important to consider the electoral competitiveness of the ballots;
it is well-documented that more competitive elections elicit greater likelihood of par-
ticipation. Even so, the discipline has yet to agree upon a benchmark measure of
competitiveness. To incorporate this feature of the electoral environment, I use the
margins of victory between the top two candidates in each state for its presidential,
U.S. senatorial, and gubernatorial elections (availability permitting); for each state,
I then take the narrowest of these three margins of victory and use it as the gauge
of competitiveness for that election. And lastly, I include other measures of conve-
nience voting: Election Day Registration, no-excuse absentee voting, no-fault early
voting, and vote by mail.16 Table 4.A3 in the Supplementary Materials delineates the
convenience voting procedures allowed by each state for each electoral cross-section.
15A non-trivial proportion of individuals refuse to report income and length at current address. The
results presented within the chapter use Complete Case Analysis.
16To construct this table, I relied primarily on an extensive data collection project by Cemenska
et al. (2009) as well as information published by the National Council of State Legislatures.
The Cemenska et al. dataset, although thoroughly researched and well-codified, has a couple
of drawbacks: It does not explicitly consider midterm elections, and it tracks legislation only
until 2008. The NCSL datasets are more current, but fail to report dates of implementation for
early and absentee voting procedures. I cross-referenced these two databases and searched state
legislation when necessary to delineate the convenience voting procedures in each state for each




Table 4.1 displays estimates of each variable’s impact on participation. For the full
probit results, refer to Figures 4.A1 and 4.A2 and Table 4.A4 of the Supplementary
Materials. A recent paper by Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) eloquently advocates that
researchers working with nonlinear models estimate quantities of interest using ob-
served values, rather than consider the effect on the “average case.” Occasionally, the
average case is of theoretical interest, but in this case (as in many others), the scope
lies far beyond the impact on individuals belonging to any particular demographic
background. Accordingly, I examine discrete differences for each variable while using
the observed values for the other covariates. In general, the signs on the coefficient
point estimates accord with the general consensus in the literature. Unless otherwise
noted in the discussion, the sign of the coefficient and significance level are the same
for both the registration and turnout models.
As expected, the discrete difference for each pair of ages is positive and statisti-
cally significant, confirming that older voters have higher propensities to participate.
Females are more likely than males to register and vote. For employment status, those
who are employed serve as the reference group; the negative effects on the variables
Unemployed and Not in the Labor Force indicate that individuals in these groups are
less likely to participate than those who are employed. Likewise, the relationships
among the education variables are predictable; the expected change in propensity to
vote is positive and statistically significant for each additional level of education. The
estimated effect of moving is significantly negative, supporting the general wisdom
that residential stability is an important correlate of political behavior.
One of the only surprising demographic results is that all else held constant, a
Black person has a greater likelihood of registering and voting than a White person.
This result could reflect a recent trend of increasing political participation among
minorities; indeed, the 2012 CPS reports that for the first time in American history,
blacks are participating at higher levels than whites (Census Bureau 2013). Thus,
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Table 4.1: Average Effect on Political Participation
Variable Registration Turnout
Age: 18 → 25 0.049 0.063
Age: 25 → 35 0.062 0.084
Age: 35 → 45 0.053 0.073
Age: 45 → 55 0.044 0.062
Age: 55 → 65 0.035 0.051
Male → Female 0.033 0.028
White → Black 0.050 0.083
White → Asian −0.160 −0.171
White → Other Race −0.028 −0.047
Non-Hispanic → Hispanic −0.046 −0.049
Income: Level 3 → Level 7 0.051 0.069
Income: Level 7 → Level 10 0.035 0.050
High School → Some College 0.137 0.150
Some College → College 0.046 0.070
College → Postgraduate 0.042 0.065
Employed →Unemployed −0.028 −0.033
Employed → Not in Labor Force −0.038 −0.033
Recent Mover: 0 → 1 −0.083 −0.100
Midterm → Presidential 0.029 0.145
Margin of Victory: 1% → 5% −0.001 −0.003
EDR: 0 → 1 −0.002 0.008
No-Fault Early: 0 → 1 −0.010
No-Excuse Absentee: 0 → 1 0.007
Vote by Mail: 0 → 1 0.010
Online Registration 0 → 1 0.014 0.018
This table delineates the estimated effects for each variable on
the outcome of interest. All estimates are statistically significant
at the 5% level.
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the positive estimated effect for African American heritage is perhaps less surprising
than it appears at first blush. The negative estimated effects of the other ethnicity
covariates indicate that Asians and those who belong to another race are less likely
to participate than Whites, and Hispanics are less likely to participate than non-
Hispanics.
The electoral variables are also somewhat in line with what we would expect.
An individual has a higher predicted probability of voting in a Presidential election
than a midterm election. Note, too, that the relative magnitude is particularly high
for the model of turnout; this result intuitively makes sense given that registration
typically carries over from other elections, so those who register during a Presidential
election are often still registered for the next midterm election. The estimated effect
of the margin of victory moving from 1% to 5% is negative, as we should expect; in
more competitive races, turnout is usually higher. The relative magnitude, however,
is quite small; it is possible that the intensity of the political climate is already
effectively captured by the state and year fixed effects.
Figure 4.1 displays the empirical distribution of discrete differences associated with
the most popular forms of convenience voting, including online registration. Before
discussing the differences associated with other forms of election policy, it is worth
mentioning that this model does not fully identify the causal relationship between
these variables and participation, as the dataset does not contain a pre-treatment
cross-section for each state offering these liberalizations. Instead, the measure cap-
tures the difference in participation associated with states that offer a particular
policy. The discrete difference associated with EDR is fairly minimal, in contrast to
cross-sectional designs that have suggested a pronounced, positive impact (Alvarez
and Nagler 2007, 2008, 2011; Brians and Grofman 2001; Burden et al. 2014). Other
forms of convenience voting, such as the opportunities to vote absentee (without an
excuse) and to vote by mail, exhibit similarly weak results. Meanwhile, the negative
effect associated with early voting lends credence to the concern in the literature that
this opportunity might reduce participation (Burden et al. 2014); at the very least,
there seems to be a culture of lower participation associated with states that allow
79
Figure 4.1: The Relationship Between Participation and Election Policies
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their residents to vote early.
And of course, the variable of primary interest is the availability of online registra-
tion. The estimated effect of online registration is positive and statistically significant
in both the registration and turnout models, indicating that individuals who live in
OR states are more likely both to register and to vote. Those who promote online reg-
istration as a promising mechanism for stimulating turnout will no doubt be pleased
to see evidence that individuals are taking advantage of this liberalization. Yet al-
though the nature of the relationship gives reason for optimism, I point out that the
relative magnitude is somewhat small, approximately 1.4% for registration and 1.8%
for turnout.17 Even so, it still seems to exert influence that matches or even exceeds
that of other forms of convenience voting.
Moreover, the discrete differences in Table 4.2 suggest that the impact of online
registration might become more pronounced over time.18 In the regression model,
treatment is no longer binary. Instead, states that are introducing online registration
for the first time are coded as “Wave 1,” and states that have allowed online regis-
tration for at least one previous election are coded as “Wave 2.”19 As an example,
Arizona introduced online registration prior to the 2002 midterm election. Thus, for
residents of Arizona in 2000, Wave 1 = Wave 2 = 0; in 2002, Wave 1 = 1 and Wave 2
= 0; and in 2004 —2012, Wave 1 = 0 and Wave 2 = 1. Because it might take time for
residents to become aware of the opportunity to register online, and/or states to work
out the kinks in the websites, there is theoretical reason to believe that the impact
might vary over time. For example, South Carolina introduced online registration
only four days prior to the closing date for the 2012 cross-section (Pew Center on the
States 2012); it is a priori unrealistic to assume that exposure to the treatment is
homogeneous across South Carolina, and Arizona, which had allowed online registra-
17The confidence intervals overlap, for the reader who may feel concerned that the impact on turnout
is higher than that on registration.
18For the full results, refer to Table 4.A5.
19Only two states (AZ and WA) allowed online registration for more than two electoral cross-sections,
so a model with additional waves runs the risk of conflating the effects of online registration with
electoral idiosyncrasies of these states. As we obtain data for additional cross sections, it will be
worthwhile to consider finer partitions.
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Table 4.2: Average Effect on Political Participation (Probit,
Treatment by Wave)
Variable Registration Turnout
Age: 18 → 25 0.049 0.063
Age: 25 → 35 0.062 0.084
Age: 35 → 45 0.053 0.073
Age: 45 → 55 0.044 0.062
Age: 55 → 65 0.035 0.051
Male → Female 0.033 0.028
White → Black 0.050 0.083
White → Asian −0.160 −0.171
White → Other Race −0.028 −0.047
Non-Hispanic → Hispanic −0.046 −0.049
Income: Level 3 → Level 7 0.051 0.069
Income: Level 7 → Level 10 0.035 0.050
High School → Some College 0.137 0.150
Some College → College 0.046 0.070
College → Postgraduate 0.042 0.065
Employed → Unemployed −0.028 −0.033
Employed → Not in Labor Force −0.038 −0.033
Recent Mover: 0 → 1 −0.083 −0.100
Midterm → Presidential 0.029 0.145
Margin of Victory: 1% → 5% −0.001 −0.003
EDR: 0 → 1 −0.002 0.009
No-Fault Early: 0 → 1 −0.010
No-Excuse Absentee: 0 → 1 0.008
Vote by Mail: 0 → 1 0.011
Control → Wave 1 0.008 0.010
Wave 1 → Wave 2 0.014 0.026
Control → Wave 2 0.022 0.036
This table delineates the estimated effects for each variable on
the outcome of interest. All estimates are statistically significant
at the 5% level.
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tion for ten years. The results of this model indeed suggest the presence of a lagged
effect, as evidenced by the positive (and statistically significant) estimated effect of
switching from a Wave 1 to a Wave 2 state. It is possible, then, that the estimated
effect of online registration is actually biased downward when the treatment is coded
as binary.
4.8.2 Spotlighting Under-represented Subgroups
Those who promote various forms of convenience voting often express a desire for an
electorate that is more representative of the voting-eligible population. Historically,
certain demographics have registered and voted at lower rates, and many policies seek
to reduce the institutional barriers that might discourage participation. In this vein,
I consider how individuals of particular demographic backgrounds interact with the
online registration treatment. In this case, I test for an interactive effect of online
registration and (1) age, (2) ethnicity, and (3) residential mobility. Fortunately, the
size of the CPS allows me to partition individuals into subgroups and still achieve
adequate statistical power. I execute the probit model using three separate subsam-
ples and estimate the average treatment effect of online registration for each: (1)
individuals under the age of 30, (2) racial minorities, and (3) recent movers. Table
4.3 displays the average treatment effect of online registration for each subsample;
Tables 4.A6, 4.A7, and 4.A8 report the full set of results.





Recent Movers 0.022 0.021
This table delineates the estimated treatment effect of
online registration on the outcome of interest for different
subsamples of interest. For the full set of results, see
Tables 4.A6, 4.A7, and 4.A8.
I will first discuss the impact on young voters. We have theoretical reason to
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suspect that young adults might be particularly affected by this registration oppor-
tunity, given their exposure to and utilization of technology. Indeed, the estimated
effect of online registration is positive and statistically significant in both outcome
models, and the estimated average treatment effect is 2.2% for registration and 2.7%
for turnout. Although these numbers may fall far short of advocates’ hopes, it is
nonetheless promising that at least some portion of this demographic is responding
to the opportunity. Interestingly, the coefficient on EDR achieves statistical signifi-
cance in the regression of turnout (unlike the analogous regression using the entire
sample), suggesting that perhaps this subgroup might reap greater benefits from con-
venience voting in general.
The results for ethnic minorities are less promising. Although the estimated effect
of online registration achieves statistical significance at the 5% level in the registration
model, it fails to reach any conventional level of significance in the turnout model.
The estimated average treatment effect is approximately 1.5% for registration and less
than 1% for turnout, suggesting that the gains —if existent —are minimal. We have
little reason to believe a priori that ethnic minorities will take particular advantage of
online registration, so these results are not especially surprising, but reformers seeking
a more ethnically representative electorate may have to pursue other approaches to
stimulate participation from this demographic subgroup.
And finally, as with young voters, there is evidence that recent movers respond
to this treatment at the registration and turnout stages. Because registration is tied
to residence, this subgroup would have to go through the registration process even
if they were registered prior to moving. Members of new communities may have
more reason to seek online resources rather than utilize the civic services, given their
lack of familiarity with and connection to the area. Additionally, online registration
might better inform residents of their assigned precincts, resulting in fewer mishaps
on Election Day. The average treatment effect is similar to that of young voters —just
over 2% for both registration and turnout, and significantly bounded away from null
in both models. And notably, the results are weaker for other forms of convenience
voting, suggesting that online registration might be the most effective attempt yet
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to capture this portion of the voting-eligible population. Again, these results hardly
suggest that online registration is bringing in new participants en masse, but they do
give cause for hesitant optimism.
4.8.3 Aggregate Results
As its advocates attempt to implement online registration, many will want to know
whether this reform will have any practical impact on the election. I have presented
the estimated impact at the individual level, but it remains unclear whether or not
online registration will actually have any bearing on the actual election. To explore
the real-world significance, for each state that did not allow online registration, I
estimate the number of additional votes if it had implemented such a system prior to
the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. To do so, for each control state, I estimate
the Average Treatment Effect on the Control (or the ATC), and then multiply this
quantity by the voting-eligible population.
I arrive at the measure of the ATC by using the point estimates from the fitted
model to predict the probability that each individual in a control state votes, with and
without OR available, and then averaging the difference over all respondents. More
explicitly, for each individual in a control state, I impute the following quantities:
P̂0(Yist = 1) = Φ(α̂ +Xistβ̂ + Zstρ̂+ γ̂s + θ̂t),
which is simply the fitted probability from the main effects model (recall that Tst = 0
for individuals in control states), and
P̂1(Yist = 1) = Φ(α̂ +Xistβ̂ + Zstρ̂+ δ̂ + γ̂s + θ̂t),
where δ̂ is the point estimate for the coefficient on online registration. I take their
difference to estimate the change in predicted probability:
∆̂ist = P̂1(Yist = 1)− P̂0(Yist = 1).
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For each state-year, I average over ∆ and multiply by the total voting-eligible pop-
ulation to arrive at the estimated influx of votes that online registration would have
generated.20 To broaden the scope of inference, I repeat this process twice, using the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient on online
registration.
Table 4.4: Estimated Influx of Voters
State Lower Bound Estimate Upper Bound Margin of Victory
NC 2008 70.832 108.119 144.965 14.177
MO 2008 45.861 69.996 93.841 3.903
IN 2008 53.557 81.830 109.824 28.391
FL 2008 129.294 197.235 264.290 236.148
MT 2008 6.908 10.530 14.100 11.723
FL 2012 146.480 223.729 300.158 74.309
NC 2012 77.987 119.124 159.832 92.004
OH 2012 97.774 149.368 200.436 166.272
I use the probit results in Table 4.A4 to estimate the additional votes that online
registration would have produced in the 2008 and the 2012 Presidential contests;
the final column of this table lists the actual margin of victory in that election. For
these states, the upper bound on the estimated influx exceeded the realized margin
of victory. Tables 4.A9 and 4.A10 report the results for every control state in 2008
and 2012, respectively.
Table 4.4 lists the states for which the upper bound on the estimated influx of
votes exceeds the actual margin of victory in the 2008 and 2012 Presidential contests;
Tables 4.A9 and 4.A10 report the information for each control state in the 2008 and
2012 election cycles. In each year, for a small collection of states, the margin of
victory between the top two presidential slates is contained within (or lies to the left
of) the projected interval. In 2008, for three states (IN, MO, NC), the margin of
victory is less than the lower bound for the estimated influx; the same is true of FL
in 2012.
Hypothetically, then, it is within the realm of possibility for online registration
to influence the outcome. The Voter Supplement does not detail partisan affiliation,
so it is difficult to estimate the partisan makeup of these additional votes. Consider,




though, Missouri in 2008. The margin of victory was 3903 votes, while the estimated
increase in turnout with online registration is 69,996; it is hardly inconceivable that
the partisan makeup of these additional voters could alter the outcome of the election.
This comparison gives merely a glimpse of the potential aggregate impact of this
form of convenience voting, but Missouri’s results in 2008 suggest that politicians
and campaign activists may want to consider the potential electoral implications. In
the next chapter, I will advance a method to predict the impact of online registration
on vote share.
4.9 Conclusion
Despite my skepticism that online registration would have any meaningful impact
on individual or aggregate turnout, the results of this investigation suggest that this
particular form of convenience voting may actually live up to the promises of its
enthusiasts. Indeed, the results of this investigation suggest that this reform may be
especially important for young adults and recent movers. Given these implications,
perhaps we can don our rose-colored glasses with fewer misgivings. On the other
hand, it is fair to point out that the results are driven primarily by the two most
recent cross-sections of data. As we amass additional data, future projects should
continue to evaluate whether online registration is part of the solution to the turnout
puzzle, or simply a distraction from the true barriers to universal participation.
Of course, conservative results are still entirely compatible with a normative case
for the online registration movement. Firstly, states save money and reduce error
when residents register themselves online (Baretto et al. 2010). Secondly, we can
expect that the effect, however minimal, will be positive; it would be extremely
surprising if voters became less likely to participate if given the opportunity to register
online (cf. Hanmer 2007, 2009; Glynn and Quinn 2011). And lastly, even if the effect
of online registration is purely one of substitution, we can still assume that overall
welfare has increased; the citizens who utilize online registration presumably find it
more convenient and less costly than other registration alternatives.
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The true effect of online voter registration remains to be seen, as the “waves”
treatment suggests (Table 4.2). In the future, more citizens may become aware of this
opportunity, and knowledge of the existence of online registration is a prerequisite to
its utilization. As more states’ election administrations consider online registration,
news coverage of the movement will increase. Others may learn through word of
mouth, and it is quite possible that voter mobilization groups will shift resources to
promoting this method. Decades passed in California before a substantial proportion
of citizens took advantage of no-excuse absentee voting (Alvarez, Levin, and Sinclair
2012). Furthermore, people are already completing more of their daily activities
online. And finally, as the voting base naturally shifts with each generation, we can
hope that the influx of new voters, who have greater technological exposure, will be
more likely to seek and pursue registration online.
On the other hand, while proponents of online voter registration have argued
that it will foster a new sense of political activism, the current project gives reason
to temper those expectations. It is fair to celebrate the potential impact on young
adults and recent movers, but we should bear in mind that there is currently little
evidence that online registration will capture other underrepresented segments of the
electorate, such as racial minorities. Consequently, the results of this study seem
to echo the concern that despite persistent reform efforts, we still have difficulty
encouraging fully representative participation (Berinsky 2005).
There is still a great deal of work to be done if we want to develop an accurate
metric for assessing the performance of these reforms. An assumption of condition-
ally exogenous selection is implicitly embedded within my research design, and this
assumption is tenuous at best (see Hanmer 2009). In other words, this method as-
sumes that whether or not an individual is treated is independent from how she would
respond to treatment. We might reasonably infer that if this assumption does not
hold in reality, our results might incorporate some bias, but just how this bias might
manifest itself remains unclear. Some papers have attempted to sidestep this assump-
tion by instead using nonparametric bounds (Glynn and Quinn 2011, Hanmer 2007),
but Hanmer (2007) admits that the results of this method are substantively unin-
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formative. Other papers have utilized an RDD approach (Keele and Minozzi 2013,
Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006), but opportunities to exploit this design are limited
by the structure of implementation. Furthermore, the literature does not fully ac-
count for the possibility that individuals may interact with the treatment differently,
and perhaps as a function of their demographic backgrounds. It seems inherently
plausible, for example, that only politically engaged citizens take advantage of these
reforms because they are the only ones aware of the liberalizations. Future papers
should consider and address the importance of salience in these reform efforts.
And finally, even with the fairly promising results presented in this paper, the
turnout puzzle remains unresolved. Despite numerous pieces of legislation designed
to reduce the costs of voting and millions of dollars poured into “Get Out the Vote”
campaigns, American elections are still characterized by low levels of participation
(Leighley and Nagler 1992). Even if it helps, online registration is not a panacea;
the most generous estimates of its promise do not suggest anything near universal
participation. This chapter acknowledges the concerns about the futility of mobiliza-
tion efforts and naturally begs the question of why these reforms are not having the
promised effect. Are non-voters so apathetic about politics that they are indifferent?
Are they convinced of the improbability of pivotality and unwilling to vote if there
is any cost? Or are they perhaps unaware of the reforms that could enhance their
voting experiences? Future research should disentangle these potential explanations,




Figure 4.A1: Confidence Intervals for Discrete Differences, Registration
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Figure 4.A2: Confidence Intervals for Discrete Differences, Turnout
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Other Race 14.152 2.23%
White 540.689 85.08%
Hispanic 45.486 7.16%
High School or Less 280.821 44.19%




Not in Labor Force 209.829 33.02%
Employed 403.283 63.46%
Recent Mover 228.824 40.31%
This table gives the demographic distribution
for the sample. The variables in boldface serve
as reference categories in the econometric mod-
els. Age is treated as a continuous variable, with
mean 47.23, minimum 18, and maximum 80.
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Table 4.A2: Access to Convenience Voting by State and Year
Convenience Voting 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
EDR 8.44 % 10.73 % 11.40 % 12.71 % 14.87 % 14.68 % 16.87 %
No-Fault Early 44.86 % 46.50 % 51.41 % 58.50 % 60.47 % 63.03 % 63.03 %
No-Excuse Abs 38.67 % 39.13 % 42.26 % 48.49 % 48.09 % 53.69 % 53.49 %
Vote by Mail 2.60 % 3.45 % 3.35 % 3.29 % 3.27 % 3.25 % 3.40 %
Online Registration 0.00 % 1.27 % 1.26 % 1.30 % 2.92 % 12.00 % 25.33 %
This table illustrates the distribution of access to each type of convenience voting for each yearly
cross-section of the survey sample. Of particular interest is access to online registration, which has
been steadily increasing.
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Table 4.A3: Convenience Voting by State and Year
State EDR No-Excuse Absentee No-Fault Early Mail Online Registration
AL
AK X X
AZ X X 2002
AR X
CA X X 2012










KS X X 2010
KY
LA 2008 2010
ME X X X






MT 2006 X X
NE X X















UT X 2004 2010
VT X X
VA
WA X X 2008
WV 2002
WI X X X
WY X X 2008
This table lists the convenience voting procedures for each electoral cross-section by state. An
“X” denotes that the state offered that particular form of convenience voting in all electoral
cross-sections of this dataset. If the entry is a year, that is the first electoral cross-section that
a particular state offered that form of convenience voting. And finally, if the entry is blank, the
state did not allow that form of convenience voting in any electoral cross-sections in this dataset.
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Table 4.A4: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Binary Treatment)
Registration Turnout
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.024 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.129 (0.004) 0.089 (0.004)
Black 0.216 (0.008) 0.283 (0.007)
Asian −0.550 (0.013) −0.531 (0.012)
Other Race −0.107 (0.014) −0.150 (0.013)
Hispanic −0.175 (0.008) −0.155 (0.008)
Income 0.043 (0.001) 0.051 (0.001)
High School −0.073 (0.006) −0.682 (0.005)
Some College −0.215 (0.007) −0.233 (0.006)
Postgraduate 0.248 (0.011) 0.248 (0.008)
Unemployed −0.111 (0.011) −0.107 (0.010)
Not in Labor Force −0.147 (0.006) −0.106 (0.005)
Moved −0.319 (0.005) −0.316 (0.004)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.115 (0.008) 0.461 (0.008)
EDR −0.009 (0.021) 0.027 (0.019)
No-Fault Early −0.033 (0.014)
No-Excuse Absentee 0.022 (0.015)
Vote by Mail 0.034 (0.032)
Online Registration 0.055 (0.011) 0.059 (0.011)
Intercept 0.147 (0.033) −0.939 (0.033)
N 509,439 509,439
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.172
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the probit model fitted to the entire sample, with online registration modeled
as a binary treatment.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The exception
in the registration model is EDR (no significance); exceptions in the turnout
model are No-Fault Early (5% significance) and EDR, No-Excuse Absentee, and
Vote by Mail (no significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
96
Table 4.A5: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Treatment by Wave)
Registration Turnout
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.024 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.129 (0.004) 0.089 (0.004)
Black 0.216 (0.008) 0.283 (0.007)
Asian −0.550 (0.013) −0.531 (0.012)
Other Race −0.107 (0.014) −0.150 (0.013)
Hispanic −0.175 (0.008) −0.155 (0.008)
Income 0.043 (0.001) 0.051 (0.001)
High School −0.703 (0.006) −0.682 (0.005)
Some College −0.215 (0.007) −0.233 (0.006)
Postgraduate 0.248 (0.011) 0.249 (0.008)
Unemployed −0.111 (0.011) −0.107 (0.010)
Not in Labor Force −0.147 (0.006) −0.106 (0.005)
Moved −0.319 (0.005) −0.316 (0.004)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.114 (0.008) 0.461 (0.008)
EDR −0.008 (0.021) 0.030 (0.019)
No-Fault Early −0.033 (0.014)
No-Excuse Absentee 0.026 (0.015)
Vote by Mail 0.036 (0.032)
Wave 1 0.031 (0.012) 0.031 (0.011)
Wave 2 0.088 (0.017) 0.117 (0.016)
Intercept 0.147 (0.033) −0.944 (0.033)
N 509,439 509,439
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.172
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the probit model fitted to the entire sample, with Online Registration modeled
in two binary waves.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The excep-
tion in the registration model is EDR (no significance); exceptions in the turnout
model are No-Fault Early (5% significance), No-Excuse Absentee (10% signifi-
cance), and EDR and Vote by Mail (no significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Table 4.A6: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Young Voters)
REGISTRATION TURNOUT
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Female 0.113 (0.008) 0.101 (0.008)
Black 0.215 (0.015) 0.324 (0.014)
Asian −0.383 (0.024) −0.386 (0.025)
Other Race −0.079 (0.024) −0.107 (0.025)
Hispanic −0.180 (0.014) −0.148 (0.015)
Income 0.019 (0.001) 0.028 (0.001)
High School −0.817 (0.011) −0.802 (0.011)
Some College −0.284 (0.012) −0.335 (0.011)
Postgraduate 0.250 (0.027) 0.323 (0.024)
Unemployed −0.122 (0.016) −0.149 (0.017)
Not in Labor Force −0.158 (0.010) −0.103 (0.010)
Moved −0.167 (0.009) −0.196 (0.009)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.145 (0.016) 0.543 (0.017)
EDR 0.044 (0.041) 0.092 (0.040)
No-Fault Early −0.071 (0.029)
No-Excuse Absentee 0.067 (0.032)
Vote by Mail 0.094 (0.066)
Online Registration 0.065 (0.021) 0.080 (0.021)
Intercept 0.651 (0.056) −0.219 (0.063)
N 106,843 106,843
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.134
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the probit model fitted to the subsample of individuals less than 30 years of
age, with Online Registration modeled as a binary treatment.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The exceptions
in the registration model are Margin of Victory (10% significance) and EDR (no
significance); exceptions in the turnout model are EDR, No-Fault Early, and
No-Excuse Absentee (5% significance), and Vote by Mail (no significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Table 4.A7: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Minority Voters)
REGISTRATION TURNOUT
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.029 (0.001) 0.034 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.176 (0.009) 0.153 (0.008)
Income 0.017 (0.001) 0.026 (0.001)
High School −0.565 (0.012) −0.559 (0.011)
Some College −0.099 (0.014) −0.121 (0.013)
Postgraduate 0.186 (0.023) 0.184 (0.020)
Unemployed −0.029 (0.018) −0.042 (0.018)
Not in Labor Force −0.216 (0.011) −0.176 (0.011)
Moved −0.274 (0.009) −0.296 (0.009)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.089 (0.016) 0.377 (0.016)
EDR 0.010 (0.060) 0.087 (0.059)
No-F ault Early −0.031 (0.033)
No-Excuse Absentee −0.012 (0.034)
Vote by Mail −0.103 (0.109)
Online Registration 0.051 (0.022) 0.027 (0.021)
Intercept −0.086 (0.107) −1.024 (0.106)
N 106,001 106,001
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.139
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the probit model fitted to the subsample of non-White individuals, with Online
Registration modeled as a binary treatment.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The excep-
tions in the registration model are Margin of Victory and Online Registration
(5% significance) and Unemployed, EDR, and the intercept (no significance);
exceptions in the turnout model are Unemployed (5% significance) and EDR,
No-Excuse Absentee, No-Fault Early, Vote by Mail, and Online Registration (no
significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Table 4.A8: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Recent Movers)
REGISTRATION TURNOUT
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.019 (0.001) 0.024 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.126 (0.006) 0.091 (0.006)
Black 0.229 (0.011) 0.298 (0.010)
Asian −0.478 (0.018) −0.452 (0.018)
Other Race −0.084 (0.019) −0.131 (0.019)
Hispanic −0.172 (0.011) −0.157 (0.011)
Income 0.038 (0.001) 0.047 (0.001)
High School −0.696 (0.008) −0.711 (0.008)
Some College −0.217 (0.009) −0.249 (0.008)
Postgraduate 0.244 (0.014) 0.260 (0.012)
Unemployed −0.127 (0.014) −0.141 (0.014)
Not in Labor Force −0.140 (0.008) −0.089 (0.008)
Margin of Victory 0.000 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.147 (0.012) 0.522 (0.012)
EDR −0.030 (0.031) −0.013 (0.030)
No-Fault Early −0.052 (0.021)
No-Excuse Absentee 0.045 (0.024)
Vote by Mail −0.026 (0.048)
Online Registration 0.070 (0.016) 0.064 (0.016)
Intercept −0.028 (0.047) −1.016 (0.051)
N 208,995 208,995
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.152
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard er-
rors for the probit model fitted to the subsample of recent movers, with Online
Registration modeled as a binary treatment.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The excep-
tions in the registration model are Margin of Victory, EDR, and the intercept
(no significance); exceptions in the turnout model are No-Fault Early (5% signif-
icance), No-Excuse Absentee (10% significance) and EDR and Vote by Mail (no
significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Table 4.A9: Estimated Influx of Voters, 2008
State Lower Bound Estimate Upper Bound Margin of Victory
AK 5,789 8,854 11,896 70,247
AL 32,054 48,875 65,461 453,067
AR 22,327 34,079 45,691 215,707
CA 238,888 364,830 489,415 3,262,692
CO 32,394 49,400 66,172 215,004
CT 25,203 38,451 51,529 368,345
DE 6,283 9,581 12,832 103,085
FL 129,294 197,235 264,290 236,148
GA 68,743 104,969 140,792 204,636
HI 11,406 17,449 23,446 205,305
IA 21,608 32,949 44,131 146,561
ID 11,241 17,171 23,040 166,572
IL 96,157 146,818 196,907 1,388,169
IN 53,557 81,830 109,824 28,391
KS 21,875 33,411 44,825 184,890
KY 34,017 51,943 69,669 296,477
LA 33,063 50,435 67,579 365,286
MA 43,450 66,222 88,655 795,244
MD 39,227 59,840 80,184 669,605
ME 9,900 15,093 20,211 126,650
MI 69,313 105,674 141,519 823,940
MN 29,080 44,242 59,125 297,945
MO 45,861 69,996 93,841 3,903
MS 22,008 33,570 44,979 169,935
MT 6,908 10,530 14,100 11,723
NC 70,832 108,119 144,965 14,177
NE 13,107 19,998 26,803 119,660
NH 10,017 15,276 20,463 68,292
NJ 63,124 96,352 129,186 602,215
NM 14,307 21,838 29,281 125,590
NV 19,482 29,771 39,961 120,909
NY 142,828 218,097 292,528 2,052,174
OH 90,312 137,839 184,791 262,224
OK 29,411 44,936 60,308 457,669
OR 24,099 36,713 49,128 298,816
PA 106,866 163,214 218,957 620,478
RI 7,976 12,173 16,319 131,180
SC 36,691 56,034 75,168 172,447
SD 5,502 8,387 11,230 32,130
TN 53,988 82,531 110,820 391,741
TX 176,170 269,532 362,221 950,695
UT 20,362 31,135 41,818 268,360
VA 58,223 88,850 119,099 234,527
VT 4,955 7,561 10,134 120,288
WI 37,396 56,978 76,258 414,818
WV 17,937 27,448 36,893 93,609
WY 4,256 6,495 8,706 82,090
This table estimates the additional votes in the 2008 Presidential contest had
these states offered online registration; the final column lists the actual margin of
victory in that election.
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Table 4.A10: Estimated Influx of Voters, 2012
State Lower Bound Estimate Upper Bound Margin of Victory
AK 5,220 7,967 10,683 42,036
AL 39,839 60,861 81,668 460,229
AR 26,565 40,682 54,723 253,335
CT 27,143 41,425 55,534 270,210
DE 6,702 10,225 13,702 77,100
FL 146,480 223,729 300,158 74,309
GA 77,314 118,192 158,709 304,861
HI 11,901 18,217 24,495 185,643
IA 23,818 36,347 48,720 91,927
ID 12,524 19,145 25,708 208,124
IL 100,002 152,758 204,968 884,296
KY 38,350 58,639 78,758 407,820
MA 47,515 72,480 97,117 733,301
ME 10,204 15,562 20,845 109,030
MI 74,378 113,475 152,072 449,313
MN 33,276 50,678 67,797 225,942
MO 48,775 74,491 99,931 258,644
MS 23,512 35,902 48,153 147,797
MT 7,512 11,459 15,354 66,089
NC 77,987 119,124 159,832 92,004
NE 14,681 22,421 30,076 172,983
NH 10,687 16,309 21,863 39,643
NJ 66,954 102,277 137,234 647,861
NM 15,330 23,422 31,434 79,547
NY 152,974 233,794 313,862 1,995,381
OH 97,774 149,368 200,436 166,272
OK 32,328 49,452 66,447 447,778
PA 113,658 173,697 233,165 309,840
RI 8,440 12,893 17,300 122,473
SD 6,367 9,722 13,038 65,571
TN 57,251 87,584 117,693 501,621
TX 197,945 303,093 407,652 1,261,719
VA 64,929 99,165 133,035 149,298
VT 5,223 7,972 10,688 106,541
WI 40,603 61,886 82,854 213,019
WV 18,276 27,981 37,629 179,386
WY 4,773 7,293 9,788 101,676
This table estimates the additional votes in the 2012 Presidential contest had
these states offered online registration; the final column lists the actual margin of
victory in that election.
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Table 4.A11: Effects on Political Participation (Logit)
Registration Turnout
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.039 (0.001) 0.051 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.224 (0.007) 0.149 (0.007)
Black 0.389 (0.014) 0.484 (0.013)
Asian −0.942 (0.022) −0.893 (0.021)
Other Race −0.179 (0.023) −0.251 (0.022)
Hispanic −0.288 (0.014) −0.258 (0.013)
Income 0.073 (0.001) 0.086 (0.001)
High School −1.234 (0.010) −1.143 (0.009)
Some College −0.395 (0.012) −0.397 (0.010)
Postgraduate 0.502 (0.021) 0.443 (0.015)
Unemployed −0.185 (0.018) −0.178 (0.017)
Not in Labor Force −0.261 (0.010) −0.180 (0.009)
Moved −0.549 (0.008) −0.530 (0.007)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.004 (0.000)
Presidential 0.194 (0.014) 0.769 (0.013)
EDR −0.023 (0.037) 0.046 (0.033)
No Fault Early −0.055 (0.023)
No Excuse Absentee 0.038 (0.026)
Vote by Mail 0.059 (0.054)
Online Reg 0.096 (0.020 0.101 (0.018))
Intercept 0.313 (0.057) −1.548 (0.056)
N 509,439 509,439
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.172
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the logit model fitted to the entire sample, with Online Registration modeled
as a binary treatment.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The exception
in the registration model is EDR (no significance); exceptions in the turnout
model are No Fault Early (5% significance) and EDR, No Excuse Absentee, and
Vote by Mail (no significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Table 4.A12: Effects on Political Participation (Scobit)
Registration Turnout
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.029 (0.001) 0.046 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.149 (0.005) 0.130 (0.006)
Black 0.246 (0.011) 0.412 (0.012)
Asian −0.657 (0.017) −0.787 (0.020)
Other Race −0.131 (0.016) −0.223 (0.019)
Hispanic −0.213 (0.010) −0.233 (0.012)
Income 0.052 (0.001) 0.076 (0.001)
High School −0.800 (0.015) −0.983 (0.014)
Some College −0.238 (0.009) −0.333 (0.010)
Postgraduate 0.263 (0.013) 0.354 (0.014)
Unemployed −0.138 (0.013) −0.159 (0.015)
Not in Labor Force −0.167 (0.007) −0.154 (0.008)
Moved −0.371 (0.008) −0.458 (0.008)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.004 (0.000)
Presidential 0.135 (0.010) 0.669 (0.014)
EDR −0.009 (0.024) 0.038 (0.028)
No Fault Early −0.048 (0.020)
No Excuse Absentee 0.031 (0.022)
Vote by Mail 0.048 (0.046)
Online Registration 0.063 (0.013) 0.087 (0.015)
Intercept −1.261 (0.088) −1.958 (0.062)
ln α 1.131 (0.067) 0.414 (0.039)
α 3.099 (0.208) 1.513 (0.060)
N 509,439 509,439
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the scobit model fitted to the entire sample, with Online Registration modeled
as a binary treatment.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The exception
in the registration model is EDR (no significance); exceptions in the turnout
model are No Fault Early (5% significance) and EDR, No Excuse Absentee, and
Vote by Mail (no significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
104
Table 4.A13: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Alternate Coding of Non-
Response to Participation)
Registration Turnout
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.017 (0.001) 0.025 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.109 (0.004) 0.070 (0.004)
Black 0.252 (0.008) 0.317 (0.007)
Asian −0.518 (0.013) −0.483 (0.012)
Other Race −0.079 (0.014) −0.123 (0.013)
Hispanic −0.160 (0.008) −0.132 (0.008)
Income 0.043 (0.001) 0.051 (0.001)
High School −0.690 (0.006) −0.668 (0.005)
Some College −0.201 (0.007) −0.218 (0.006)
Postgraduate 0.250 (0.011) 0.248 (0.009)
Unemployed −0.125 (0.011) −0.115 (0.010)
Not in Labor Force −0.150 (0.006) −0.102 (0.005)
Moved −0.326 (0.005) −0.329 (0.004)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.073 (0.008) 0.432 (0.008)
EDR 0.007 (0.022) 0.035 (0.019)
No-Fault Early −0.039 (0.014)
No-Excuse Absentee 0.035 (0.015)
Vote by Mail 0.043 (0.032)
Online Registration 0.062 (0.012) 0.062 (0.011)
Intercept 0.436 (0.034) −0.701 (0.033)
N 509,439 509,439
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.162
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the same model as Table 4.A4, but registration and turnout are measured
differently. For each outcome variable, all those who did not answer the question
are coded as participants. (In Table 4.A4, these respondents are coded as non-
participants, following the rubric of the Census Bureau.)
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The excep-
tions in the registration model are Age2 and EDR (no significance); exceptions
in the turnout model are No-Excuse Absentee (5% significance), EDR (10% sig-
nificance), and Vote by Mail (no significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Table 4.A14: Effects on Political Participation (Probit, Omitting Non-
Respondents to Participation Questions)
Registration Turnout
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.020 (0.001) 0.029 (0.001)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.120 (0.004) 0.082 (0.004)
Black 0.252 (0.009) 0.312 (0.008)
Asian −0.548 (0.013) −0.524 (0.013)
Other Race −0.091 (0.014) −0.142 (0.013)
Hispanic −0.172 (0.008) −0.149 (0.008)
Income 0.044 (0.001) 0.053 (0.001)
High School −0.715 (0.006) −0.691 (0.005)
Some College −0.209 (0.007) −0.230 (0.006)
Postgraduate 0.252 (0.011) 0.251 (0.009)
Unemployed −0.126 (0.011) −0.115 (0.010)
Not in Labor Force −0.153 (0.006) −0.107 (0.005)
Moved −0.334 (0.005) −0.330 (0.004)
Margin of Victory −0.001 (0.000) −0.003 (0.000)
Presidential 0.087 (0.008) 0.457 (0.008)
EDR 0.001 (0.022) 0.030 (0.020)
No-Fault Early −0.038 (0.014)
No-Excuse Absentee 0.031 (0.015)
Vote by Mail 0.040 (0.032)
Online Registration 0.061 (0.012) 0.063 (0.011)
Intercept 0.325 (0.034) −0.857 (0.034)
N 496,837 499,463
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.173
This table represents the point estimates and associated (robust) standard errors
for the same model as Table 4.A4, but registration and turnout are measured
differently. For each outcome variable, all those who did not answer the question
are dropped from the sample. (In Table 4.A4, these respondents are coded as
non-participants, following the rubric of the Census Bureau.)
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The exception
in the registration model is EDR (no significance); exceptions in the turnout
model are No-Excuse Absentee (5% significance) and EDR and Vote by Mail (no
significance).
I include both state and year fixed effects. Year 2000, Year 2010, and Maine
are dropped due to perfect collinearity. In the Turnout model, Oregon is also
dropped due to perfect collinearity.
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Chapter 5
Who Votes, and How?
5.1 Summary
The literature on convenience voting has devoted considerable attention to identifying
its impact on turnout, and to a lesser extent, the demographic representativeness of
the electorate. Most of the papers in this area, however, merely speculate how voting
liberalizations will affect electoral outcomes. This de-emphasis is likely a result of
the lack of ideological data in the Current Population Survey, rather than disinterest.
This paper offers a new approach for estimating the partisan composition of the elec-
torate under various electoral conditions. After identifying an electorate using the
Rosenstone-Wolfinger approach, a Random Forest model (generated by out-of-sample
data) simulates how these individuals would have voted in the 2012 Presidential con-
test. The distributions of vote share barely shift, offering empirical support for the
conjecture that convenience voting procedures will minimally affect electoral out-
comes. Although the substantive focus of discussion is on online registration, the
procedure advanced herein is readily applicable to other forms of convenience vot-
ing. More broadly, this paper offers a blueprint for any project that can incorporate
multiple surveys, as long as the two surveys contain a common set of questions that
predict the missing outcome.
107
5.2 Introduction
Modern American elections are characterized by low turnout, with participation rates
far lower than those of other contemporary democracies (Hanmer 2007, 2009). More-
over, the demographic distribution of the electorate differs meaningfully from that of
the voting-eligible population (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Over the past
several decades, states have introduced various liberalizations to try to stimulate
turnout by improving the voter experience, popularly called “convenience voting”
policies. The political science literature has devoted considerable attention to the im-
pact of these policies, beginning with a seminal paper by Rosenstone and Wolfinger
(1978).
Since this important paper, political scientists have carefully scrutinized conve-
nience voting procedures, especially Election Day Registration (hereafter, EDR) and
the Motor Voter provisions (Hanmer 2009). Still, though, the literature is ambivalent
about the effectiveness about specific policies, as well as the appropriate methodolog-
ical approach (cf. Berinsky 2005). Yet while many scholars have contributed to the
debate on the consequences for turnout, the literature is fairly quiet about the impact
on actual election results. In a review of the convenience voting literature, Gronke
et al. point out that “the vast bulk of political science research in the field has [in-
stead] concentrated on voter participation” and to a lesser degree, the demographic
representativeness of the electorate (2008: p. 438). A discussion of the impact on the
partisan composition of the electorate is usually relegated to a quick hypothesis near
the end of the manuscript, if included at all.
This is a noteworthy and unfortunate gap in the literature. Within and outside of
academia, people are interested not only whether people are voting, but also how they
are voting. Popular wisdom contends that voting liberalizations will aid Democrats,
since those in lower socio-economic brackets vote at systematically lower rates, and
these individuals tend to prefer Democratic candidates (Highton and Wolfinger 1998).
But many political scientists, including Rosenstone and Wolfinger, speculate that
Democrats will benefit only marginally, or not at all (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978;
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Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Knack and White 2000;
Brians and Grofman 2001; Highton 2004; McDonald 2008). One explanation is that
convenience voting primarily impacts the behavior of those who have moved recently
and young adults, rather than those in lower income brackets (Highton and Wolfin-
ger 1998; Knack and White 2000). Gronke et al. (2008) infer from the literature a
positive correlation between strength of partisanship and utilization of convenience
methods, suggesting that these procedures in and of themselves will impact the ag-
gregate partisan distribution only minimally.
Other papers argue to the contrary, and suggest that convenience voting may ac-
tually aid Republicans. The narrative is as follows: Convenience voting procedures do
little to encourage non-voters to alter their behavior, and instead render the process
easier for those who are already politically engaged. Berinsky (2005) and Berinsky,
Burns, and Traugott (2001) offer evidence that these reforms actually render the elec-
torate less demographically representative, which might in turn lead to Republican
gains. And in a recent paper, Neiheisel and Burden (2012) use a natural experiment in
Wisconsin to conclude that EDR increased Republican vote share; they suggest that
the non-voters likely to capitalize on EDR are politically resourceful and from higher
socio-economic brackets, and they also posit that EDR might hinder mobilization
efforts because the pool of registrants is not fully realized prior to the election.
In my review of the convenience voting literature, only two papers infer conclu-
sions regarding partisanship from an individual-level regression model: Mitchell and
Wlezien (1995) and Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott (2001).1 This absence could be
due to a lack of data: Many papers in this area rely on the Current Population Survey,
administered by the U.S. Census Bureau, which asks respondents about participation
but not about partisanship or ideology.2 Brians and Grofman (2001) explicitly lament
1To derive their model, Mitchell and Wlezien use data from the American National Election Survey,
which they admit has some shortcomings compared to the more-commonly used CPS. Berinsky,
Burns, and Traugott use a dataset restricted to Oregonians, so the scope of inference is inherently
limited.
2An incomprehensive list includes Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978), Leighley and Nagler (1992),
Nagler (1994), Mitchell and Wlezien (1995), Highton (1997), Highton and Wolfinger (1998), Knack
and White (2000), Brians and Grofman (2001), Alvarez and Nagler (2007, 2008, 2011), Hanmer
(2007), Keele and Minozzi (2013), and Glynn and Quinn (2011).
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this drawback in their paper and consign their analysis to comparisons of Democrat-
Republican vote share prior to and after implementation of EDR. Knack and White
(2000) simply include a measure of state-level Republican vote share in their turnout
model.
A similar paucity of data inspired methodological innovation in the public opinion
and electoral forecasting literature (see Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). My paper
advances a new method for estimating how a change in election policy will affect vote
share, using out-of-sample data to simulate the individual presidential preferences
of those most likely to alter their turnout behavior. Other work in this area uses
an individual-level model to identify the demographic distribution of the counterfac-
tual electorate, but these papers use aggregate opinion of demographic groups from
other surveys to inform their inference (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Highton and
Wolfinger 1998; Knack and White 2000). This paper is the first (to my knowledge) to
incorporate an individual-level model of partisanship after parametrically identifying
the electorate. To ground the analysis, I focus exclusively on how online registration,
one of the most recent innovations, might impact electoral outcomes, but my method
is readily applicable to other forms of convenience voting.
The paper proceeds as follows: I first discuss the qualitative evidence that sug-
gests that online registration does not benefit a particular political party (at least
uniformly). Because online registration has been supported and signed into law by
politicians of both major parties, I predict that online registration will not lead to
substantial electoral gains for the state’s minority party. I briefly review the turnout
model from Chapter 4 of my dissertation, which allows me to identify the demographic
composition of the electorate with and without online registration. I then describe
how and why I use a nonparametric technique called Random Forests to describe
the relationship between demography and vote choice, using out-of-sample data. The
Random Forest model enables me to simulate partisan distributions for conditions
with and without online registration. The results confirm that this particular form of
convenience voting does not dramatically alter the partisan landscape for any given
state. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for further adoption of online
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registration, and an exploration of how this method can advance other research in
this area and others.
5.3 Online Registration: A Bipartisan Movement
Online registration is one of the newest forms of convenience voting, a byproduct of
perennial interest in mobilization and an increasingly tech-savvy electorate (Pellissier
2015).3 The adoption of online registration offers an especially interesting case study
for partisanship, because unlike other forms of convenience voting, it is not associ-
ated with a particular political party (see Underhill, Hernandez, and Hubler 2014).
In contrast, for example, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 was strongly
backed by Democrats, and signed into law by a Democratic President (Clinton) after
being rejected by a Republican (Bush Sr.); Republican leadership in the House later
supported its repeal, and Republican Governors resisted its implementation (High-
ton and Wolfinger 1998). Ponoroff highlights the peculiarity of online registration’s
broad ideological appeal in a “field often subject to partisan bickering” (2010: p. 2).
The qualitative evidence supports these claims: Both red and blue states have in-
troduced online registration and the bipartisan Presidential Commission on Election
Administration recently endorsed it as a valuable innovation in election administra-
tion (2014). Table 5.1 details the states that currently allow online registration, as
well as the partisan affiliation of the Governor who signed the requisite legislation.
Online registration offers a number of benefits to the government. The Presiden-
tial Council on Election Administration argued that online registration streamlines
the administrative duties of the state and enhances the voter experience (2014). The
Council lauded this policy as a way of easing the financial and administrative burdens
of running elections, and removing barriers that might discourage potential voters.
Ponoroff (2010) mentions that states do need to invest a sizable sum to develop the
infrastructure to allow for online registration, but the marginal cost of registering
3For an excellent resource on which states currently allow online registration, refer to the NCSL
website (last updated 2014): http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
electronic-or-online-voter-registration.aspx.
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Table 5.1: Legislative History of Online Registration
State Signed Legislation Governor (Party)
Arizona no legislation required, implemented 2002
California 2011 SB 397 Jerry Brown (D)
Colorado 2009 HB 1160 Bill Ritter (D)
Connecticut 2012 HB 5024 Dannel Malloy (D)
Delaware
Georgia 2014 HB 942 Nathan Deal (R)
Hawaii 2012 HB 1755 Neil Abercrombie (D)
Illinois 2013 HB 2418 Patt Quinn (D)
Indiana 2009 HB 1346 Mitch Daniels (R)
Kansas no legislation required, implemented 2009
Louisiana 2009 HB 520 Bobby Jindal (R)
Maryland 2012 HB 173 Martin O’Malley (D)
Massachusetts 2014 HB 3788 Deval Patrick (D)
Minnesota 2014 HF 2096 Mark Dayton (DFL)
Missouri 2014 HB 1739 Jay Nixon (D)
Nebraska LB 661
New York 2011 A08165 Andrew Cuomo (D)
Oregon 2009 HB 2386 Ted Kulongoski (D)
South Carolina 2012 H 4945 Nikki Haley (R)
Utah 2009 SB 25 Jon Huntsman, Jr. (R)
Virginia 2012 HB 2341 Bob McDonnell (R)
Washington 2007 HB 1528 Christine Gregoire (D)
West Virginia 2013 SB 477 Earl Ray Tomblin (D)
This table delineates the year that each state passed legislation allow-
ing online registration, the specific bill, and the Governor who signed
it into law. I obtained much of this information from NCSL (2013). It
is important to note that the date of implementation does not always
occur in the same year as the date the legislation passed.
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individuals is substantially lower with an online (rather than paper-based) method.
Additionally, he recounts anecdotal evidence from election administrators that sug-
gests fewer registration errors, which have been shown to disenfranchise voters (see
Alvarez and Hall 2014).
The extant literature does not offer a great deal of information about the impact
of online registration on the partisan composition —at least not directly. Most of
the limited discussion focuses on the distinct but related question of how this form of
convenience voting will alter the demographic composition of the electorate. Baretto
et al. (2010) find that whites, young adults, and urbanites were most likely to register
online in Arizona and Washington. This study, commissioned by Pew, also claims
that many residents of these states indicated that they would update their register
information online should they move. Using a probit model, Pellissier (2015) draws
similar conclusions: Young adults and recent movers are more likely to participate
if the state allows online registration, but not racial minorities. Meanwhile, Garćıa
Bedolla and Vélez (2013) focus exclusively on the response in California. The ethnic
composition of the individuals who registered online reflected the composition of
the state’s population fairly closely. Again, young voters were most likely to utilize
this method, especially among Latinas. Moreover, restricting their attention to two
counties, these authors ascertain that most of the individuals who registered online
lived in less affluent areas.
It is difficult to extrapolate from these results how online registration will affect
election results, as young voters and the less affluent tend to be more Democratic,
while white voters tend to be less so. In my reading of the literature, the discussion
of the implications for partisanship is somewhat limited. In Washington and Arizona,
online registrants were significantly more likely to avoid registering with a particular
party (Baretto et al. 2010). Among online registrants in California, women and
minorities tended to register with the Democratic Party at higher rates than men and
whites, respectively (Garćıa Bedolla and Vélez 2013: Figure 2, p. 3). These authors
determine that race and gender, and their interaction, are important determinants of
the political affiliations of individuals who register online.
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A priori, then, it is still somewhat ambiguous whether online registration will alter
the aggregate partisan distribution of the electorate, and if so, how. It is also entirely
possible that the impact of online registration on the preference distribution will be
heterogeneous across states. In the Downsian framework (1957), online registration
should primarily affect those who are nearly indifferent between casting a ballot and
abstaining; the characteristics of this population could vary by state. If politicians
are office-motivated, it is at least somewhat unlikely that they would support a piece
of legislation that reduced their future electoral prospects, or their party’s.4 It is
also worth noting that few of these states typically hold statewide elections that are
competitive. Given this incentive structure, I speculate that online registration will
not result in disproportionate gains for the state’s minority party. At the very least, I
expect that any gains will be minimal enough to preserve the outcome for the majority
party.
Like any question of causal inference, the primary difficulty is that of missing-
ness: We only observe one of two (or more) potential outcomes (Rubin 1974). In
this context, I only know with certainty how individuals behave with or without the
opportunity to register online. If a large, nationally-representative survey included
information about participation and candidate preference, I would only need to iden-
tify who belonged to the electorate under each condition. The American National
Election Survey asks about both, but the sample size for each state is relatively small
for each electoral cross section. As mentioned earlier, the CPS is a rich source of data
for studying registration and turnout, and much of the participation literature relies
on this survey instrument (see footnote 2); the CPS, though, does not ask any ques-
tions about candidate preference, partisan identification, or ideology. Meanwhile, the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study is a large, nationally-representative dataset
that offers excellent information about political preferences (Ansolabehere 2013; here-
after, CCES ). Yet although the researcher can recover the estimates of turnout fairly
4The focus of my paper is the voter perspective, so a full discussion of politicians’ incentives and
decision-making is beyond its intended scope. By and large, however, majority party support of
a piece of legislation suggests that the party does not perceive a policy as a threat to its future
electoral success.
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closely using the given weights, the raw frequency of individuals who report abstain-
ing is fairly low for some of the less-populated states. In Wyoming, for example, only
3 of the 110 individuals sampled reported abstaining; for an additional 28 individu-
als, the dataset does not list a response (probably due to survey attrition, given that
“Skipped” and “Not Asked” were other possible values). Similarly, in Vermont, only
5 (of 159) reported not casting a ballot, with 19 missing values. Accordingly, it might
be overly ambitious —if not impossible —to procure enough within-state variation to
describe the counterfactual electorate.
To identify how online registration affected the electoral outcomes in the 2012
election, I need information about both participation and partisanship. Fortunately,
the CPS and the CCES profile demography similarly, and demography explains a
great deal of the variation in political preference within a given state (see Park,
Gelman, and Bafumi 2004). I exploit this relationship to bridge information across
these two surveys, even though they sample different individuals. More specifically,
like so much of the work on voter participation, I model turnout behavior with the
CPS. I then fit a Random Forest model to the CCES data to predict partisanship
as a function of demographic variables. I use these results to simulate the preferred
candidate for the CPS individuals predicted to vote by the turnout model. My
method allows the researcher to take advantage of the relative merits of both surveys
without having to limit the scope of investigation. The literature on convenience
voting offers a nice blueprint for identifying turnout behavior with the CPS dataset,
and I discuss that before turning my attention to my less conventional model of
partisanship.
5.4 Predicting Turnout
Most of the convenience voting literature builds upon the framework introduced in
Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978), in which a binary response model recovers the
propensity to participate (a latent variable). The determinants of participation in-
clude individual-level demographic variables (e.g. age, gender, education) and state-
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level electoral conditions (particularly policy).
The Rosenstone-Wolfinger approach is not without detractors. Recently, several
papers have expressed concern about the assumptions embedded within this method.
The binary response model assumes that the treatment distribution is independent of
the first moment for the distribution of potential outcomes, at least after conditioning
on a set of pre-treatment variables. But several papers have questioned whether
this condition is satisfied, notably Hanmer (2007, 2009), Glynn and Quinn (2011),
and Keele and Minozzi (2013). Hanmer (2007) finds that the results are not overly
sensitive to the model specification, and so cannot reject the Rosenstone-Wolfinger
approach, but Glynn and Quinn (2011) and Keele and Minozzi (2013) argue that
the conventional approach grossly overestimates the impact of convenience voting
(specifically, EDR) on turnout.
These papers helpfully advance methods that rely on less tenable assumptions,
but as I argued in Chapter 2, the current body of evidence fails to discredit the
traditional approach to estimation in this area of the literature. The bounding tech-
niques employed in Hanmer (2007, 2009) and Glynn and Quinn (2011) serve as a
useful sanity check, but (used alone) offer an unnecessarily restrictive scope of in-
ference. Meanwhile, the natural experiments advanced in Keele and Minozzi (2013)
and Neiheisel and Burden (2012) require a specific form of implementation, and it
is somewhat precarious to extrapolate that individuals in other states will respond
like residents of Wisconsin and Minnesota, two states with anomalous participation
histories. Most problematically, the parametric results that Glynn and Quinn (2011)
critique are unduly inflated by the specification that they employ.
Although it is important to acknowledge these concerns about the validity of the
Rosenstone-Wolfinger framework, I contend that the current body of literature has yet
to dismantle it. As in Chapter 1, I use a probit model to estimate the propensity to
vote as a function of demographic variables (age, gender, race, education, employment
status, income, and residential mobility) and state-level variables (competitiveness,
EDR, no-fault early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, postal voting, and of course,
online registration). While many papers in this area have used cross-sectional analysis,
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I pool cross-sections to create a panel dataset, as advocated in Leighley and Nagler
(2014).5 For identification purposes, I include at least one pre-treatment wave for each
state that currently allows online registration; since Arizona pioneered this procedure
prior to the 2002 election, I include all cross-sections from 2000 through 2012.
Table 5.2: Accuracy of the Turnout Model
State % Correctly Predicted State % Correctly Predicted
Minnesota 80.71 Missouri 74.39
Wisconsin 80.41 Georgia 73.75
Colorado 80.40 Ohio 73.67
Massachusetts 78.11 South Carolina 73.48
Maine 78.08 Wyoming 73.48
Delaware 78.00 Alaska 73.04
Oregon 77.82 Utah 72.58
New Hampshire 77.36 Illinois 72.50
Maryland 77.01 New Mexico 72.42
Connecticut 76.52 Rhode Island 72.40
North Carolina 76.39 South Dakota 72.25
Virginia 76.38 Pennsylvania 72.13
Michigan 76.28 Kentucky 71.93
Iowa 76.27 New Jersey 71.57
Washington 76.14 California 71.50
Vermont 76.11 Tennessee 71.10
Indiana 75.77 Oklahoma 71.05
Montana 75.75 Texas 70.75
Kansas 75.63 New York 70.69
Louisiana 75.48 Arizona 70.22
Mississippi 75.37 Arkansas 69.77
Florida 75.32 Hawaii 67.93
Alabama 75.11 Nevada 67.05
Idaho 74.90 West Virginia 66.82
Nebraska 74.77
This table presents the number of individuals correctly classified as voters or abstainers by the
parametric turnout model, disaggregated by state. I use a probit specification and classify an
individual as a voter if the estimated propensity to vote exceeds 50%.
For more details about the model and data, refer to Chapter 1. The fitted model
yields Ŷ = Φ(α̂ + Xβ̂ + Zρ̂ + δ̂T + γ̂ + θ̂), where Ŷ is the estimated propensity to
cast a ballot. To generate two different electorates, one for each online registration
condition, I consider an individual as a voter if Ŷ ≥ 0.5 Overall, the model performs
quite well, correctly classifying nearly three-quarters of respondents (74.14%). Table
5.2 lists the percent correctly predicted by state.
5See Chapter 2 of my dissertation for a brief discussion of why panel datasets offer a superior
statistical approach. Cross-sectional data may be biased by electoral anomalies, as I found in my
replication of Glynn and Quinn (2011); Keele and Minozzi (2013) made this point, as well.
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Figure 5.1: Classification Accuracy by (Estimated) Propensity Score
Stratifying by turnout behavior, the model accurately predicts turnout for 86.86%
of voters but only 43.73% of non-voters. Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of
propensity scores for those which the model predicts accurately (1a) and inaccurately
(1b). Interestingly, the distribution of propensity scores is far more symmetric for in-
dividuals whom the model incorrectly classifies; this suggests that the raw frequencies
of individuals the model misclassifies are fairly similar across the two groups. But
because 70% of the individuals in the sample reported voting in the 2012 election,
this means that the proportion of voters the model misclassifies is far lower than the
proportion of abstainers.
Having identified electorates in each online registration condition, I need some
way to estimate aggregate vote share at the state level. As mentioned earlier, the
CPS does not describe political opinion or candidate preference. To gain insight into
the political consequences of this election policy, I need an individual-level model of
vote choice. The next section describes how I create this model and use it to simulate




The fundamental challenge for this particular research question is how to accommo-
date missingness. Most research in the participation literature uses the CPS, which
does not ask about partisanship, vote choice, or ideology. In this case, then, the
concern is not whether data are missing at random or conditionally at random, but
simply that they are missing altogether. To simulate vote choice in counterfactual
scenarios using the CPS data, I need a method to identify the relationship between
characteristics described in the CPS and candidate preference. In other scholarship,
researchers use the joint distributions of non-missing observations within a dataset
to impute values for the missing observations (“multiple imputation”; see King et al.
2001). Unfortunately, though, since the desired information is missing for all obser-
vations in the CPS, this method will not suffice. In this chapter, I instead estimate
these joint distributions using another survey entirely, leveraging the fact that both
the CPS and the CCES include common demographic covariates that predict vote
choice fairly accurately, and the CCES also includes various measures of candidate
preference.
The motivation behind this paper bears some resemblance to the literature on
state-level public opinion, particularly the studies that use disaggregation (Erikson,
Wright, and McIver 1993) and Multilevel-Regression and Poststratification (MRP;
introduced in Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004). Disaggregation merges national sur-
veys and then (as the name suggests) partitions individuals into states; the partition-
ing is immediate, but finding enough national-level surveys and making the questions
of interest compatible across surveys can invite some frustration. The related MRP
technique is more involved in terms of modeling, but also more robust (Kastellec,
Lax, and Phillips 2014). With this procedure, the researcher recovers state-level pref-
erences from a national survey (or collection of surveys) by fitting a predictive model
to the entire dataset, deriving within-state demographic weights via Census data,
and then weighting predictions accordingly before aggregating. The MRP approach
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requires a smaller collection of data because it exploits the relationship between de-
mography and public opinion and the demographic information readily available from
the U.S. Census.
In both this stream of scholarship and my own project, the researcher aims to
construct a measure of public opinion for each state, but lacks the necessary data.
The reason the data are missing differs, though: In the public opinion literature,
the researcher does not have enough data points in every state to construct an ag-
gregate measure with confidence. The CCES dataset is a large enough sample to
allow for such measurement, but cannot identify a counterfactual electorate. More
specifically, my turnout model is necessary to predict the demographic distribution of
each state’s electorate both with and without online registration. The Census-derived
demographic weights in MRP only inform the researcher about the demographic com-
position of the voting-age population, not the population of voters conditioned on a
particular electoral policy.
One approach to estimating partisanship in a different scenario would be to use
the Rosenstone-Wolfinger turnout model to identify a counterfactual electorate, and
impute counterfactual weights for this group. Applying MRP would be immediate.
Although MRP has enjoyed some prominence within the public opinion literature,
though, I use an alternative technique from the machine learning literature called
Random Forests. I first discuss CART, the intellectual predecessor to Random Forest,
and I then explain why I believe this research design to be superior.
5.5.2 Introducing CART
Breiman et al. (1984) introduce Classification and Regression Trees, a nonparamet-
ric method for identifying relationships in data. The two types of tree are similar,
but classification trees are specific to outcomes with categorical values, such as vote
choice. In common parlance, a classification tree looks like a flowchart; theorists
could alternatively imagine an extended game. There are an outcome of interest Y
and a set of predictor variables X. The classification tree sequentially bifurcates in-
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dividuals into different classes based on their covariates profiles.6 More concretely,
for the turnout outcome, a tree could first partition the sample into different age
brackets, and then divide each age bracket into different racial groups. The process
would continue iteratively until some stopping criterion is satisfied. (This criterion is
unnecessary for the Random Forest, as explained below.) The aim is to repeatedly
split the data until the classes are as homogeneous in their outcome values as pos-
sible, to maximize predictive accuracy. As Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2011)
point out, a classification tree is easily interpretable, and the researcher needs no
prior knowledge about the functional relationship between X and Y .
Classification trees are attractive for a number of reasons: they are intuitive and
computationally efficient, and require no assumptions about the functionality of the
relationship. But they are not without drawbacks. Notably, they can be incredibly
unstable, as “the effect of an error in the top split is propagated down to all of the
splits below it” (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2011: p. 312). This concern,
known as “overfitting,” applies to almost all models, as it can lead the researcher
to extrapolate conclusions that may be unwarranted, or at the very least, not quite
accurate. It is especially pertinent, though, if the aim is to make out-of-sample pre-
dictions. Intuitively, overfitting means underestimating the variance of the stochastic
component of the functional relationship. To accommodate this concern, a variety of
techniques have modified the classification tree to integrate this uncertainty.
Random Forest, introduced in Breiman (2001) and further formalized in Giau
(2014), is one such modification.7 This method performs favorably to other ap-
proaches, such as bagging or boosting (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2011), and
it is computationally more efficient (Breiman and Cutler n.d.; Kuhn and Johnson
2014). The Random Forest generates a pre-specified number K of classification trees.
The Random Forest safeguards against overfitting by estimating a model for a boot-
6It is possible to partition into more than two groups for each step, but Hastie, Tibshirani, and
Friedman (2011) advise against this procedures, since it can affect the splits at the next nodes.
They point out that collapsing in this way is necessary, since the algorithm can simply divide the
data again on the same variable if it provides the optimal split.
7Zachary Jones maintains a collection of articles that discuss Random Forests on the following
website: https://github.com/zmjones/statisticallearning/blob/master/abf.md.
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strapped sample of the dataset for each classification tree k in the ensemble (Breiman
2001). The cross-validation, then, is built into the model, similar to bagging pro-
cedures. But bagging can still lead to highly-correlated trees, so Random Forest
incorporates randomness into the covariates, as well (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Fried-
man 2011). To reduce statistical dependence among the classification trees in the
ensemble, the Random Forest only allows the algorithm to choose among a random
(strict) subset of the variables at each node. For each observation in the dataset,
then, the Random Forest has K independently-drawn predictions of the individual’s
class (Breiman 2001).
Ensemble methods, like the Random Forest, allow “increased out-of-sample stabil-
ity and the ability to capture complex functional forms with relatively simple classi-
fiers” (Grimmer and Stewart 2013: p. 278). Although this method has become quite
popular (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2011), it is still largely absent from the
political science literature (Jones and Linder 2015). For a more detailed treatment
of Random Forests, see the original paper Breiman (2001), Chapter 8 of Kuhn and
Johnson (2014), or Chapter 15 of Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2011). In the
next subsection, I discuss my particular execution of the Random Forest model, as
well its advantages over MRP.
5.5.3 The Value of Random Forests
As mentioned earlier, another design for this question would simulate a counterfactual
electorate, re-weight the subset of voters, and then apply MRP. There are a number
of reasons to prefer the Random Forest design. First, the Random Forest model
already incorporates a safeguard against overfitting by using a bootstrapped sample
for each classification tree. The version of MRP implemented in the current body of
literature does not, to my knowledge, incorporate any kind of cross-validation. Of
course, it is possible to adjust the bias induced by overfitting by performing some
kind of cross-validation (for example, k-fold cross-validation, as presented in Section
4.4 of Kuhn and Johnson 2014), but the researcher should add this extra step.
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More precariously, the MRP approach is highly parametric, and so requires all
the assumptions embedded in this class of models.8 In Park, Gelman, and Bafumi
(2004), the function f linking Y and X is an inverse logistic CDF, though the authors
emphasize that their approach is generalizable to other specifications. Alternatively,
in the Random Forest model, f is a generic function; like other machine learning
techniques, this procedure allows an algorithm to “learn” the ideal representation
from the data. This functional flexibility is appealing, as it allows the researcher
to have a completely diffuse prior about the relationships in the data; it imposes no
assumptions about the form or distribution, but instead discovers the functional form
that best explains the relationship (Jones and Linder 2015). Moreover, while Park,
Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) and Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2014) need to include
interacted variables in their specification, the Random Forest identifies interactions
through natural experimentation with the data (Breiman and Cutler n.d.).
Furthermore, the parametric specification in the MRP literature fits a single model
to all fifty states, although the model is multilevel in nature. But this restriction im-
poses a single functional form on the preference relationship, while the partisan data
suggest a good deal of variance across states in how demographic inputs affect vote
choice. In other words, the MRP method not only assumes a particular functional
form for the joint distribution of the outcome and covariates (e.g. logit, probit), but
it also further imposes that the joint distribution the parametric model recovers is
homogeneous across all states, which is quite unrealistic. Consider the proportion of
CCES individuals who reported casting a ballot for Obama in 2012. In Vermont,
66% of all residents indicated doing so, and 67% of white residents; meanwhile, in
Louisiana, these numbers were 36% for all residents and only 21% for whites. A para-
metric regression on pooled data would control for other factors that could intervene,
but it would estimate a single parameter (or vector of parameters) that explain(s) the
relationship between race and preference. It is obvious from this example, though,
that race relates to vote choice heterogeneously across states. In my Random For-
8Recall that I am already using a parametric design in the turnout model, which itself has raised
concern in the literature, discussed in Chapter 2.
123
est model, alternatively, I disaggregate the individuals by state and begin with a
generic function f mapping demographic profile to preference space. This allows the
researcher to recover the proper functional form to describe the relationship between
demography and vote choice in each state.
5.5.4 Data and Execution
Nonetheless, the MRP literature offers a useful insight into measuring public opin-
ion: Demographic information can explain a good deal of the variation in political
preferences. As in Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) and Kastellec, Lax, and Philips
(2014), I model preference as a function of Age Bracket, Gender, Race, and Edu-
cation.9 I also add a variable for Employment Status to capture the individual’s
socio-economic background more fully. The MRP approach specifies a multilevel
model to incorporate state-level characteristics, since the typical paucity of data does
not allow the researcher to specify an individual-level model for each state. For my
purposes, the richness of the CCES does permit me to fit a separate model to the
sampled individuals in each state, so I rely on the following functional form:
Pref = f(AgeBracket,Gender,Race, Education, Employment |State).
Again, allowing the algorithm to discover a different functional representation for
every state allows demography to explain vote choice heterogeneously across states.
In the post-survey wave, the CCES asks all voters for whom they cast a ballot in
the presidential contest (variable “CC410a”), and all non-voters whom they preferred
(variable “CC410a nv”). I use both of these variables to create a categorical variable
P of presidential vote choice.10 Admittedly, these two variables admit measurement
9The authors of Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) only consider African American heritage; I
partition race slightly differently, described in the next subsection.
10In the pre-survey wave, there is a variable “V305c,” which asks individuals whom they prefer most
for President. This same question is asked of all respondents, whether or not they eventually
vote, so researchers could consider using this variable instead. On the other hand, in battleground
states, campaign activity is heightened in the weeks leading up to the election, so individuals in
the states we are most interested in analyzing may be subject to changing their minds between
the pre-survey wave and Election Day.
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error differently; while individuals who voted might recall their ballots imperfectly, or
be reluctant to share that information, non-voters are subject to other kinds of uncer-
tainty. By using information from both variables, however, I increase the statistical
power of the model. Candidate preference Pi is treated as an individual-level variable




i }. The basic
goal of my predictive model is to generate an empirical probability distribution that
is specific to an individual’s demographic profile and state of residence.
Individuals are partitioned into four different age groups: 18-25, 26-45, 46-65, and
66+. The CPS and CCES measure ethnicity slightly differently. The CCES allows
the individual to choose “Hispanic” when asked about race, but the CPS does not,
instead asking later whether the individual is of Hispanic heritage. If an individual
in the CPS indicates Hispanic heritage, I classify that individual as “Hispanic” (in
other words, this designation overrides the other racial categories). Otherwise, the
CPS creates finer partitions for race. Accordingly, I designate individuals as “White,”
“Black”, “Hispanic,” or “Other,” using the (broader) CCES partitions. Gender is a
binary variable, “Male” or “Female.” Education is an ordinal variable, with four
levels: “High School,” “Some College,” “College,” and “Postgraduate.” Employment
(the only variable the cited MRP literature did not include) is a categorical variable,
with three possible values: “Employed,” “Unemployed,” and “Not in Labor Force.”
I implement the procedure with the “randomForest” package in R (Liaw and
Wiener 2002; adapted from Breiman and Cutler’s Fortran code). Per the recommen-
dation of Kuhn and Johnson (2013), I create an ensemble of 1000 classification trees.
At each node of every classification tree, the Random Forest model chooses the opti-
mal split using two randomly-selected variables.11 I subdivide the data by state, and
the Random Forest model generates 1000 predictions of candidate preference for an
individual of arbitrary demographic background; the model assigns the individual to
whichever class receives the most votes among the individual trees.
I could use this approach to make an out-of-sample prediction, but doing so would
11The researcher can manually tweak the number of variables randomly selected, but Breiman (2001)
recommends the square root of the total number.
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disregard the probability that the model misclassifies the individual. To incorporate
this information, I take 500 bootstrap samples of the CCES dataset for each state; I
use these samples to estimate
P(Pref = Obama | prediction = Obama),
P(Pref = Romney | prediction = Obama),
and
P(Pref = Other | prediction = Obama),
and the analagous probabilities when the tree predicts “Romney” or “Other.”12 I av-
erage over these probabilities to generate an estimate of the multinomial distributions
{pOj , pRj , potj } for j ∈ {Obama, Romney, Other}, where the superscript indicates actual
preference and the subscript indicates the Random Forest’s predicted classification.13
Table 5.3 lists the estimated conditional distributions for each state.
I can use this information to make individual predictions about preference and
aggregate information about vote share. For each individual for whom the model
predicts candidate j, I generate 1000 realizations of her actual preference from the
empirically-generated multinomial distribution {p̂Oj , p̂Rj , p̂otj }. Then, for each of these
1000 iterations, I take the weighted average across all individuals in the state’s sample
to simulate that state’s vote share for candidate j, using the given survey weights.14
I do this for each state, using the electorates identified under each online registration
condition (Section 2).
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Figure 5.2: Simulated and Actual Vote Shares in the 2012 Presidential Elections
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5.6 Validity
Because I need to consider the accuracy of my out-of-sample predictions, I discuss
the validity of my Random Forest model. To gauge validity, I contrast the aggregate
results for both the CCES and CPS with actual election results, taken from the a re-
port issued by the Federal Elections Commission, available at http://www.fec.gov/
pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf. Figure 5.2 graphs the distributions of
predicted Obama vote share against the true results, and Table 5.4 delineates similar
information. In most cases, the model over-predicts the vote share for Obama, the
winner of the 2012 election.15 Graphically, this is represented by the point (indicating
the actual election result) lying outside the 95% confidence interval for simulated vote
share. If the point lies to the right of the interval(s), the simulations underestimate
Obama vote share and are biased in favor of Romney; if the point lies to the left, the
converse is true.
The vertical line in the graph illustrates the 50% threshold necessary for Obama
to secure victory (though a vote share less than 50% can still result in victory if
the total vote share for third-party candidates is sizable enough). If the distribution
intersects this line, the simulations suggest some uncertainty about the electoral out-
come. For the CCES, these states include Vermont, Maine, Oregon, New Mexico,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Nevada, New Hampshire, Iowa, Virginia, Ohio, Colorado,
Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Alaska, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Arkansas, West Virginia, and (surprisingly) Hawaii, the state with the
greatest electoral support for Obama.16 For the CPS, these states are New Mexico,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Iowa, Colorado, Georgia, Arizona, Mississippi, In-
12These probabilities are not always fully identified, given that in some bootstrap samples in some
states, the ensemble never predicts “Other.”
13Future work should incorporate additional uncertainty into the multinomial distribution using the
empirical CDF.
14It is important to note that the weights correspond to the residential population of each state,
rather than the population of voters, so there is likely some measurement error.
15This could be the result of psychological incentives to support the winner (see Atkeson 1999),
unrepresentative sampling or weighting by the survey instrument, biases in the Random Forest
model, or any combination of these factors.
16This could be due to the smaller sample of Hawaiians.
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diana, Texas, Tennessee. The narrower CPS regions reflect the larger sample size of
this survey.
Let us briefly consider the state-level biases in greater detail. One could also
raise a concern that the model overfits CCES data, despite the literature that claims
that Random Forest circumvents this issue (Breiman 2001; Hastie, Tibshirani, and
Friedman 2011; Kuhn and Johnson 2014). However, discrepancies in the CCES and
the CPS results could instead indicate different sampling biases in these surveys. Al-
though both are large and nationally-representative, selection into the survey sample
follows a different mechanism, so bias could arise. And again, the confidence inter-
vals for the CCES are typically far wider (probably due to the smaller sample size),
however, so the likelihood that the true vote share falls within the identified region
is greater. Only two distributions favored Romney unduly: Hawaii and Maine (CPS
only); Obama won each of these states. Meanwhile, many distributions over-predict
Obama with CPS data: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia; the dis-
tributions generated by CCES data favor Obama for a small subset of these states:
Indiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Although these distributions
are biased, the mean vote share still typically predicts the victor correctly. And across
all states, the average deviation from the actual result is approximately 2.95% for the
CCES estimates and 3.42% for the CPS estimates.
These results do pose concerns for a small subset of states. The model greatly over-
predicts Obama’s vote share in Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Texas, and Tennnessee,
though Romney won fairly handily in each of these states. Florida and Ohio warrant
particular mention, given the level of competitiveness in their elections. The mean
simulated vote share correctly predicts Obama for both datasets and both states,
though the CCES distribution indicates some uncertainty about the victory, and
the CPS slightly overestimates Obama’s vote share for Florida. The most egregious
concerns, however, are Indiana and North Carolina, two states that also featured
very competitive elections. For North Carolina, the CPS distribution does not even
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admit the possibility of a Romney victory. The results for Indiana are somewhat
less concerning, though still worth pointing out: Both surveys suggest considerable
uncertainty about the victor, but lean toward Obama, while Romney succeeded in
the actual election. A couple different explanations exist as to why the surveys’
simulated distributions could deviate from the actual results. First, it could be that
the relationship between preference and demography, or at least these particular
demographic variables, exhibits instability. Second, it is possible that the surveys’
sampling procedures accurately capture the overall population of these two states,
but not the population of individuals who voted in the 2012 election. Regardless, it
is encouraging to see that in most states, the model correctly recovers the winner,
and without a strong degree of bias.
5.7 Results
Table 5.5 presents the average simulated vote share for Obama, with and without on-
line registration. A positive number in the “Difference” column suggests that Obama
would (in expectation) gain vote share if the state introduced online registration, and
a negative suggests the opposite.
For all of these states, the actual margin of victory exceeds the expected increase
in vote share. Averaging across blue states, Obama (in expectation) gains 0.0% of
the vote; across red states, 0.12%. Returning to the original hypothesis, I specu-
lated that politicians would be hesitant to introduce policy that diminished their
probability of success in future elections, suggesting that the state would trend in
the direction of the party of the Governor who signed the requisite legislation. The
results are actually mixed. Of the states with Democratic Governors (at the time
the legislation passed), Obama is expected to gain vote share in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Missouri, New York, and West Virginia; and lose it in Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington. Of the states with Re-
publican Governors, Obama is expected to gain vote share in Georgia, Indiana, and
South Carolina; and lose it in Louisiana, Utah, and Virginia. In all of these cases, it
130
is important to remember that both the expected gains and the expected losses are
quite modest.
The Democratic candidate’s largest expected losses occur in Oklahoma (2012 re-
sults: 67% to 33%, Romney), Washington (56% to 41%, Obama), Alaska (55% to
41%, Romney), Arkansas (61% to 37%, Romney), and Hawaii (71% to 28%, Obama).
On the other hand, his largest expected gains occur in Nevada (52% to 46%, Obama),
Missouri (54% to 44%, Romney), Nebraska (60% to 38%, Romney), Indiana (54% to
44%, Romney), and North Carolina (50% to 48%, Romney). Of all of these, the only
competitive contest occurred in North Carolina, and even there, the margin of victory
exceeds the expected change. In the other competitive elections —Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia, Ohio, Colorado, and Florida —the outcome would still be preserved, according
to these results.
It is worthwhile to consider the most competitive elections in greater detail. Fig-
ure 5.3 plots the simulated Obama vote shares for electorates without and with the
availability of online registration, focusing on the six most competitive elections of
2012 (all with a margin of victory under 5%). These distributions support the hypoth-
esis that the partisan composition of the electorate would not change dramatically.
For each state, the distributions overlap, indicating that we cannot indicate a sta-
tistically significant difference. For all but Virginia, though, the distribution shifted
slightly in favor of Obama, so future research should continue to monitor these effects.
Notably, the model does not do an excellent job of predicting partisanship in North
Carolina, as discussed in Section 4 and evidenced by the bounds on the simulated
electorates; these results, therefore, should be viewed with some degree of skepticism.
In all cases, though, the estimated shift in distribution from this policy innovation
does not dramatically alter the partisan preferences of the electorate.
By and large, these results support the widespread conception that online regis-
tration is a bipartisan trend (PCEA 2014; Ponoroff 2010; Underhill, Hernandez, and
Hubler 2014). The distribution of Obama’s simulated vote share looks nearly similar
with and without the availability of online registration, and for every state. This
null finding regarding partisanship may help to alleviate concerns among detractors,
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Figure 5.3: Partisanship With and Without OR
although individuals concerned about fraud may still have some hesitancy (see Un-
derhill, Hernandez, and Hubler 2014). In Arizona and Washington, those who have
registered online have evaluated this system favorably, and a supermajority of those
who registered by more traditional means support this election procedure (Baretto
et al. 2010). Given this high level of popularity among registered voters, and the fi-
nancial and clerical advantages for election administration (PCEA 2014), states that
can invest the money to establish a safe and secure online infrastructure may want to
consider strongly this new form of convenience voting. As McDonald (2008) points
out, it is far easier to pass legislation that affects election administration if it is not
perceived to advantage one of the major parties over the other.
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion
My findings echo the speculations of earlier scholarship that convenience voting will
not dramatically shift the electorate toward one of the major parties (Rosenstone and
Wolfinger 1978; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Knack and
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White 2000; Brians and Grofman 2001; Highton 2004; McDonald 2008; Gronke et
al. 2008). Moreover, my state-level analysis reveals that the minimal gains that do
exist do not uniformly benefit one party in particular. Instead, the effect on vote
share depends on the particular characteristics of the members of the voting-eligible
population who are most sensitive to election law, and this group’s preferences vary
across states.
More broadly, this paper has important implications for research on other election
procedures (particular convenience voting procedures), other projects on political be-
havior that are constrained by the absence of ideological information in the CPS, and
(most generally) observational studies that require information from multiple surveys.
For the convenience voting literature, my proposed method is immediately applicable
to any project that can identify counterfactual electorates. Because full identification
of a causal effect requires at least one pre-treatment wave for every state that allows
a particular policy, this might require an extensive dataset for some of the older poli-
cies (such as EDR). But if the researcher is willing to admit some uncertainty and
use a partially-identified model, it is still readily possible to extrapolate the partisan
implications of EDR. This advancement can greatly benefit the convenience voting
literature, which has to date been mostly limited to questions about participation
and conjectures about partisan implications (Neiheisel and Burden 2012).
A natural next line of inquiry for research in this area exists in the contemporary
debate over voter identification laws. Although these identification policies are widely
discussed in the popular press, the scientific literature is relatively quiet about how
these laws affect turnout (Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2007, 2011), and to my knowl-
edge, even less about how they affect election results. This is an important question
for American elections, and certainly warrants further inquiry. In a recent blog ar-
ticle about this topic, the author laments that none of the scientific studies “sought
to measure how a decline in turnout [due to voter ID laws] could effect the Demo-
cratic and Republican candidates in particular, rather than the overall figure” (Silver
2012). To remedy this lacuna, he used some of the techniques employed in the con-
venience voting literature: He looked at the legislators who introduced these policies,
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changes in aggregate vote share, and demographic characteristics of the groups most
likely to be affected, which are self-admittedly “crude.” I believe that an individual-
level model would provide a superior approach, and the method that I advance in this
chapter for binary convenience voting treatments would only need slight modification.
The estimation of vote choice with the Random Forest approach and CCES data can
be combined with the Bayesian ordinal treatment model advanced in Alvarez, Bai-
ley, and Katz (2011) —rather than the Wolfinger-Rosenstone binary response model
—to simulate election results given different forms of voter identification policy. This
question is ripe for scientific inquiry, and the method that I advance in this paper is
readily applicable.
The Random Forest model of candidate preference that I generate is immediately
applicable to any CPS dataset, or other survey dataset that asks respondents about
their age, gender, race, education, and employment. Because the Random Forest
does not overfit, it is particularly useful for out-of-sample predictions (Breiman 2001).
The same procedure can impute an array of missing data that might be of interest
to researchers who bemoan the lack of political information in the CPS ; the CCES
also asks respondents about their ideology, religious backgrounds, attentiveness to the
news, and policy preferences, all of which relate to demography and might be valuable
inputs in a model of turnout. The Random Forest generates K classification trees,
and in so doing, naturally creates a measure that admits some uncertainty. I use the
empirical output of the Random Forest model to create a probability distribution for
a categorical variable, but researchers have some flexibility about how to utilize the
trees’ information. Another alternative could be a measure that is based on some
normalized scale of the potential outcomes. A discussion of all the ways a researcher
can extract information from the trees lies far beyond the scope of this investigation,
but it is worthwhile to note that the measurement approach that I employ in this
paper is only one of an entire menu of options.
And finally, in the broadest sense, the method that I advance is viable for any
project that needs to utilize information from multiple surveys, as long as the surveys
contain a common set of questions that predict the missing data with some accuracy.
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The Random Forest model can inform the researcher about data missing from a
particular survey by drawing this information from another source, and it avoids the
somewhat tenuous and controversial assumptions embedded within any parametric
approach. This procedure broadens the scope of analysis by allowing a researcher
to leverage information across datasets. Applied social science relies on data, and
researchers often have to adjust their research questions to accommodate the data
available. Many projects use observational data from pre-existing surveys, due to
funding limitations. By offering a procedure that liberates the researcher from being
limited to one particular dataset, the method that I propose broadens the set of
questions that researchers can address.
135
Table 5.3: Conditional Multinomial Distributions
Random Forest Prediction
Obama Romney Other
State P(Obama) P(Romney) P(Other) P(Obama) P(Romney) P(Other) P(Obama) P(Romney) P(Other)
AL 92 6 2 24 72 4 0 0 100
AK 80 20 0 20 77 3 0 0 100
AZ 73 23 4 34 63 3 0 0 100
AR 82 14 3 24 69 7 0 0 100
CA 65 30 5 35 61 4 NA NA NA
CO 70 28 2 31 65 4 0 0 100
CT 72 23 5 29 70 1 8 23 69
DE 80 19 1 25 71 4 0 0 100
FL 69 27 4 38 59 3 NA NA NA
GA 88 8 4 24 73 3 NA NA NA
HI 79 17 4 18 82 0 0 0 100
ID 80 20 0 28 66 6 0 0 100
IL 71 26 3 37 58 5 NA NA NA
IN 65 32 4 27 67 5 0 0 100
IA 64 32 4 28 67 5 0 0 100
KS 69 26 5 30 65 5 0 0 100
KY 69 28 3 34 61 5 0 0 100
LA 94 4 3 19 77 4 NA NA NA
ME 66 28 6 26 73 2 NA NA NA
MD 77 18 5 34 64 2 0 0 100
MA 67 29 4 32 63 5 NA NA NA
MI 65 30 5 34 62 4 0 0 100
MN 68 29 4 36 59 5 NA NA NA
MS 92 5 3 16 80 4 0 0 100
MO 73 22 5 35 61 4 0 0 100
MT 70 28 3 29 68 4 0 0 100
NE 72 22 5 32 66 2 0 0 100
NV 76 24 1 33 64 3 0 18 82
NH 65 31 5 31 67 2 0 0 100
NJ 60 38 2 51 47 2 NA NA NA
NM 65 28 7 29 67 4 0 0 100
NY 71 25 4 37 59 4 0 32 68
NC 80 18 3 31 65 4 0 0 100
ND 72 21 6 15 74 10 0 0 100
OH 67 30 4 34 62 4 0 0 100
OK 81 16 3 31 67 2 NA NA NA
OR 64 32 4 28 68 3 0 0 100
PA 67 29 4 35 60 6 0 0 100
RI 68 28 4 26 74 0 0 0 100
SC 83 12 5 24 71 5 0 0 100
SD 74 26 0 27 70 3 NA NA NA
TN 81 17 3 32 64 5 NA NA NA
TX 76 20 4 29 65 5 0 0 100
UT 81 14 5 28 66 6 0 0 100
VT 74 23 3 20 80 0 NA NA NA
VA 69 29 3 33 62 5 0 20 80
WA 64 32 4 30 65 5 0 0 100
WV 65 29 6 25 72 3 NA NA NA
WI 63 35 2 32 65 3 NA NA NA
WY 78 11 11 20 71 9 0 0 100
For each individual i in state j, the Random Forest model predicts how that individual voted; I identify the true probability that the
individual voted for Obama, Romney, or another candidate conditioned on that prediction. NA indicates that the Random Forest
never predicts a particular candidate.
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Table 5.4: Contrasting Simulated and Official Obama VS
CCES CPS 2012
State Mean Bounds Mean Bounds Official Results
AK 41 [31, 51] 46 [43, 49] 41
AL 40 [35, 46] 42 [39, 45] 38
AR 43 [37, 50] 40 [37, 44] 37
AZ 45 [41, 50] 49 [45, 53] 45
CA 59 [57, 62] 60 [58, 61] 60
CO 50 [45, 56] 53 [50, 55] 51
CT 58 [52, 64] 62 [60, 65] 58
DE 63 [54, 70] 68 [66, 71] 59
FL 52 [49, 55] 54 [52, 56] 50
GA 47 [44, 51] 51 [48, 53] 45
HI 58 [48, 69] 60 [57, 63] 71
IA 53 [47, 59] 53 [50, 55] 52
ID 33 [27, 40] 34 [31, 38] 33
IL 58 [54, 61] 60 [58, 62] 58
IN 51 [46, 56] 51 [48, 54] 44
KS 43 [37, 48] 42 [39, 45] 38
KY 46 [41, 52] 45 [42, 48] 38
LA 44 [39, 49] 45 [43, 48] 41
MA 61 [56, 66] 62 [59, 65] 61
MD 62 [58, 66] 63 [60, 65] 62
ME 52 [44, 60] 53 [50, 55] 56
MI 56 [52, 60] 55 [53, 57] 54
MN 53 [47, 57] 52 [50, 54] 53
MO 45 [41, 50] 47 [44, 49] 44
MS 42 [36, 48] 49 [47, 52] 44
MT 46 [37, 55] 44 [40, 47] 42
NC 53 [49, 56] 56 [54, 58] 48
NE 42 [36, 49] 44 [41, 47] 38
NH 54 [44, 63] 55 [53, 57] 52
NJ 56 [51, 60] 56 [53, 58] 58
NM 51 [43, 59] 53 [49, 57] 53
NV 51 [44, 57] 51 [48, 55] 52
NY 61 [58, 64] 63 [61, 65] 63
OH 53 [49, 56] 53 [51, 55] 51
OK 39 [32, 46] 41 [38, 45] 33
OR 55 [50, 60] 54 [51, 57] 54
PA 52 [48, 55] 51 [49, 53] 52
RI 58 [48, 67] 62 [59, 65] 63
SC 42 [36, 47] 46 [44, 49] 44
SD 37 [28, 49] 39 [36, 42] 40
TN 49 [44, 54] 48 [44, 51] 39
TX 46 [43, 49] 49 [47, 51] 41
UT 33 [27, 39] 32 [29, 35] 25
VA 53 [48, 57] 55 [52, 57] 51
VT 67 [54, 78] 69 [66, 72] 67
WA 55 [51, 59] 56 [53, 59] 56
WI 55 [50, 60] 54 [52, 57] 53
WV 45 [36, 54] 40 [37, 44] 36
WY 30 [20, 42] 25 [22, 28] 28
This table describes the distributions of simulated Obama vote share
generated by fitting the Random Forest model to the weighted CCES
and CPS datasets. The partisanship model is discussed in detail in
Section 3 of this chapter.
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Table 5.5: Average Obama Vote Share Without and With Online Reg-
istration
Blue States Red States
State No OR OR Difference State No OR OR Difference
NV 49.53 50.32 0.79 MO 45.02 45.56 0.54
IA 52.90 53.19 0.29 NE 42.77 43.28 0.51
OH 51.42 51.69 0.27 IN 49.40 49.81 0.41
MI 54.60 54.84 0.24 NC 54.25 54.63 0.38
IL 58.65 58.88 0.23 MS 45.22 45.58 0.36
DE 68.62 68.85 0.23 TN 43.08 43.44 0.36
CA 58.91 59.10 0.19 TX 45.49 45.85 0.36
FL 51.94 52.12 0.18 KY 43.82 44.14 0.32
PA 49.45 49.63 0.18 AZ 45.90 46.20 0.30
ME 52.53 52.69 0.16 GA 48.57 48.84 0.27
RI 61.96 62.10 0.14 WV 38.78 39.04 0.26
OR 53.73 53.86 0.13 KS 42.15 42.28 0.13
CO 52.66 52.78 0.12 UT 30.02 30.10 0.08
NJ 55.40 55.48 0.08 SC 44.95 45.01 0.06
WI 54.04 54.10 0.06 SD 38.92 38.94 0.02
MA 61.76 61.78 0.02 ID 33.46 33.43 -0.03
NY 61.90 61.92 0.02 LA 43.50 43.47 -0.03
MN 51.73 51.74 0.01 WY 25.37 25.31 -0.06
MD 62.42 62.41 -0.01 AL 41.30 41.18 -0.12
VA 53.62 53.60 -0.02 MT 44.80 44.68 -0.12
VT 69.67 69.64 -0.03 AR 39.59 39.40 -0.19
NH 54.30 54.25 -0.05 AK 44.93 44.56 -0.37
NM 52.17 52.12 -0.05 OK 41.24 40.67 -0.57
CT 61.32 61.22 -0.10
HI 57.49 57.32 -0.17
WA 56.31 55.95 -0.36
This table presents the average Obama vote share across simulations of turnout with
and without online registration. Identification of the electorate in each scenario is
described in Section 2 of this chapter, and the partisanship model is discussed in
Section 3. The final column presents the difference between the average vote share




Together, these chapters address questions that remain unresolved in the convenience
voting literature. Although this work offers further insight, additional scholarship
should continue to explore these issues.
Chapter 2 surveys a lingering methodological question of how to design research to
identify the relationships between policy and behavior. Although several prominent
papers have challenged the dominant statistical approach (particularly Keele and
Minozzi 2013 and Glynn and Quinn 2011), the current body of research has yet to offer
a convincing demonstration of its inappropriateness. Both of these papers execute
parametric regressions modeled after those of Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978), and
reject the estimands as unreasonably large in magnitude. Yet both of these papers
specify regressions that neglect important convariates and utilize only cross-sectional
data, which has already been shown to bias results (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006;
Leighley and Nagler 2014). The alternative methods that scholars have proposed,
such as natural experiments and non-parametric bounds, offer important supplements
to the binary response model. I conclude that the literature should take a holistic
approach and examine these questions through all of these lenses. Future work should
continue to examine the sensitivity of results to these designs and any alternative
methods that scholars discover.
Chapter 3 considers the impact of election policy, but narrows the focus to a par-
ticular subset of the electorate that has been underrepresented both at the polls and
in the literature. Individuals with disabilities vote at consistently low rates, but it is
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difficult to identify the precise relationship between disability status and participation
because of the mediating influence of confounders. To accommodate the imbalance
across observable across disabled and non-disabled populations, I execute three differ-
ent kinds of matching: propensity score, Mahalanobis distance, and genetic. Matching
typically reduces the magnitude of the affect of disability on participation, though
the direction and significance do not change. After accounting for interactive effects,
the impact of disability appears to be realized in relation to employment status, and
future research should continue to explore this characterization. Notably, the most
popular forms of convenience voting do not appear to remedy the disproportionate
representation, though they might have some small mobilizing affect. Additional
scholarship should continue to examine how individuals with disabilities participate
in elections, and how they respond to new technologies (Stewart 2011). The research
design should incorporate matching, or address possible confounders in some other
way. As the CPS offers additional cross sections of data, it will be interesting to
explore the stability of the point estimates in this work.
Chapter 4 returns to a more general focus in terms of population, but a narrower
focus on policy. The peer-reviewed literature has yet to describe how online voter reg-
istration impacts the electorate, and this silence is particularly glaring given its rising
popularity. My work offers insight into how this new form of convenience voting is
influencing registration and turnout behavior. Online voter registration is associated
with a small but statistically significant increase in participation at both stages, and
this finding is robust to many alternate specifications. Moreover, there is evidence
that its impact may become more pronounced over time, though its brief history
means that this relationship may be driven by one or two states that introduced it
first. One can use my results to benchmark how this particular form of convenience
voting compares to others, but it is important to interpret these estimates with care.
The dataset does not contain a full set of pre-treatment waves for the other policies,
so the causal impact is not fully identified. Nonetheless, my results suggest that
online registration may be one of the more successful electoral innovations, though
a substantial portion of the voting-eligible population will still abstain. As more
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states adopt this policy and additional electoral cross sections become available, it
will be worthwhile to investigate the impact more broadly. Furthermore, future work
should consider whether a binary treatment is the appropriate statistical strategy; a
heterogeneous treatment might be superior, or some other categorical representation.
And finally, Chapter 5 offers the most novel approach to scholarship on conve-
nience voting. Most studies have shied away from formally investigating the impact
of policy on the electorate’s partisan composition, due to data limitations of the CPS.
To circumvent this lack of data, I turn to the CCES, a large, nationally-representative
survey that asks about both demography and vote choice. I model vote choice as a
function of age, gender, race, and education using a Random Forest (Breiman 2001),
and I correct the model’s prediction by estimating the distribution of true vote choice
conditioned on model prediction.
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